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l)STRATEGIC RENEWAL IN REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS
HOW INTER- AND INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
FORCES INFLUENCE EUROPEAN INCUMBENT ENERGY FIRMS
How do incumbent firms strategically renew in regulatory environments? Assuming that
regulation can both constrain and enable a firm’s strategic renewal opportunities, we
inves tigate how and to what extent incumbent firms undertake exploitative and explorative
strategic renewal actions in order to remain competitive. Exploitative strategic renewal
involves those actions that strengthen or optimise a firm’s current resource deployments,
whereas explorative strategic renewal relates to actions that generate new sources of
value creation for the firm. Based on old institutional theory, new institutional theory,
neo-institutional theory and institutional entrepreneurship literature, a multi-level frame -
work that combines selection and adaptation arguments has been developed and applied
to investigate strategic renewal behaviour of a sample of European energy incumbents. At
industry level of analysis, results show how inter-organisational institutional forces signifi -
cantly impact firms’ choices of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions through
regulative, normative and cognitive forces. At organisational unit level of analysis, we
find that the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces is positively related to exploi -
tative strategic renewal actions. In addition, entrepreneurial proclivity appears to be a
catalyst of both exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions. Finally, our results
provide insights how environmental selection and firm level adaptation are interrelated in
the context of regulation. The extent of inter-organisational regulative forces positively
moderates the relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative
strategic renewal actions.
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 3 
1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
In the increasingly turbulent business environment of today, managers find themselves 
confronted with rapid and profound changes in macro social, economic, political and 
technological conditions. Although deregulation programmes have been introduced in 
many industries to keep pace with shifting macro environmental developments, regulation 
will continue to be an important tool to safeguard public policy goals (OECD 1997). This 
especially affects industries with a high ‘public-good’ character, like healthcare, public 
transportation and energy. The recent crisis in the global financial services industry 
provides evidence that the potential downsides of deregulation are more severe than one 
could possibly have imagined. 
Market regulation policy is based on the assumption that humans (or managers) 
are incapable or unwilling to understand the long-term consequences of their actions and 
that collective decision making will reduce that error to some extent. This thesis has its 
focus on strategic renewal actions in the context of regulatory policy. Most studies 
emphasise that regulatory environments constrain strategic renewal choices (Peteraf and 
Reed 2008) or limit managerial latitude of action (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987). 
Organisations incorporate institutional rules, which provide stability and legitimacy 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). From this perspective, the regulatory environment acts as an 
external selection mechanism that imposes constraints upon a firm’s strategic renewal 
actions (e.g. Beardsley, Bugrov and Enriquez 2005; Flier et al. 2001; Kim and Prescott 
2005). Complementary to this deterministic view, Peteraf and Reed (2008: 100) argue that 
“managers may be able to respond adaptively to the constrained conditions” and propose a 
more voluntaristic view of strategic renewal as an adaptive mechanism in regulatory 
environments. Assuming that strategic renewal in regulatory environments is both 
constrained and enabled, this thesis addresses the research problem of how and to what 
extent incumbent firms undertake strategic renewal actions in pursuit of a competitive 
advantage. 
18
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Research scope 
We will study strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms in the European energy 
industry. We specifically focus on incumbent firms that are active in electricity or gas. 
European energy incumbents were used to supply energy to customers in a monopolistic 
market for decades or even centuries. Since the implementation of European Union (EU) 
directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC, which heralded the start of a single European market 
for electricity and gas, respectively, the European energy industry has been confronted by 
major regulatory punctuations (e.g. Helm and Jenkinson 1998; Newbery 2004). In this 
context, incumbent firms – as opposed to new entrants – may suffer from the liability of 
oldness (Hensmans, Van den Bosch and Volberda 2001), meaning difficulties to adapt to 
changing regulatory circumstances.  
In the context of changing regulatory circumstances, many attributes can be 
distinguished to investigate a firm’s strategic responses. We exemplify three classifications 
that are widely debated in literature: external oriented versus autonomous strategic renewal 
actions, international versus domestic strategic renewal actions and exploitative versus 
explorative strategic renewal actions. First, it is of strategic importance of incumbent firms 
to decide on changing autonomously (e.g. Burgelman 1996) or in cooperation with outside 
partners (e.g. Dyer and Singh 1998). Second, should incumbent firms choose to expand 
internationally (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal 1995) or concentrate on the national market (e.g. 
Porter 1990)? Third, should firms strengthen their current resource configuration or core 
competencies (e.g. Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984) or develop dynamic capabilities (e.g. 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) that may lead to new ways of wealth generation? This 
relates to March’s (1991) notion of exploitation and exploration. As March (1991: 71) 
pointed out: “Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Exploitation includes such 
things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution”. 
Expansion into new markets, new product introductions and the creation of new businesses 
are typical examples of explorative strategic renewal actions, whereas optimisation, 
efficiency programs, and actions that increase the scale of existing businesses exemplify 
exploitative strategic renewal actions.  
19
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In this thesis, we focus on the concepts of exploitation and exploration to 
investigate incumbent firms’ strategic responses for two main considerations. First, 
although exploitation and exploration were originally presented in the context of 
organisational learning (March 1991), strategic management researchers have taken up the 
concepts to describe the content dimension of strategic renewal (e.g. Volberda, Baden-
Fuller and Van den Bosch 2001; Volberda et al. 2001b; Flier 2003). The other two 
classifications relate to the context dimension of strategic renewal (Flier 2003). In line 
with the research problem, the focus of this thesis is on the content dimension of strategic 
renewal, i.e. strategic renewal actions. Second, exploitation and exploration address 
performance issues. In the short run, exploitation optimises current performance, whereas 
exploration involves costs of experimentation and uncertainty about performance (March 
1991). In the long run, exploitation may be sub-optimal, whereas the gains of exploration 
may become beneficial (March 1991). This is also known as the exploration/exploitation 
trade-off (March 1991).   
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
To overcome the exploration/exploitation trade-off (March 1991), recent studies in 
strategic renewal stress that firms have to address exploration and exploitation 
simultaneously (e.g. Beckman 2006; Benner and Tushman 2003; Gupta, Smith and Shalley 
2006; Jansen et al. 2008; Lubatkin et al. 2006; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). The twin 
concepts of exploitation and exploration involve a number of complex variables and 
contingencies (Gupta et al. 2006). This thesis aims to address a number of variables and 
contingencies that constitute a firm’s strategic development path (Siggelkow 2002) of 
exploitation and exploration. More specifically, we build on the works of of Johnson, 
Melin and Whittington (2003), Mintzberg (1978), Siggelkow (2002), Van de Ven (1992) 
and Volberda et al. (2001a; 2001b) to analyse a firm’s strategic development path of 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions to align with or adapt to (changing) 
regulatory issues.  
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The research aim is explicated into the following main research question: 
 
In the context of regulatory environments, what factors influence an incumbent firm’s 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions over time? 
 
Three sets of sub-questions are specified to answer the main research question. First, we 
delve into contextual issues of regulatory environments and question how patterns of 
regulatory reform have diffused across European electricity and gas markets since the 
implementation of EU directives 96/92/EC (electricity) and 98/30/EC (gas). This gives rise 
to the first set of sub-questions: 
 
Q1a. Which characteristics are associated with regulatory environments?  
Q1b. At country level, how does regulatory reform diffuse across European energy 
markets? 
 
Based on the assumption that strategic renewal in regulatory environments is both 
constrained and enabled, strategic renewal actions can be investigated from a variety of 
strategic renewal perspectives that maintain either a selection or an adaptation argument 
(e.g. Aldrich 1999; Lewin and Volberda 1999; Volberda et al. 2001a). Selection 
perspectives are deterministic and claim that firms are constrained or relatively inert to 
renew themselves (Haveman, Russo and Meyer 2001). Following Lewin and Volberda 
(1999) and Volberda et al (2001a), population ecology, evolutionary theory, industrial 
organisation and resource based view are classified as selection perspectives. From a 
population ecology perspective, structural inertia limits the leeway in a firm’s strategic 
renewal actions (e.g. Hannan and Freeman 1984). Evolutionary theory stresses the 
proliferation of existing routines in a firm’s strategic renewal actions (e.g. Nelson and 
Winter 1982). Industrial organisation centres on the ‘structure-conduct-performance’ 
approach (e.g. Bain 1956; Mason 1957). Originally, this perspective explained strategy and 
performance as a result of industry structure: “the firm was stuck with the structure of its 
industry and had no latitude to alter the state of affairs” (Porter 1981: 613). Resource based 
21
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view emphasises the exploitation of existing core competencies in a firm’s strategic 
renewal activities (e.g. Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984).  
In general, selection perspectives provoke exploitative strategic renewal actions, 
i.e. actions that strengthen a firm’s current resource deployments and maintain congruence 
with a firm’s current path of institutionalised activities. In this respect, the concept of path 
dependency seems applicable. Garud and Karnoe (2001: 4) describe path dependency as: 
“a sequence of events constituting a self-reinforcing process that unfolds into one of 
several potential states”. Further, path dependency “characterizes specifically those 
historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or 
event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney 2000: 507). Selection 
perspectives differ in their unit of analysis. Most selection perspectives maintain an 
industry level of analysis in which firms are considered to be homogeneous entities (e.g. 
industrial organisation). However, some selection perspectives have a firm level of 
analysis and assume that resources are heterogeneously dispersed across firms (e.g. 
resource based view). This gives rise to the second set of sub-questions: 
 
Q2a. At industry level, which environmental determinants are related to firms’ exploitative 
strategic renewal actions? 
Q2b. At firm level, which internal factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards exploitative 
strategic renewal actions? 
 
Complementary to selection perspectives, adaptation perspectives are voluntaristic and 
claim that firms are less inert and able to renew (Haveman et al. 2001). Dynamic 
capabilities theory, behavioural theory, organisational learning and strategic choice theory 
are classified as adaptation perspectives (Volberda et al. 2001a). Dynamic capabilities 
theory emphasises renewal in a firm’s activity pattern over time. In addition to the resource 
based view, it is argued that firms need to adapt their core competencies over time in order 
to meet changing demands of the environment (e.g. Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece et 
al. 1997). Behavioural theory views strategic renewal as the allocation of organisational 
slack to new skills and capabilities (e.g. Cyert and March 1963). From an organisational 
learning perspective (e.g. Argyris and Schön 1978; Fiol and Lyles 1985), the ability to 
22
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learn, unlearn, and relearn allows organisations to reflect on their strategic renewal actions, 
which might in turn affect future strategic renewal actions. Finally, strategic choice 
theorists (e.g. Child 1997) emphasise managerial leeway in a firm’s strategic renewal 
choices.  
In general, adaptation perspectives constitute opportunities for explorative 
strategic renewal actions in addition to exploitative strategic renewal actions. Explorative 
strategic renewal actions generate new ways of wealth generation for the firm and involve 
a firm’s proclivity to deviate from its historical institutionalised pattern of activities. In this 
respect, the concepts of path independency or path creation (Garud and Karnoe 2001) 
seem applicable. As knowledgeable agents, managers meaningfully navigate the sequence 
of strategic renewal actions, rather than being passive observers within a stream of events 
(Garud and Karnoe 2001). Although adaptation perspectives generally maintain a firm 
level of analysis, adaptation may also result from weakening environmental selection 
pressures. Therefore, and similar to the second set of sub-questions, we will study 
antecedents of explorative strategic renewal actions at both an industry and a firm level of 
analysis. This gives rise to the third set of sub-questions: 
 
Q3a. At industry level, which environmental determinants are related to firms’ explorative 
strategic renewal actions? 
Q3b. At firm level, which internal factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards explorative 
strategic renewal actions? 
 
The research questions will be addressed from both a theoretical and an empirical point of 
view. Table 1.1 provides an overview how various chapters of this thesis relate to the 
research questions. Our research questions might suggest that strategic renewal actions are 
either environmentally or organisationally derived. However, we agree with Hrebiniak and 
Joyce (1985: 336) that: “… classifying renewal as either organizationally or 
environmentally determined is misleading and diverts research inquiry away from the 
critical interactive nature of organization-environment relationships in the adaptation 
process”. In addition to explaining strategic renewal actions either environmentally or 
organisationally, our theoretical framework is therefore also geared towards hypothesising 
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strategic renewal actions as a result of the interaction between internal and external 
organisational processes.  
 
Table 1.1: Overview of the research questions  
Research question Theoretical  
in chapter 
Empirical  
in chapter 
Q1a. Which characteristics are associated with regulatory 
environments? 
Q1b. At country level, how does regulatory reform diffuse across 
European energy markets? 
2 
 
 
 
7  
Q2a. At industry level, which environmental determinants are 
related to firms’ exploitative strategic renewal actions? 
Q2b. At firm level, which internal factors influence a firm’s 
proclivity towards exploitative strategic renewal actions? 
5  
 
5 
8  
 
9  
Q3a. At industry level, which environmental determinants are 
related to firms’ explorative strategic renewal actions? 
Q3b. At firm level, which internal factors influence a firm’s 
proclivity towards explorative strategic renewal actions? 
5 
 
5 
8  
 
9  
 
1.3 Multi-level institutional approach 
 
To address the research questions, an institutional theory lens is adopted for two main 
considerations. First, institutional theory is helpful to study the behaviour of organisations 
and its members in the context of regulatory processes (e.g. Scott 2001). More specifically, 
as regulatory environments can both constrain and enable managerial action (Peteraf and 
Reed 2008), institutional theory may explain “purposive action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006: 214).  
Second, institutional theory is adopted for its applicability to various levels of 
analysis. At society or country level, institutional theory is helpful to study macro level 
developments. Sectors or industries are the focal unit of analysis in meso level institutional 
studies. Micro level institutional studies adopt a firm (and its organisational members) unit 
of analysis. For example, Scott’s (2001) regulative pillar can be applied to study (1) 
24
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political processes in a society (e.g. Newbery 2004), (2) sector regulations (e.g. Beardsley 
et al. 2005) or (3) organisational rules, laws and sanctions (e.g. North 1990).  
Theorists commonly distinguish between old, new and neo institutionalism (e.g. 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; Greenwood and Hinings 1996). In addition, institutional 
entrepreneurship has emerged as a concept that has attracted increased attention in recent 
years (Garud, Hardy and Maguire 2007). Table 1.2 summarises the four streams of 
institutional theory according to strategic renewal potential and level of analysis. Intra-
organisational perspectives study institutional processes within firms (micro level), 
whereas inter-organisational perspectives study institutional processes that transcend 
`individual firms (meso and macro level). 
 
Table 1.2: Four institutional perspectives classified according to level of analysis and strategic 
renewal potential 
Level of analysis Strategic renewal potential 
 Low (constrained) Medium High (enabled) 
Mainly intra-
organisational 
Old institutional 
theory (e.g. DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991a) 
 Institutional 
entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Garud et al. 2007) 
Both intra- and inter-
organisational  
 Neo institutional 
theory (e.g. 
Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996) 
 
Mainly inter-
organisational 
New institutional 
theory  (e.g. Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell 
1991b) 
  
 
Old institutional theory studies institutional constraints at firm level: the organisation and 
its members (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). On the contrary, institutional entrepreneurship 
literature suggests more leeway for strategic renewal opportunities. Institutional 
entrepreneurship refers to: “activities of actors who have an interest in particular 
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
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transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004: 657). Although the concept 
of institutional entrepreneurship has been applied at various levels of analysis, Lounsbury 
and Crumley (2007: 993) argue that institutional entrepreneurship has “too often 
celebrated the actions of a single or small number of actors. We focus at the organisational 
unit level and try to deepen the understanding of how embedding agency in the intra-
organisational context provides a platform for unfolding entrepreneurial activities (Garud 
et al. 2007). New institutional theory focuses on the inter-organisational context (e.g. 
Meyer and Rowan 1977). Organisations are conceptualised as homogeneous entities 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991b) that respond similarly to institutional prescriptions. 
Strategic renewal is limited to being perceived legitimate by the outside world. Neo 
institutional theory emerged in reaction to old and new institutionalism and bridges these 
together (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Neo institutional theory, when elaborated, 
“provides a model of change that links organizational context and intra-organizational 
dynamics” (Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1023). Consequently, from a neo institutional 
theory perspective, the strategic renewal potential is considered to be medium. 
 
1.4 Research contributions 
 
Our research problem and questions (see paragraph 1.2) are framed from both a selection 
and an adaptation point of view. Although it has long been suggested that strategic renewal 
needs to be studied from selection and adaptation perspectives simultaneously (e.g. 
Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; Lewin and Volberda 1999), the number of empirical studies in 
which this indeed occurs is still limited. This may be explained by the fact that both views 
rely on different methodological assumptions (Burrell and Morgan 1979). In general, 
selection theories study strategic renewal at industry level, while adaptation theories study 
strategic renewal from a company level perspective. Within institutional theory, selection 
has recently become linked to adaptation in a number of instances. Examples are Peteraf 
and Reed (2008), Rodrigues and Child (2003) and Zietsma and Lawrence (2005) who 
study the possibility of strategic choice or active agency in institutionalised contexts. This 
study contributes to recent developments in institutional theory literature in which 
selection and adaptation arguments are combined. Building upon old institutionalism, new 
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institutionalism, neo institutionalism and institutional entrepreneurship literature, a multi-
level framework has been developed to study how various elements of a firm’s 
institutional context interact and influence the extent to which strategic renewal actions are 
either constrained or enabled. From this framework, we further distinguish three main 
contributions at different levels of analysis from both a theoretical and a 
methodological/empirical point of view (see table 1.3).  
First, at inter-organisational level of analysis, a framework will be developed to 
substantiate how the institutional regime constitutes of regulative, normative and cognitive 
elements that impact upon incumbent firms’ strategic renewal actions. Regimes are 
defined as: “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making 
procedures around with actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations” Krasner (1983: 2). Applying a document analysis procedure, we have created a 
database which contains 1127 strategic renewal actions of 13 European incumbent energy 
firms in the period 1999-2004. Contrary to a rational-actor approach – in which managers 
choose the best strategic action given the cost/benefit conditions at hand – our statistical 
findings clarify “what has meaning and what actions are possible” (Zucker 1983: 2). 
Further, while recent studies mainly focus on survey data to measure issues of exploitation 
and exploration (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda 
2006), our document analysis procedure allows for a complementary way of measuring 
exploitation and exploration. A major strength of this method is the use of 
contemporaneous reporting on the actual realisation of exploitation and exploration at 
strategic action level.  
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Table 1.3: Main theoretical and methodological/empirical contributions of the research at 
different levels of analysis 
Level of 
analysis  
Theoretical contribution based on 
developed framework and 
hypotheses 
Methodological/empirical 
contribution based on document 
analysis and survey research 
Inter-
organisational 
 
To new institutional theory: 
Inter-organisational institutional forces 
impact firms’ choices of exploitative 
and explorative strategic renewal 
actions through regulative, normative 
and cognitive forces.  
Based on document analysis:  
A strategic action pattern approach 
will be applied to measure the actual 
realisation of exploitation and 
exploration at strategic action level.  
   
Intra-
organisational 
To old institutional theory: 
The extent of intra-organisational 
regulative forces is positively related 
to exploitative strategic renewal 
actions. 
To institutional entrepreneurship:  
Institutional entrepreneurship is a 
catalyst of both exploitative and 
explorative strategic renewal actions. 
Based on survey research:  
A new survey scale will be developed 
and validated to measure the extent of 
intra-organisational regulative forces. 
 
Based on survey research:  
An existing survey scale will be 
adapted to measure the extent of 
institutional entrepreneurship at 
organisational unit level. 
   
Intra- and inter-
organisational 
To neo institutional theory: 
The extent of inter-organisational 
regulative forces positively moderates 
the relationship between intra-
organisational regulative forces and 
exploitative strategic renewal actions. 
Based on survey research:  
A new survey scale will be developed 
and validated to measure the extent of 
inter-organisational regulative forces. 
 
Second, at intra-organisational level of analysis, we argue that the extent of intra-
organisational regulative forces is positively related to exploitative strategic renewal. This 
contributes to the old institutional theory notion that strategic renewal actions are “… 
crystallized through the preservation of custom and precedent” (Selznick 1949: 182).  In 
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addition, from an institutional entrepreneurship perspective, we hypothesise a positive 
relationship between institutional entrepreneurship and both exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal actions. Freshly developed empirical insights contribute to recent 
literature in which the influence of managerial roles on the integration of exploitation and 
exploration is addressed (e.g. Jansen et al. 2008; Lubatkin et al. 2006). From a 
methodological/empirical point of view, our institutional entrepreneurship measure is 
inclined towards parameters that facilitate the embeddedness of entrepreneurship within an 
organisational unit. This diverts the attention away from the individual level of analysis, 
which is common in institutional entrepreneurship literature (Lounsbury and Crumley 
2007).   
Third, we bridge new institutionalism and old institutionalism by applying a neo 
institutional theory perspective (e.g. Greenwood and Hinings 1996). More specifically we 
provide insights how environmental selection and firm level adaptation are interrelated in 
the context of regulation. As the inter-organisational regulatory context provides 
institutional pressures for adopting a clearly legitimated organisational template 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996), we hypothesise that the higher the extent of inter-
organisational regulative forces will be, the greater the impact of intra-organisational 
regulative forces on exploitative strategic renewal. As appropriate scales for intra- and 
inter-organisational regulative forces are not available, we will take several steps to 
develop valid measures for these constructs. 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is structured into four parts and ten chapters (see figure 1.1). In the first part, 
the research is introduced (this chapter) and the main research concepts are elaborated 
upon. In the next chapter, we will define characteristics of regulatory environments and 
start exploring how regulatory reform can affect firms’ strategic choices of exploitation 
and exploration. In chapter 3, we will describe eight strategic renewal perspectives that are 
classified as either selection or adaptation. To conclude, we classify the four institutional 
theory perspectives according to their position in the selection-adaptation debate (e.g. 
Baum 1996). 
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 Figure 1.1: Thesis structure indicating main contents of the chapters  
  
1. Introduction 
Research problem, scope, 
questions and contributions 
 
 
2. Regulatory environments 
Regulation, regulatory reform 
and firm implications 
 
 3. Strategic renewal 
Selection and adaptation 
debate 
 
  
4. Institutional theory 
Review of four institutional 
perspectives 
 
 
 5. Theoretical framework 
Research model and 
hypotheses  
 
 
  
6. Research methodology 
Description of document 
analysis and survey design 
 
 
7. Country level findings 
European electricity and 
gas market statistics 
 
 8. Industry level findings 
Exploitation / exploration at 
strategic action level 
 
 9. Firm level findings 
Exploitation / exploration 
at organisational unit level 
 
  
10. Conclusion 
Discussion, limitations, 
contributions and conclusion 
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The second part of the thesis is geared towards building a multi-level institutional 
theoretical framework. First, we will extensively review the four institutional theory 
perspectives in chapter 4. Then, in chapter 5, we further refine our choice for institutional 
theory. The main variables of this thesis and relationships between these variables are 
specified. Two sets of hypotheses will be developed. The first set of hypotheses, at 
industry level, is developed from a new institutional theory perspective. The second set of 
hypotheses, at organisational unit level, builds upon old institutional theory, neo 
institutional theory and institutional entrepreneurship literature.  
In the third part, we describe our methodology and present the empirical findings. 
In chapter 6, the research design and data collection methods are described in detail. A 
document analysis will be conducted to address the first set of hypotheses and a survey has 
been designed to investigate the second set of hypotheses. Chapter 7 presents European 
electricity and gas market statistics. More specifically, we describe how patterns of 
regulatory reform diffuse across six Northwest European electricity and gas markets: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom (UK). In chapter 8, 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions from 13 European incumbent energy 
firms are presented and analysed, whereas chapter 9 has been reserved for empirical 
analyses at organisational unit level of two Dutch leading energy firms.  
In the final chapter, we will discuss our research findings at various levels of 
analysis. In addition, limitations of our study will be addressed and suggestions for future 
research are presented. Finally, implications for scholars and managers are presented and 
an overall conclusion will be drawn.  
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2 Characteristics of regulatory environments  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we address the first research question (1a) which characteristics are 
associated with regulatory environments. In paragraph 2.2, we define regulation, 
regulatory reform and deregulation and describe how these concepts relate to liberalisation 
and privatisation. Then, in paragraph 2.3 we list a number of variables that are of strategic 
importance to a firm and indicate how these differ across regulated and deregulated 
environments. In paragraph 2.4, we explore how incumbent firms strategically respond to 
regulatory reform. In the context of exploitative and explorative strategic actions, we 
review the findings of various empirical studies that focus on the relationship between 
regulatory reform and a firm’s strategic choices. Paragraph 2.5 concludes by emphasising 
that regulatory environments provide an interesting research setting to study strategic 
renewal actions. 
 
2.2 Regulation, regulatory reform and deregulation 
 
Regulation 
Regulation is a governmental tool to attain desirable public policy goals (OECD 1997). 
Mahon and Murray (1980: 124) define regulation as: “an administrative and legal process 
designed to insure that the public interest is represented and served by means other than 
market forces”. Mahon and Murray (1980) further differentiate between social and 
economic regulation. The main purpose of social regulation is to regulate non-economic 
activities, like health and safety, whereas economic regulation targets economic activities 
in a specific industry. Primary reasons for regulation are to limit excessive competition 
(Vietor 1989) and to promote stability within an industry (Kim and Prescott 2005). To this 
end, researchers highlight the importance of regulatory agencies or regulatory programmes 
to control the market (e.g. Mahon and Murray 1980). Such control takes the form of 
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market entry/exit control and price control (Vietor 1989; 1991; 1994; Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington 1995).  
 
Regulatory reform 
Many industries had been regulated for decades or even centuries. Although regulation 
will continue to be an important tool safeguard public policy goals, it can become an 
obstacle to achieve the purposes it was originally attended for (OECD 1997). This is 
especially the case in times of rapid and profound changes in macro social, economic and 
technological conditions (OECD 1997). The objective of regulatory reform, according to 
the OECD (1997: 5) is “… to improve efficiency of national economies and their ability to 
adapt to change and to remain competitive. Reform that sharpens competitive pressures 
provides powerful incentives for firms to become more efficient, innovative and 
competitive”. Issues of regulation and regulatory reform have been studied in various 
empirical settings, like railroads (e.g. Smith and Grimm 1987), financial services (e.g. 
Reger, Duhaime and Stimpert 1992), trucking (e.g. Silverman, Nickerson and Freeman 
1997) and airlines (e.g. Peteraf and Reed 2008; Walker, Madsen and Carini 2002). 
Amongst different types of regulatory reform, deregulation seems to have received most 
attention in research. Researchers often cite the OECD (1997: 6) to define deregulation: 
“Deregulation is a subset of regulatory reform and refers to complete or partial elimination 
of regulation in a sector to improve economic performance”.  
 
Deregulation  
Deregulation is easing or eliminating governmental control in three major areas: (1) a 
firm’s freedom of entry into a market, (2) its freedom within a market and (3) its 
profitability within the market (Emmons 2000). Put simply, deregulation can be 
characterised as the movement from a regulated to a deregulated environment (Mahon and 
Murray 1980). Like regulation, a general distinction can be made between social 
deregulation and economic deregulation (Mahon and Murray 1980; OECD 1999). Table 
2.1 provides an overview of regulation, regulatory reform and deregulation and illustrates 
how these concepts are interrelated.  
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Table 2.1: Illustrative descriptions of regulation, regulatory reform and deregulation 
Concept Description 
“Regulation is an administrative and legal process designed to insure that the 
public interest is represented and served by means other than market forces” 
(Mahon and Murray 1980: 124). 
Regulation 
 
“A fundamental objective of regulatory reform is to improve efficiency of 
national economies and their ability to adapt to change and to remain 
competitive. Reform that sharpens competitive pressures provides powerful 
incentives for firms to become more efficient, innovative and competitive” 
(OECD 1997: 5). 
Regulatory reform 
 
Deregulation “Deregulation is a subset of regulatory reform and refers to complete or 
partial elimination of regulation in a sector to improve economic 
performance” (OECD 1997: 6). 
 
 Important motives for deregulation are efficiency (Gentle 1996), freedom of customer 
choice and internationalisation (Geelhoed 1993). Researchers have been interested in 
economic deregulation and its impact on firms for more than two decades by now. In the 
early eighties, Mahon and Murray (1980) are one of the first to notice a rising trend of 
deregulation in the United States. Mitnick (1978) identifies four methods of deregulation 
from the viewpoint of the regulatory program or agency. First, catastrophic ending in 
which the regulatory program or agency ceases to exist on a specific date. Second, wind-
down concerns a gradual reduction in the level of activities by the agency. Third, stripping 
involves the termination of activities one by one. Fourth, disintegration is related to the 
split-up of the program or agency and the transfer of parts to new or other agencies.  
Authors commonly distinguish between scope and pace of deregulation. Scope 
relates to intensity (Reger et al. 1992) or degree at which regulations are relaxed (Kim and 
Prescott 2005) from an industry. Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the difference between 
high scope and low scope of deregulation. 
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Figure 2.1: The intensity or degree at which regulations are relaxed: low scope versus high 
scope of deregulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pace is associated with the speed at which regulations are removed from an industry (Kim 
and Prescott 2005; Reger et al. 1992; Spulber 1989). Kim and Prescott (2005) identify four 
forms of deregulation based on scope and pace. First, plodding deregulation in which both 
scope and pace are low. Second, piecemeal deregulation concerns low scope and high 
pace. Third, metamorphic deregulation is characterised as high scope and low pace. 
Fourth, frame-breaking deregulation is associated with high scope and high pace (see table 
2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Four types of deregulation  
Scope of deregulation Pace of deregulation 
 Low High 
Plodding deregulation 
(High predictability) 
Piecemeal deregulation 
(Medium predictability) 
Low 
  
High Metamorphic deregulation 
(Medium predictability) 
Frame-breaking deregulation 
(Low predictability) 
Source: Adapted from Kim and Prescott (2005) 
 
As frame-breaking deregulation is a one-off event that occurs at a specific date, this type 
of deregulation is associated with very low levels of predictability from the viewpoint of 
firms. On the other hand, plodding is a process that takes place gradually over time. This 
‘regulatory incrementalism’ (Reger et al. 1992) provides firms with a more favourable 
window to prepare themselves for deregulation. Metamorphic deregulation and piecemeal 
deregulation are positioned in between, resulting in medium levels of predictability. We 
Regulated Deregulated 
Regulated Deregulated 
 High scope 
 Low scope 
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acknowledge that deregulation of industries often needs new regulation or re-regulation – 
instead of less regulation – in order to assure fair competition or to safeguard public policy 
goals. This is referred to as the paradox of deregulation (Hancher and Van Damme 2000), 
which is illustrated in figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: The paradox of deregulation: new regulation or re-regulation 
 
 
 
 
Liberalisation and privatisation 
Deregulation is related to liberalisation and privatisation. Liberalisation implies opening up 
markets or economies for competition. Helm and Jenkinson (1998) provide a good 
overview of how competition has been introduced into telecom, gas, electricity, rail and 
water in the UK. Liberalisation has consequences for a firm’s strategic decision-making 
and success. For example, Toulan (2002) found that liberalisation increases incentives for 
firms to outsource. Further, while liberalisation allows a firm to enter new markets, and 
thus to increase its market share, it may also have a negative impact on firm success due to 
the threat of new entrants and increased rivalry among existing players (Porter 1980). 
Stiwenius (1985) described the disastrous consequences of airline liberalisation, which 
called for an entirely new corporate philosophy at SAS. In response to national 
announcements of deregulation and/or liberalisation, some firms are wholly or partly 
privatised. Privatisation is related to the sale of shares in a company by local, regional or 
national governments. The primary purpose of privatisation is to promote economic 
development (Zahra et al. 2000). Researchers have studied privatisation consequences in 
terms of financial and operational performance (Boubakri and Cosset 1998; D’Souza and 
Megginson 1999), organisational change (Newman 2000), entrepreneurial mindset 
(Johnson, Smith and Codling 2000) and first-mover advantages (Doh 2000).  
 
 
 
Regulated Deregulated 
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2.3 Characteristics of regulated and deregulated environments  
 
From the preceding discussion, it should become clear that regulation and deregulation are 
of strategic importance to a firm. Table 2.3 lists a number of strategic characteristics and 
indicates how these differ across regulated and deregulated environments.  
  
Table 2.3: Main characteristics of regulated and deregulated environments  
Variable Regulated environment Deregulated environment 
Number of actors  Few Many 
Governmental control Tight Reduced 
Management skills Political Strategic 
Competition Limited Increased 
External dependency Low High 
Main stakeholder Regulatory agency Customers and competitors 
Profit stream Steady Volatile 
Strategic opportunities Limited Increased 
Source: Adapted from Mahon and Murray (1980) 
 
Building upon Thompson’s (1967) concepts of domain and task environment, regulated 
environments have a clearly defined domain and task environment, with few external 
actors that try to influence the organisation (Mahon and Murray 1980). Moreover, as firms 
in a regulated environment are involved in a relationship with the regulatory program or 
agency, they have clearly developed skills in political bargaining and protection from 
competitive and market forces (Mahon and Murray 1980). The extent of competition is 
limited due too price controls and entry controls (e.g. Vietor 1994). Given these benefits, 
deregulation is a dramatic environmental event (Mahon and Murray 1981) in which 
managers become increasingly dependent upon resources and actors external to the firm 
(e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). More specifically: “The regulated firm has role 
arrangements with its competitors, the regulatory agency, state and federal legislatures and 
other elements. Deregulation disrupts these agreements. … The act of deregulation will 
involve the organization with new stakeholders, constituencies, and multiple bargaining 
situations as well. It will require the firm to deal more directly with its customers and 
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competitors than ever before” Mahon and Murray (1980: 131). Deregulation breaks down 
non-competitive practices of firms (McGahan and Kou 1995). Relaxing or abolishing entry 
controls and price controls may increase both rivalry among existing players and the threat 
of new entrants (Porter 1980). Consequently, competitors and customers become the most 
important stakeholders, not the regulatory agency (Mahon and Murray 1980). Profitability 
is also affected by deregulation. Although regulated environments guarantee a steady 
stream of profits, very high rates of return are difficult to achieve (Owen and Braeutigam 
1978). Deregulation may increase profit volatility over time. Finally, as the locus of 
strategic decision-making is at the managers of the firm and no longer at the regulatory 
agency (Smith and Watts 1992), deregulation may increase a firm’s set of strategic 
opportunities (Gaver and Gaver 1995). In the next paragraph, we will elaborate upon how 
regulatory reform affects a firm’s strategic responses.  
 
2.4 Regulatory reform and its impact on strategic choices 
 
It has long been recognised in strategic management literature that firms should maintain 
congruence with changing environmental conditions in order to remain competitive 
(Burton and Obel 2004; Thompson 1967; Volberda 1998). Bourgeois (1980) states that a 
change in domain definition should lead to corresponding changes in organisational 
actions. The impact of regulatory reform on a firm’s strategic responses has been studied 
in several empirical settings. More specifically, these studies question if firms changed 
strategy after key regulatory issues, and, in case they did, in what direction? In line with 
the research questions, the findings of these studies are interpreted in the context of 
exploitative and explorative choices (see table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4: Overview of representative studies that investigate if firms changed strategy after 
regulatory reform   
Authors Industry Interpreted finding in the context of 
exploitative and exploratory choices 
Smith and Grimm (1987) Railroad Increased focus on exploration 
Reger et al. (1992) Banking Decreased focus on exploration 
Silverman et al. (1997) Trucking Increased focus on exploitation 
Fox-Wolgramm et al. (1998) Banking Increased focus on exploitation 
Haveman et al. (2001) Thrifts Increased focus on exploration 
Walker et al. (2002) Airline No increased focus on exploration 
Peteraf and Reed (2008) Airline Increased focus on exploitation 
 
Smith and Grimm (1987) expected a firm to have different strategies before and after 
deregulation. Results of 27 railroad firms indicate that 15 railroads indeed changed 
strategy. Although not central to the study of Smith and Grimm (1987), a thorough 
analysis of their results indicates that 14 of the 15 changes involve an increase in 
organisational innovativeness (i.e. exploration), while only one change in strategy is 
associated with a decrease in organisational innovativeness. Reger et al. (1992) questioned 
if firms pursue riskier strategies under regulation or deregulation. Their findings from the 
U.S. banking industry suggest that deregulation is negatively associated with risk (i.e. 
exploration). Furthermore, Reger et al. (1992) found that product/market diversification is 
unaffected by deregulation. Analysing firm mortality in the U.S. trucking industry, 
Silverman et al. (1997) advise a multidisciplinary approach to ensure a firm’s survival 
after deregulation. At the beginning of deregulation, it appears that firms focus on 
optimising organisational characteristics along profit measures, efficient relationships with 
resource providers, and legitimacy (i.e. exploitation).  
Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt (1998) questioned if organisations respond 
differently to pressing institutional issues. In the context of a key regulatory issue, they 
compare a ‘defender bank’ and a ‘prospector bank’ adaptation. The defender bank shows a 
pattern of activity that resembles Greenwood and Hinings’ (1988) notion of aborted 
excursion, while the prospector bank fits with Greenwood and Hinings’ (1988) notion of 
reorientation. However, Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998) argue that this reorientation 
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remained within its current strategic orientation. Both change modes are therefore 
characterised as first-order change (i.e. exploitation). Haveman et al. (2001) study the 
impact of regulatory punctuations on activity/investments into new lines of business (i.e. 
exploration) in the savings and loan associations industry (thrifts). Findings show a 
significant positive effect: “Immediately after the regulatory punctuation, many thrifts 
decreased their reliance on residential mortgages, their traditional product, and 
simultaneously increased their investments in new lines of business” (Haveman et al. 
2001: 264). Walker et al. (2002) suggest that incumbents are forced to adapt their 
traditional practices, initiate new programmes and increase experimentation in order to 
attract and retain customers (i.e. exploration). However, findings from the deregulating 
airlines industry show that incumbents do not become more diverse as their markets 
become more competitive (Walker et al. 2002). Finally, Peteraf and Reed (2008) question 
– in the context of regulatory reform – how managerial choice can facilitate organisational 
adaptation and improve efficiency. Findings from the airline industry, using cost function 
estimation in both regulated and deregulated periods, point at costs reductions and 
increased efficiency (i.e. exploitation) under regulatory change. More specifically: “At a 
more microlevel, we found further evidence to suggest that managers employ choice 
within different choice domains in an adaptive and cost saving manner. Our findings 
suggest that they choose technologies that are specific to a particular set of operational 
variables and make efficiency enhancing adjustments” (Peteraf and Reed 2008: 110). 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have addressed research question (1a) which characteristics are 
associated with regulatory environments. We described regulatory environments along the 
concepts regulation, regulatory reform and deregulation, and illustrated how these relate to 
each other. In addition, the paradox of deregulation (Hancher and Van Damme 2000) was 
introduced to emphasise that industries often need new regulation or re-regulation – 
instead of less regulation – to assure fair competition. As will be shown in chapter 7, the 
paradox of deregulation is very applicable to the European energy industry. Regulatory 
environments entail many characteristics that are of strategic importance to a firm. The 
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issue of how regulatory reform affects a firm’s strategic choices was the focal point of 
interest in paragraph 2.4. Although Walker et al. (2002) found that regulatory reform does 
not affect a firm’s strategic responses, the majority of studies found empirical support that 
regulatory reform impacts firms’ choices of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal 
actions. Despite the fact that some types of strategic change are favoured over others, it is 
argued that firms that do take action will out-perform firms that do not take action in times 
of regulatory reform (Smith and Grimm 1987). In conclusion, regulatory environments 
provide an interesting research setting to study strategic renewal of incumbent firms. 
Strategic renewal will be described more extensively in the next chapter. In the remainder 
of this thesis, we will more precisely investigate how and to what extent various regulatory 
variables and contingencies relate to exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions.  
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3 Strategic renewal  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the main dependent variables of the study: strategy and strategic 
renewal. Over the last forty years, strategy has developed into a multi-dimensional 
construct in contemporary business literature. With the growing emergence of business 
firms, the concept of strategy gained momentum in a sociological and economic direction 
(e.g. Dobbin and Baum 2000). Sociological and economic approaches to strategy will be 
briefly reviewed in paragraph 3.2. In addition to strategy, we introduce strategic renewal as 
a more dynamic concept to better understand organisation-environment contingencies in 
paragraph 3.3. Further, we present four idealised strategic renewal journeys developed by 
Volberda et al. (2001a) to illustrate how our strategic renewal conceptualisation applies to 
incumbent firms. In paragraph 3.4, we depart from the classification of Volberda et al. 
(2001a) to describe eight single-lens perspectives. Four perspectives maintain a selection 
argument (i.e. population ecology, evolutionary theory, new institutional theory and 
resource based view), while the other four are classified as adaptation (i.e. dynamic 
capabilities theory, behavioural theory, organisational learning and strategic choice). 
Finally, institutional theory is brought forward to address the research problem and 
research questions. Institutional theory entails both selection and adaptation arguments.  
 
3.2 Sociological and economic approaches to strategy 
 
In this section, we build upon Dobbin and Baum (2000) in order to briefly describe 
sociological and economic contributions to strategy. Sociological approaches delve into 
issues of power, network structure and socially constructed reality, while economic 
approaches are geared towards theorising efficiency and profitability. 
Sociological approaches to strategy have their roots in the works of Marx (1894), 
Durkheim (1933) and Weber (1978). First, structural power theory has its breeding ground 
in the work of Marx (Dobbin and Baum 2000). Structural power theory suggests that the 
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structure, composition and influence of board members have an impact upon business 
strategy (e.g. Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Useem, 1984). Second, network theory emerged 
from Durkheim’s (1933) work of how networks produce social identity (Dobbin and Baum 
2000). It is further argued that network structure and position determine business success 
(e.g. Burt 1992; Palmer et al. 1995). Third, the sociological branch of institutional theory 
(e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966; DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; Meyer and Rowan 1977) 
builds on Weber’s (1978) notion of ‘verstehen’, the subjective meaning of action (Dobbin 
and Baum 2000). In this respect, “strategic decisions occur within an institutional context 
that defines what is ‘strategic’ and what is not” (Dobbin and Baum 2000: 11). 
Mainstream economics has initially ignored the role of strategy. From a 
microeconomic point of view, the firm “observes market prices and then makes efficient 
choices of output quantities. All firms are alike, having access to the same information and 
technology, and the decisions they make are rational and predictable, driven by cost and 
demand conditions” (Dobbin and Baum 2000: 6). However, subsequent economic 
approaches denote a more active role of strategy. First, industrial organisation emphasises 
the ‘structure-conduct-performance’ approach (e.g. Bain 1956; Mason 1957), which 
explains strategy and performance as a result of industry characteristics. Second, 
behavioural theory questions how firms make economic decisions (Cyert and March 1963; 
March and Simon 1958). Behavioural theory provides an explanation for strategy as the 
allocation of organisational slack to new skills and capabilities (e.g. Cyert and March 
1963). Third, transaction cost theory (e.g. Coase 1937; Williamson 1975) views 
organisations as an alternative to markets for the execution of transactions. As transactions 
will usually be executed at the lowest costs, they shift between markets and organisations 
(Coase 1937). This argument was adopted later by Williamson (1975) in his transaction 
cost theory approach. In this approach, there are three relevant dimensions of transactions 
that determine a make or buy decision: asset specificity, uncertainty/complexity and 
frequency. In addition, Williamson (1975) identifies relationship atmosphere as the fourth 
dimension, which refers to the sociological preference for governance structures that 
cannot be explained by efficiency (e.g. Douma and Schreuder 1992). This latter dimension 
links transaction cost theory with the sociological branch of institutional theory. 
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3.3 Strategy and strategic renewal  
 
Although we would like to provide an all-encompassing definition of strategy for 
analytical convenience, this seems very difficult. We refer to Elfring and Volberda (2001a: 
1) who argue that: “The choice of a definition and the application of specific strategic 
management techniques are greatly dependent on which paradigmatic schools of thought 
in strategic management one prefers”. Yet, if a broad definition of strategy is required, we 
refer to Johnson and Scholes’ (1997: 10) definition: “Strategy is the direction and scope of 
an organisation over the long term which achieves advantage for the organisation through 
its configuration of resources within a changing environment to meet the needs of markets 
and to fulfil stakeholder expectations”. Rather than coming up with (too) narrow 
definitions of strategy and strategic renewal, we prefer types or conceptualisations of 
strategy and strategic renewal.  
 
Strategy 
Mintzberg (1987) identifies five ways how the term strategy can be conceptualised: plan, 
ploy, pattern, position, and perspective. These strategy conceptualisations can be related to 
Mintzberg’s (1990) schools of thought (see table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Strategy conceptualisations and associated schools of thought 
Conceptualisation Description  Associated school of thought 
Plan Intended course of action Planning 
Ploy Plan to outwit competition Political  
Pattern Consistency in behaviour Learning 
Position Location in the environment Positioning  
Perspective Way of perceiving the world Cognitive 
Source: Adapted from Mintzberg (1987; 1990) 
 
First, plan recognises strategy as an intended course of action, which is developed 
consciously and purposefully. Second, ploy specifies strategy as a specific plan or 
manoeuvre to outwit competitor(s). Third, strategy can be conceptualised as a pattern in a 
stream of decisions (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). In this respect, strategy results from 
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consistency in behaviour, which has strong ties with the learning school. Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985) further distinguish between deliberate and emergent strategies. Deliberate 
strategies, like plans, are realised as intended. Emergent strategies are realised without any 
intention. Purely emergent strategies have potential for on-time adjustments to changing 
environmental circumstances, whereas deliberate strategies do not. Fourth, position views 
strategy as a means of locating the firm in the environment. Fifth, perspective describes 
strategy as a unique way of perceiving the world. Strategy is a cognition that exists in the 
minds of people.   
 Mintzberg’s (1987) strategy conceptualisations are rather static, i.e. there is little 
room for adaptation to environmental changes. The very nature of planning is static as it 
provides a ‘roadmap’ of how to go from A to B. In times of environmental change, the 
formulated strategy can no longer be realised as intended. Positioning calls for an effective 
fit between organisation and environment. However, as firms exploit and defend a niche 
location in the environment, this results in a rather static fit. In times of environmental 
change, fit should be analysed as a dynamic concept (e.g. Volberda 1998). Recognising 
strategy as a perspective, organisational responsiveness may be limited due to taken for 
granted assumptions and cognitive limitations of policy makers. Patterns are perhaps the 
least static conceptualisation of strategy. Miles and Snow (1978) identify three ideal 
strategy types that show a consistent pattern of organisational responses to environmental 
conditions: defenders, prospector and analyzers. Defenders exploit existing products and 
markets, which requires control and efficiency. Prospectors search for new products and 
new markets, which call for innovation and flexibility. Analyzers combine elements of 
both defenders and prospectors, which requires a balance of efficiency and flexibility. The 
appropriateness of each strategy is contingent upon the environment. The defender strategy 
is most appropriate in stable environments, whereas the prospector strategy is most 
appropriate in dynamic environments (Miles and Snow 1978).  
 
Strategic renewal 
In times of environmental change, one needs more dynamic conceptualisations of strategy 
that take changing environmental conditions into account. Strategic renewal has emerged 
as a concept to address more dynamic applications of the term strategy. Strategic renewal 
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might be viewed as organisational change in reaction to environmental change (Snow and 
Hambrick 1980). More specifically, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) refer to strategic 
renewal as a difference in form, quality or state over time in an organisation’s alignment 
with the environment. However, March (1981) notes that most changes in organisations 
are done in a relatively familiar way, which promotes organisational stability rather than 
organisational change. Strategic renewal really occurs when new solutions are applied 
(Snow and Hambrick 1980).  
Building on the works of of Johnson et al. (2003), Mintzberg (1978), Siggelkow 
(2002), Van de Ven (1992) and Volberda et al. (2001a; 2001b), we conceptualise strategic 
renewal as a firm’s strategic development path of exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal actions to align with or adapt to (changing) regulatory issues. Based on March’s 
(1991) notion of exploitation and exploration, exploitation involves familiar change, 
whereas exploration is associated with unfamiliar change. Related issues of exploitation 
and exploration in previous research (see table 3.2) are described in terms of, for example, 
inertia and stress (Huff, Huff and Thomas 1992), evolutionary and revolutionary change 
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1996), incremental learning and step-function learning (Helfat and 
Raubitschek 2000), institutionalised learning versus intuiting, interpreting and integrating 
(Crossan and Berdrow 2003), and alignment and adaptation (Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004).  
 
Table 3.2: Issues of exploitation and exploration in previous research  
Author(s) Describing familiar change versus unfamiliar change as: 
Ghemawat (1991) Commitment versus flexibility 
Huff et al. (1992) Inertia versus stress 
Mezias and Glynn (1993) Incremental convergence versus radical orientation 
Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) Evolutionary change versus revolutionary change  
Volberda (1998) Preservation versus change 
Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) Incremental learning versus step-function learning 
Crossan and Berdrow (2003) Institutionalised learning versus intuiting, interpreting, 
integrating  
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) Alignment versus adaptation 
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The framework developed by Volberda et al. (2001a) is useful to illustrate how our 
conceptualisation of strategic renewal applies to incumbent firms. Volberda et al. (2001a) 
identify four idealised strategic renewal journeys of multi-unit firms, each characterised by 
a different balance between exploitation and exploration (see figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1: Four idealised strategic renewal journeys  
 Top management PASSIVE 
with respect to environment 
 
Top management ACTIVE 
with respect to environment 
 
Frontline and middle 
management PASSIVE  
 
Emergent renewal 
“Following industry rules” 
 
 
Directed renewal 
“Adapting to industry rules” 
 
Frontline and middle 
management ACTIVE  
 
Facilitated renewal 
“Influencing industry rules” 
 
Transformational renewal 
“Changing industry rules” 
 
Source: Volberda et al. (2001a) 
 
The upper-left box illustrates the situation in which both top management and frontline- 
and middle management are passive regarding the environment, i.e. emergent renewal. In 
such a context, strategic renewal is limited to follow the rules of the industry. Emergent 
renewal has a strong bias towards exploitation (Volberda et al. 2001a). Top managers have 
a more active attitude to the environment and the balance between exploitation and 
exploration in the upper-right box. According to Volberda et al. (2001a: 165): “As a result 
of top-down strategy making, multi-unit firms make their strategy changes deliberately, 
adapting to changes in their competitive environment, with top management explicitly 
managing the balance of exploration and exploitation by bringing in new competencies to 
some units while using well-developed competencies in others”.  
The lower-left box illustrates the situation in which frontline- and middle 
management are active and top management passive regarding the environment, i.e. 
facilitated renewal. Top management’s role is defined as creating an internal selection 
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environment (Burgelman 1994) for promising strategic renewal initiatives that originate 
from lower levels of the organisation. Exploitative and explorative units are balanced in 
the facilitated renewal journey. Finally, the lower-right box exhibits the situation in which 
both top management and frontline- and middle management actively change industry 
rules, i.e. transformational renewal. This renewal journey is associated with significant 
unlearning and new ways of thinking (Volberda et al. 2001a). The transformational 
renewal journey is further characterised by an imbalance between exploitation and 
exploration as firms can move from extreme exploitation to extreme exploration and vice 
versa (Volberda et al. 2001a). Similar to the Miles and Snow (1978) typology, the 
appropriateness of each renewal type is contingent upon the environment. Emergent and 
directed renewal journeys are most appropriate in stable environments, whereas facilitated 
renewal and transformational renewal journeys are more appropriate in hypercompetitive 
environments (Volberda et al. 2001a). 
 
3.4 Selection and adaptation perspectives in strategic renewal 
 
Strategic renewal can be contemplated from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Lewin 
and Volberda (1999) summarise twelve paradigms that are derived from Sociology, 
Economics, and Strategy & Organisation Design. Sociology contains (1) population 
ecology and (2) institutional theory. From Economics, six dominant views can be added: 
(3) industrial organisation, (4) transaction cost economics, (5) behavioural theory, (6) 
evolutionary theory, (7) resource based view and (8) dynamic capabilities theory. Finally, 
theories in Strategy & Organisational Design complement the overview: (9) contingency 
theory, (10) strategic choice, (11) learning theory and (12) life cycle and punctuated 
equilibrium. Aldrich (1999) distinguishes six perspectives that indicate the extent to which 
organisations can and do renew. From an ecological perspective, firms are slow to renew 
due to structural inertia. On the other hand, firms are less inert from an interpretive, 
organisational learning, resource dependence, and transaction cost economics perspective. 
Finally, from an institutional perspective, firms only renew when they are forced to do so 
(Aldrich 1999). 
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In the remainder of this paragraph, we build upon the classification by Volberda 
et al. (2001a) to describe eight single-lens perspectives more in depth. These eight 
perspectives are classified by Volberda et al. (2001a) according to their view on strategic 
renewal, either selection or adaptation (see table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Selection and adaptation perspectives in strategic renewal 
Mainly selection Mainly adaptation 
Population ecology  Dynamic capabilities theory 
Evolutionary theory Behavioural theory 
[New] institutional theory (italics added) Learning theory 
Resource based view Strategic choice theory 
Source: Volberda et al. (2001a)  
 
Selection perspectives 
Selection theories are deterministic (Volberda et al. 2001a) and claim that firms are 
relatively inert in times of environmental change (e.g. Haveman et al. 2001). Yet, firms 
can renew from selection perspectives, but only in relatively familiar ways (i.e. 
exploitative strategic renewal). Volberda et al. (2001a) classify theories that view strategic 
renewal as mainly selection by the environment into four groups, namely population 
ecology, evolutionary theory, (new) institutional theory (italics added) and resource-based 
view. 
Population ecology views strategic renewal as a process of selection, variation 
and retention at population level (Hannan and Freeman 1977). Organisations have little or 
no impact on its adaptation with the environment. Organisations that attempt to renew 
themselves may even decrease their survival chances (Hannan and Freeman 1984). 
Population ecology rests on the assumption of structural inertia, which results from sunk 
costs in past investments, dominant logics, behavioural dispositions and decision heuristics 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Hannan and Freeman 1977; 1984). The environment favours 
organisational forms that are reliable, accountable and reproducible (Hannan and Freeman 
1984). Organisations that survive the selection process will in turn increase their level of 
structural inertia.  
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Nelson and Winter (1982) are the pioneers of evolutionary theory with their book 
An Evolutionary theory of Economic Change. Following Douma and Schreuder (1992), 
evolutionary theory shares a number of characteristics with population ecology: (1) a 
population level of analysis, (2) the importance of environmental selection, and (3) limited 
emphasis on organisational adaptability. Evolutionary theory differs from population 
ecology as it focuses on organisational routines, whereas organisational form is the main 
concept in population ecology. Nelson and Winter (1982) describe routines as the 
equivalent of biological genes. Routines are regular and predictable behaviour patterns of 
firms (Douma and Schreuder 1992). As organisational behaviour results from automatic 
behaviour programmes, routines explain why organisations are resistant to strategically 
renew themselves. Organisations can only change in a direction that is consistent with 
prior learning. However, the potential for strategic renewal increases when routines modify 
over time. Douma and Schreuder (1992) distinguish two explanations that account for a 
process of routine modification. First, the Lamarckian view emphasises that routines which 
are not used for some time may disappear, while routines that are frequently used can 
modify over time. Second, the Darwinian view describes small mutations in routines as 
cumulative selection, step by step, over a long period of time.  
[New] institutional theory questions why there is so much homogeneity of 
organisational forms and practices (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; 1991b; Greenwood 
and Hinings 1996; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Within new institutional theory, isomorphism 
is referred to a constraining process that forces firms to resemble other firms that face the 
same environmental conditions (Hawley 1968). DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 67) 
differentiate between: “(1) coercive is isomorphism that stems from political influence and 
the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to 
uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalisation”. From a 
new institutional theory perspective, strategic renewal is directed towards maintaining 
congruence with industry rules, norms and shared logics (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
At firm level, resource based view stresses the importance of resource 
heterogeneity, which bestows a firm’s competitive advantage. From this perspective, “the 
firm is seen as a bundle of tangible and intangible resources and tacit know-how that must 
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be identified, selected, developed and deployed to generate superior performance” (Elfring 
and Volberda 2001b: 263). We follow Sanchez (2001) to describe the development of the 
resource based view over time. In his view, the origins of the resource based view trace 
back to Penrose (1959). Her theory of growth of the firm predicts that the availability of 
slack resources forces managers to search for opportunities to expand the firm’s activities. 
Firms initially grow within the current product market domain, but later also into new 
product market domains. Wernerfelt (1984) introduced the notion of resource position 
barrier, which explains above average performance. A firm may exploit its resource 
position barrier through diversification. Resource heterogeneity and immobility underlie 
Barney’s (1991) explanation for sustainable competitive advantage. For a competitive 
advantage to be sustainable, resources must be imperfectly imitable, not substitutable, 
valuable and rare (Barney 1991). Of these four characteristics, imperfect imitation is 
analysed more in depth by Dierckx and Cool (1989). Time compression diseconomies, 
asset mass efficiencies, asset stock interconnectedness, and causal ambiguity prevent 
perfect imitation of a firm’s resource endowments by other firms (Dierckx and Cool 1989). 
Researchers have critisised the resource based view as, from this perspective, firms may 
lack the capacity to develop new resources quickly (Dierkx and Cool 1989). Resource 
endowments are sticky (Teece et al. 1997) and core competencies can turn into core 
rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992) or competence traps (Levinthal and March 1993) in times 
of environmental change. According to Teece et al. (1997: 514): “at least in the short run, 
firms are to some degree stuck with what they have and may have to live with what they 
lack”.  
 
Adaptation perspectives 
Complementary to selection perspectives in strategic renewal, adaptation perspectives are 
more voluntaristic and view strategic renewal as the intentional outcome of an 
organisation’s actions (Volberda et al. 2001a). Further, adaptation theories claim that firms 
can change in relatively unfamiliar ways (i.e. explorative strategic renewal) in addition to 
familiar change (i.e. exploitative strategic renewal). Adaptation perspectives are also 
classified into four groups by Volberda et al. (2001a), namely dynamic capabilities theory, 
behavioural theory, learning theory and strategic choice theory. 
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Dynamic capabilities theory is an extension of the resource based view and 
emphasises the dynamics of resource deployments within firms over time (Sanchez 2001). 
This perspective deepens the insights how firms reconsider their fit in times of 
environmental change (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Dynamic capabilities are referred to 
as a firm’s ability to renew and adapt its strategic assets over time (Teece et al. 1997). 
Strategic assets allow an organisation to earn economic rents and are defined as: “the set of 
difficult to trade and imitate scarce, appropriable, and specialized resources that bestow a 
firm’s competitive advantage” (Amit and Schoemaker 1993: 36). Managers have to predict 
ex ante what strategic assets a firm needs in the future. A firm’s organisational and 
managerial processes, in combination with its current resource position, result in natural 
trajectories along with strategic assets develop to create a competitive advantage in the 
nearby future (Teece et al. 1997). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) stress the role of 
organisational learning in the dynamic capabilities approach. Following Volberda et al. 
(2001a), we discuss organisational learning as distinct strategic renewal perspective.  
Behavioural theory questions how firms make economic decisions (Cyert and 
March 1963; March and Simon 1958). In their book A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, 
Cyert and March (1963) criticise the microeconomic maximisation assumption and suggest 
a more behavioural approach in (strategic) decision-making (Argote and Greve 2007). 
Behavioural theory views the firm as a coalition of participants, each with their own 
objectives that need to be satisfied (Douma and Schreuder 1992). Organisational slack 
results from the difference between total resources and total payments necessary to satisfy 
the objectives of participants. Organisational slack provokes search and change: 
“Problemistic search implies that organizational aspiration levels adapt to past experience 
of the focal organization and those of comparable organizations. Once organizational 
performance falls below the aspiration level, search for solutions will occur and 
organizational changes become more likely” (Argote and Greve 2007: 343).    
Learning theory argues that organisational learning is the driver of strategic 
renewal. Fiol and Lyles (1985) stress the importance of reflection, resulting from the 
relationship between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions. In 
this respect, firms have the ability to learn, unlearn, or relearn on the basis of past 
behaviour (Volberda 1998). In the context of learning, Hedberg (1981) considers 
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organisational-environmental fit as an adaptive-manipulative relationship. Many attributes 
can be distinguished to conceptualise a firm’s learning. We exemplify three attributes that 
relate exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. First, Argyris and Schön (1978) 
differentiate between single-loop and double-loop learning. Single loop learning is 
beneficial for continuity, consistency and stability (i.e. exploitation), while double loop 
learning facilitates monitoring and reflection of both the changing external environment 
and activities within the organisation (i.e. exploration). These two types of learning are 
complementary and ‘deutero’ learning entails balancing both forms (Argyris and Schön 
1978). Second, Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) identify incremental learning and step-
function learning. Incremental learning builds on a firm’s current knowledge base (i.e. 
exploitation), whereas step-function learning involves fundamental departures from a 
firm’s existing knowledge base (i.e. exploration). Third, Crossan, Lane and White (1999) 
differentiate between institutionalised learning, which relates to the occurrence of 
routinised actions, and integrating, interpreting and intuiting. Institutionalised learning is 
associated with issues of exploitation, whereas the latter three types of organisational 
learning can be characterised as exploration. 
Strategic choice theory views strategic renewal as a dynamic interaction between 
firms and their environments (Child 1997; Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; Miles and Snow 
1978). As opposed to most selection theories, Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) argue that 
managerial intentionality is the most important driving force of strategic renewal, not the 
industry. Furthermore, decision makers of firms may have diverging ambition levels and 
views on the future, which impacts strategic choices (Volberda et al. 2001a). Applying 
their framework of four idealised strategic renewal journeys to two Dutch financial 
incumbents, Volberda et al. (2001a) empirically illustrate the notion of strategic choice. 
Although embedded in the same institutional context, Rabobank tried to alter its renewal 
journey from directed to transformational, while ING changed its renewal journey from 
emergent to facilitated. Strategic choice theory emphasises managerial leeway in the 
choice of strategic renewal actions. Although companies are ill-advised to go for all 
attractive opportunities (Mahon and Murray 1980), the question for what strategic 
opportunities a firm should go remains mainly unanswered by strategic choice theorists. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter, we have classified strategic renewal as being driven by either 
environmental selection or processes of organisational adaptation. Lewin and Volberda 
(1999) argue that although the strategy field has benefited extensively from single-lens 
perspectives, they do not resolve the selection-adaptation debate (Baum 1996). 
Researchers, according to Lewin and Volberda (1999: 523), “should consider the joint 
outcomes of managerial adaptation and environmental selection instead of naïve selection 
or naïve adaptation”. Flier, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2003) combine various single-
lens perspectives to study the concurrent operating of selection and adaptation on strategic 
renewal. In addition, it can also be argued that most theories, in the most up to date 
iterations, illustrate elements of both selection and adaptation. 
In the remainder of this thesis, we combine selection and adaptation arguments to 
study strategic renewal in the context of regulatory environments. As has been argued in 
chapter 1, we adopt an institutional theory lens to address the research problem and 
research questions. Within institutional theory, various perspectives can be distinguished 
that illustrate elements of selection and adaptation (see table 3.4). Although institutional 
theory was classified under selection theories in table 3.3, it should be noted that Volberda 
et al. (2001a) primarily refer to new institutional theory. 
 
Table 3.4: Selection and adaptation perspectives in institutional theory  
Mainly selection Selection and adaptation Mainly adaptation 
Old institutional theory (e.g. 
Clark 1972; Selznick 1957)  
Neo institutional theory (e.g. 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996) 
Institutional entrepreneurship 
(e.g. Garud et al. 2007) 
 
New institutional theory (e.g. 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977) 
  
 
Both old and new institutionalisms are classified as selection, which indicates that strategic 
renewal is relatively constrained over time. Old institutional theory (e.g. Clark 1972; 
Selznick 1957) views constraints resulting from political tradeoffs and loyalties of 
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personnel tied to local communities (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). From a new 
institutional theory perspective (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1991b), organisations 
incorporate institutional rules, which provoke stability and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). These views will be complemented with a neo institutional perspective, which 
bridges old and new institutional theory (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). According to 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1023): “Neo institutional theory contains insights and 
suggestions that, when elaborated, provide a model of change that links organizational 
context and intraorganizational dynamics”. Consequently, we argue that neo institutional 
theory comprises both selection and adaptation arguments. Finally, institutional 
entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Garud et al. 2007) is characterised as the most adaptive 
perspective within institutional theory. From this perspective, actors can actively change 
the established institutional order. In the next chapter, we will more extensively review the 
four institutional perspectives according to their position in the selection-adaptation 
spectrum.  
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4 Literature review of institutional theory 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we will review institutional theory literature and emphasise its value in 
addressing the research problem and research questions. First, we address issues of 
fragmentation and integration when studying strategic renewal behaviour of firms in 
paragraph 4.2. Institutional theory is brought forward as a dominant research programme 
that partly overcomes the limitations when studying strategic renewal either too 
fragmented or too integrated. In paragraph 4.3, we build upon old and a new institutional 
theory to describe how the institutional context can act as a selection mechanism upon 
firms’ strategic renewal actions. Applying Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism 
(i.e. regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive) at both intra-organisational (micro) and 
inter-organisational (meso and macro) levels of analysis, this results in nine institutional 
forces through which “certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for 
granted” (Zucker 1983: 2). Complementary to institutional selection mechanisms, we 
introduce the concept of deinstitutionalisation in paragraph 4.4. Deinstitutionalisation 
suggests that institutional arrangements are less taken for granted than most institutional 
theorists would suggest (Oliver 1992). In this context, neo institutional theory and 
institutional entrepreneurship literature are considered helpful to describe institutional 
adaptation mechanisms. To conclude, we address the applicability of each institutional 
perspective in analysing a firm’s strategic development path of exploitative and 
explorative strategic renewal actions.  
 
4.2 The development of institutional theory over time 
 
Volberda and Elfring (2001) review the degree of fragmentation and plurality in strategic 
management. Perhaps, there is less disagreement among strategic management theories 
than there appears to be. For example, both evolutionary theory (e.g. Nelson and Winter 
1982) and dynamic capabilities theory (e.g. Teece et al. 1997) view strategic renewal as a 
58
 44
natural trajectory of skill development over time. Nevertheless, Camerer (1985: 5) pointed 
out: “Theories are ambiguous, untested and tend to replace other theories with little 
apparent progress”. Camerer (1985) is unhappy with fragmentation and pleads for a 
disciplined methodological hypo-deductive approach in strategic management. Such 
methodological monism is central in positivistic research. On the contrary, postmodernists 
celebrate fragmentation and competition between schools of thought, despite their 
differences in methodological criteria (Mahoney 1993).  
Neither positivism nor postmodernism can be as versatile as dominant research 
programmes (Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1970; Teece 1990). On the one hand, positivistic 
methodological monism is sub-optimal as the field of strategic management is built upon 
many base-disciplines, such as Sociology, Economics, Anthropology, Psychology and 
Biology (e.g. Mintzberg 1990). On the other hand, postmodernism causes fragmentation 
and relativism. Such methodological pluralism is also sub-optimal as the accumulation of 
knowledge is hampered over time. In this respect, Teece (1990: 3) argues: “Until there is a 
framework and some accepted core of theoretical ideas, the field cannot be cumulatively. 
One cannot have meaningful exchanges in any field until there is some agreement on 
terminology, assumptions, causal structure and recognition of where different approaches 
may be applicable”. Analogous to the development of a dominant research programme, the 
development of institutional theory over time is clearly evident in the field (see table 4.1). 
Nevertheless, the institutional approach, according to Tolbert and Zucker (1999: 179) “has 
yet to become institutionalized”.  
 
Table 4.1: The development of institutional theory over time  
Institutional perspective Period Key author(s) 
Old institutional theory 1950s Selznick (1949; 1957) 
New institutional theory 1970s Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
Neo institutional theory 1990s Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
Institutional entrepreneurship 2000- Maguire et al. (2004) 
 
Institutional theory has its roots in classical or old institutional theory (e.g. Clark 1972; 
Selznick 1949; 1957), which studies bureaucracy at firm level. In the 1970s, the attention 
shifted away from the firm to the broader institutional context at industry level (e.g. Meyer 
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and Rowan 1977). These views were complemented with a neo institutional perspective, 
which bridges elements of both old and new institutional theory. As Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996: 1023) point out: “It is the convergence around multiple themes, the coming 
together of the old and the new institutionalism that we label neo institutionalism”. 
Nowadays, institutional entrepreneurship literature increasingly attracts the attention of 
institutional theorists. Institutional entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Garud et al. 2007; 
Maguire et al. 2004) has its focus on actors that break through or even change the 
established institutional order.  
 
4.3 Institutional selection mechanisms 
 
This section centres on the question of why a firm’s embeddedness in its institutional 
context is a basic reason for a firm’s resistance to change (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
Selznick (1992: 232) points out that institutionalism imposes constraints on firms by 
“making it hostage of its own history”. Or as Rodrigues and Child (2003: 2142) describe: 
“The embeddedness of companies in a highly institutionalized tradition will augment the 
extent to which their development is historically dependent”. We draw upon old and new 
institutional theory perspectives to describe institutional constraints at three levels of 
analysis. First, we address institutionalisation processes at firm level (micro level). Then, 
the impact of industry context (meso level) on firm behaviour is discussed. Finally, we 
focus on a firm’s embeddedness in its broader society at country level (macro level).  
At each level, we apply Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism. The first 
pillar concerns regulative forces like rules, laws and sanctions that exert coercive power 
upon strategic renewal. The second pillar regards normative forces and includes values and 
norms that influence strategic renewal. The third pillar comprises cultural-cognitive forces 
that highlight shared conceptions and a common frame of reference for strategic renewal. 
Applying Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism, at three levels, results in nine 
forces that constrain strategic renewal of firms (see table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Key examples of how institutional forces can constrain strategic renewal of 
incumbent firms at micro, meso and macro level  
Institutional pillar Intra-organisational 
level of analysis 
Inter-organisational 
level of analysis 
 Micro level 
constraints  
Meso level  
constraints  
Macro level 
constraints  
Regulative forces: 
rules, laws and 
sanctions 
Organisational rules 
and procedures (e.g. 
Wicks 2001) 
Sector regulations 
(e.g. Beardsley et al. 
2005) 
Political processes in 
a society (e.g. 
Newbery 2004)  
    
Normative forces: 
values and norms 
 
Social obligations 
(e.g. March and Olsen 
1989)  
Professionalisation 
(e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991b) 
Professionalisation 
(e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991b) 
    
Cultural-cognitive 
forces: shared 
conceptions 
Cognitive frames (e.g. 
Kaplan and 
Henderson 2005) 
Bandwagon pressures 
(e.g. Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf 1993) 
National culture (e.g. 
Hofstede 1985) 
Source: Adapted from Scott (2001)  
 
Micro level constraints  
Old institutional theory studies bureaucracy at firm level: the organisation and its 
members. It is predominantly political in its analysis of organisational behaviour, focusing 
on the question of how institutions exert a powerful influence over the ways in which 
people can formulate their desires and work to attain them (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). 
Issues of influence, coalitions, competing values, power, and informal structures play a 
pivotal role in organisational analysis (Clark 1972; Selznick 1957). Old institutionalism 
emphasises stability of organisational arrangements rather than change (Tolbert 1985; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Old institutionalism comprises an internal selection argument 
and claims that firms will undertake those strategic renewal actions that are legitimate 
within the prevailing organisational archetype (Greenwood and Hinings 1993).  
Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism are applied at firm level to discuss 
how intra-organisational institutional forces influence an individual firm’s strategic 
renewal actions. First, the regulative pillar can exert coercive power on strategic renewal 
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actions through organisational rules and procedures (e.g. Wicks 2001). Second, the 
normative pillar influences strategic renewal actions through the social obligations of 
organisational members (e.g. March and Olsen 1989). Third, the cognitive pillar highlights 
the impact of shared sense making (e.g. Berger and Luckman 1966) and the embeddedness 
of cognitive frames (e.g. Kaplan and Henderson 2005) on strategic renewal actions.  
In the context of micro regulative forces, organisational members may feel 
constrained by organisational structures and procedures (Scott 1987). The hallmark of 
micro regulative forces is in the presence of rules, laws and sanctions (Wicks 2001) that 
regulate and control the behaviour of organisational members. Elsbach (2002) argues that 
managers are often charged with protocols to improve the accuracy and efficiency of 
organisational members. Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that organisations often function 
according to their formal blueprints. Following Greenwood and Hinings (1993), 
organisations will undertake those strategic renewal actions that are legitimate within the 
organisational archetype. 
 Regarding micro normative forces, institutionalised values and norms (Scott 
2001) may constrain strategic renewal. Whereas micro regulative forces mainly deal with 
written rules, micro normative forces are associated with unwritten rules. Unwritten rules 
are shaped by occupational culture and discipline dominance (Volberda 1998). Regarding 
occupational culture, organisational members are expected to fulfill particular social 
obligations (March and Olsen 1989). Such expectations are shaped at school or university 
and further reinforced by meetings, courses and events of occupational associations 
(Volberda 1998). Vermeulen, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2007) argue that these 
expectations are often perceived as pressures to which one must conform. Discipline 
dominance relates to the extent to which unwritten rules are dominated by the values and 
norms of a certain discipline or profession (Volberda 1998). Discipline dominance bestows 
a firm’s core capabilities or core competencies (Leonard-Barton 1992). For example, it is 
very common that organisations are predominantly made up of engineers, marketeers or 
lawyers. However, the downside of discipline dominance is a lack of non-dominant 
disciplines (Leonard-Barton 1992), which can have inhibiting effects on strategic renewal 
actions.  
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 Micro cognitive forces include shared sense making, which results from the 
interaction between organisational members (Scott 2001). Micro cognitive forces are often 
referred to as a set of beliefs and assumptions that are taken for granted throughout the 
organisation (e.g. Schein 1985). As environmental stimuli are interpreted collectively, this 
results in a socially constructed reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966). When organisational 
members work together for a long period of time, they tend to support the existing strategy 
(Katz 1982). At the level of organisational managers, cognitive forces can be understood 
as common industry recipe (Spender 1989) or dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). 
The longer the dominant logic is in place, the more difficult it is to unlearn (Bettis and 
Prahalad 1995). Cognitive theorists further stress the role of cognitive frames (e.g. Kaplan 
and Henderson 2005). In this respect, routines are followed as these are the taken for 
granted way of how things are done (Scott 2001). The deeper cognitive frames are 
embedded, the less likely firms will change (Kaplan and Henderson 2005). 
 Combined, the micro institutional forces cause firms to undertake those strategic 
renewal actions that fit with regulatory (i.e. organisational rules and procedures), 
normative, (i.e. social expectations) and cognitive (i.e. cognitive frames) pressures, which 
collectively constitute its micro institutional context. 
 
Meso level constraints  
New institutional theory has an organisational field level of analysis. An organisational 
field is defined as: “… a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 64). Organisational fields are often 
coterminous with the boundaries of industries (Scott and Meyer 1991). New 
institutionalism has a predominantly sociological flavour in organisational analysis 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991a) and centres on the question of why there is so much 
homogeneity of organisational forms and practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). In this 
respect, isomorphism is referred to as a process that forces firms to resemble other firms 
that face the same environmental conditions (Hawley 1968). Quite similar to Scott’s 
(2001) pillars of institutionalism, DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 67) differentiate between: 
“(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of 
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legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 
(3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalisation”. New institutionalism 
comprises an external selection argument and claims that firms undertake those strategic 
actions that are legitimate with the prevailing institutional template (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1993) at industry level.  
We now apply Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism at organisational 
field level to illustrate how inter-organisational institutional forces impact upon industry 
firms’ strategic actions collectively. The first pillar concerns regulative forces like rules, 
laws and sanctions that can exert coercive power on strategic renewal actions through 
sector regulations (e.g. Beardsley et al. 2005). The second pillar regards normative forces 
that influence strategic renewal actions through values and expectations at industry level 
(e.g. Vermeulen et al. 2007). The third pillar comprises cognitive forces highlighting the 
impact of bandwagon pressures on strategic renewal actions (e.g. Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf 1993).  
Meso regulative forces are associated with specific industry regulations. The 
impact of regulation and regulators is evident in many industries: “regulatory policy 
increasingly shapes the structure and conduct of industries and sets in motion major shifts 
in economic value” Beardsley et al. (2005: 93). Various authors illustrate how sector 
regulations constrain strategic decision-making. DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) argue that 
many aspects of firm behaviour and structure are affected by the existence of a common 
legal environment. Flier et al. (2001) make note of the numerous institutional and 
regulatory limitations on domestic, cross-border and cross-sector activities of European 
financial service firms until the mid-1990s. Kim and Prescott (2005: 415) phrase the 
constraining effect of regulation as: “subsidized monitoring and disciplining through the 
implementation of laws and the policies of government agencies”. Mahon and Murray 
(1980) emphasise the important role that regulatory agencies assume. Walsh and Steward 
(1990) maintain that control of regulatory agencies substitutes internal governance 
mechanisms that would otherwise discipline managers.  
In the context of meso normative forces, the ruling values and beliefs in an 
organisational field influence the manner in which firms operate. Meso normative forces 
relate to professionalisation in an organisational field through normative isomorphism 
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(DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 71): “One important mechanism for encouraging normative 
isomorphism is the filtering of personnel. Within many organizational fields, filtering 
occurs through the hiring of individuals from firms within the same industry; through the 
recruitment of fast-track staff from a narrow range of training institutions; through 
common promotion practices, such as always hiring top executives from financial or legal 
departments; and from skill level requirements for particular jobs”.  
 Meso cognitive forces imply that firms model their organisation after similar 
organisations in the same field that they perceive to be successful or legitimate (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991b). This process of homogenisation is also referred to as mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). Innovation diffusion literature (e.g. O’Neill 
Pounder and Buchholz 1998) and – more specifically – the bandwagon phenomenon 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993) are helpful to explain mimetic behaviour. Bandwagons 
come into existence because of the sheer number of firms that already adopted a certain 
strategy, not the strategy’s efficiency or return (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993). 
 Combined, the meso institutional forces cause firms to undertake strategic 
renewal actions that are legitimate within the prevailing organisational field. As all firms 
in a particular field are exposed to the same developments, it is argued that this triggers a 
process of homogenisation (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). Furthermore, in line with 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996), it can be argued that strategic renewal actions may vary 
across organisational fields because of differences in meso institutional templates. 
 
Macro level constraints 
Although researchers have applied new institutional theory predominantly at 
organisational field level of analysis, we consider it helpful to describe institutionalisation 
processes at country or society level as well. Similar to the descriptions at micro and meso 
level, we apply Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism at country level to deepen 
our insights how macro institutional forces influence country firms’ strategic actions 
collectively. The first pillar concerns macro regulative forces like rules, laws and sanctions 
that exert coercive power on strategic renewal actions through political processes in a 
society (e.g. Newbery 2004). The second pillar regards macro normative forces that have 
an impact on strategic renewal actions through professionalisation (e.g. DiMaggio and 
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Powell 1991b). The third pillar comprises macro cognitive forces highlighting the impact 
of national culture on strategic renewal actions (e.g. Hofstede 1985).  
Macro regulative forces describe political processes in a society. A firm’s legal 
environment induces a firm’s strategic renewal activities with country-specific elements. 
For instance, the Single European Act, proposed by the European Commission to create a 
single market for financial services, telecommunications, transport, electricity and gas, 
resulted in major differences across EU countries. Britain, Spain and the Scandinavian 
countries embraced the programme with enthusiasm, but others were more cautious 
(Newbery 2004). Especially French companies could benefit from a largely protected 
home market and access to relatively cheap state-guaranteed finance (Newbery 2004).  
 Macro normative forces are associated with professionalisation of managers and 
workers (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) describe 
professionalisation in the context of organisational fields. However, we argue that issues of 
professionalisation can be applied at country level as well. At country level, formal 
education systems (e.g. universities and business schools) and professional networks (e.g. 
trade associations) that span organisational fields can be important drivers of macro level 
professionalisation, which shape organisational norms and values among (future) managers 
and their staff (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). In addition, hiring expertise from a narrow 
range of strategy consulting firms tends to make managers view business problems in a 
highly similar way. This especially goes for consulting firms that fulfil a competence 
leveraging role and act as a ‘knowledge broker’ among their client base (Van den Bosch, 
Baaij and Volberda 2005).  
 Macro cognitive forces have an impact on strategic renewal actions through 
formal and informal pressures that are exerted upon firms by cultural expectations of a 
society (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). This fits with Hofstede’s (1985) notion that 
organisational value systems are influenced by national value systems. The founders of an 
organisation or its board members are also “children of a national culture” (Hofstede 1980: 
349). Strategic renewal actions may therefore be influenced by Hofstede’s (1980) five 
dimensions of national culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity versus 
femininity, individualism versus collectivism, and long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation. 
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 Combined, the macro institutional forces cause firms to undertake strategic 
renewal actions that are legitimate within the prevailing country or society. As all firms in 
a particular country are exposed to the same developments at macro level, it is argued that 
this triggers a process of homogenisation (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). Furthermore, 
following Greenwood and Hinings (1996), it is likely that strategic renewal actions will 
vary across national environments because of differences in macro institutional templates. 
 
4.4 Institutional adaptation mechanisms 
 
In our review of institutional theory thus far, organisations have little impact on its 
adaptation with the environment. Only those strategic actions are undertaken that are 
legitimate within the prevailing institutional context at firm, industry and country level. Or 
as Aldrich (1979: 160) puts it: “Environmental selection processes set the limits within 
which rational selection among alternatives takes place. Prior limits and constraints on 
available options leave little room for manoeuvring by most organization”. Once 
organisational activities are institutionalised, they are sustainable, repetitive and stable 
over time (Zucker 1987). Oliver (1992), however, argues that these taken for granted 
organisational activities are less inevitable than institutional theorists suggest due to forces 
of deinstitutionalisation. Oliver (1992) identifies political, functional and social pressures 
for deinstitutionalisation, either internal or external to the firm. Deinstitutionalisation can 
positively impact firm level adaptations of strategic renewal. Analogous to table 4.2, we 
provide key examples of how forces of deinstitutionalisation can enable strategic renewal 
(see table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Key examples of how forces of deinstitutionalisation can enable strategic renewal of 
incumbent firms at micro, meso and macro level  
Institutional pillar Intra-organisational 
level of analysis 
Inter-organisational 
level of analysis 
 Micro level 
 predictors  
Meso level  
predictors   
Macro level 
predictors  
    
Regulative forces: 
rules, laws and 
sanctions 
Executive migration 
(e.g. Kraatz and 
Moore 2002) 
Changing sector 
regulations (e.g. 
Greenwood, Suddaby 
and Hinings 2002) 
Changing government 
regulations (e.g. Hafsi 
and Tian 2005) 
    
Normative forces: 
values and norms 
 
Increasing workforce 
diversity (e.g. Zilber 
2002) 
Changing industry 
logics (e.g. 
Lounsbury 2002) 
Changing societal 
values (e.g. Casile 
and Davis-Blake 
2002) 
    
Cultural-cognitive 
forces: shared 
conceptions 
Culturally disparate 
mergers and alliances 
(e.g. Walter 1985) 
Increasing 
performance 
pressures (e.g. 
Barreto and Baden-
Fuller 2006) 
Globalisation (e.g. 
Mueller 1994) 
Source: Adapted from Oliver (1992)  
 
It should be noted that most forces identified in table 4.3 do not suggest that firms adapt 
through any intentional strategic renewal process. Rather, in a state meso or macro level 
flux, firms may simply adhere to whichever institutional logics are most powerful to it.   
We further build upon neo institutional theory and institutional entrepreneurship literature 
to explore how institutional adaptation mechanisms at firm level may affect intentional 
strategic renewal processes. Neo institutional theory emerged in reaction to old and new 
institutionalism. Neo institutional theory addresses the interplay between organisational 
context and organisational action. More specifically, it questions how organisations 
respond to institutional prescriptions (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Contrary to new 
institutional theory – in which firms are conceptualised as homogeneous entities – firms 
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are conceptualised as heterogeneous entities in order to better understand differences in 
organisational responses (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Neo institutional theory, when 
elaborated, “provides a model of change that links organizational context and intra-
organizational dynamics” (Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1023). Consequently, neo 
institutional theory contains both selection and adaptation arguments. Unfortunately, neo 
institutional theory is weak in analysing the internal dynamics of organisational change 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996). We delve into this issue by adopting an institutional 
entrepreneurship lens. 
Institutional entrepreneurship questions how taken for granted institutional 
arrangements may dissipate and become replaced by new ones. More specifically, 
institutional entrepreneurship refers to: “activities of actors who have an interest in 
particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions 
or to transform existing ones” Maguire et al. (2004: 657). Like old institutionalism, 
institutional entrepreneurship is commonly referred to as a political process (e.g. Garud, 
Jain and Kumaraswamy 2002). In addition, it is suggested that institutional entrepreneurs 
posses social skills (Fligstein 1997). In retrospect, institutional entrepreneurship seems to 
have its breeding ground in the work of DiMaggio (1988: 14), who argued that “new 
institutions arise when organised actors with sufficient resources see in them an 
opportunity to realize interests that they value highly”. Institutional entrepreneurship 
reintroduces the concept of agency into organisational analysis (e.g. Garud et al. 2007; 
Zietsma and Lawrence 2005). Institutional entrepreneurship comprises an adaptation 
argument as it deepens the understanding of how and why novel, innovative organisational 
solutions come into existence (Garud et al. 2007).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed old institutional theory, new institutional theory, neo 
institutional theory and institutional entrepreneurship literature. Although the four 
institutional perspectives can be applied in many ways, our research problem and questions 
call for an organisational path (in)dependency approach to investigate exploitative and 
explorative strategic renewal actions in regulatory environments (e.g. Pierson 2000). From 
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an old institutional perspective, path dependency is emphasised, “… crystallized through 
the preservation of custom and precedent” (Selznick 1949: 182). From a new institutional 
theory perspective, firms converge to created templates (Greenwood and Hinings 1996) or 
paths of organising through coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio 
1991b). New institutional theory does not necessarily predict that firms cannot 
strategically renew. Firms only renew when inter-organisational institutional contingencies 
‘force’ them to do so (e.g. Aldrich 1999). Neo institutional theory questions how firms 
adapt to institutional prescriptions (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). From this perspective, 
a firm’s strategic renewal path results from the interaction between environmental and 
organisational processes. Finally, institutional entrepreneurship literature suggests that 
actors can break with existing rules to champion new innovations (Garud et al. 2007), 
which may provoke path independency or path creation – the shaping of a path by an 
entrepreneur (Garud and Karnoe 2001). In chapter 5 we more specifically draw upon the 
four institutional theory perspectives to formulate relationships that predict how 
institutional contingencies and variables impact upon exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal actions.  
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5 A multi-level institutional framework 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we address the second and third sub-set of research questions from a 
theoretical point of view. In paragraph 5.2, we present our institutional framework in two 
models: one at organisational field level of analysis and one at organisational unit level of 
analysis.  In both models, the main variables and relationships between these variables are 
specified. In paragraph 5.3, we adopt a new institutional theory lens to address the research 
questions (2a) which environmental determinants are related to firms’ exploitative 
strategic renewal actions and (3a) which environmental determinants are related to firms’ 
explorative strategic renewal actions? Three hypotheses are developed at industry level to 
predict the impact of regulative forces, normative forces and cognitive forces on firms’ 
strategic renewal actions. In paragraph 5.4, we address the research questions (2b) which 
internal factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards exploitative strategic renewal actions 
and (3b) which internal factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards explorative strategic 
renewal actions? We draw upon old institutional theory, neo institutional theory and 
institutional entrepreneurship literature to develop three hypotheses that link intra-
organisational institutional predictor variables and strategic renewal at organisational unit 
level. Finally, in paragraph 5.5, the hypotheses are summarised with reference to 
institutional theory perspective, the extent to which they maintain a selection or adaptation 
argument, level of analysis, and corresponding chapter of empirical verification. 
 
5.2 Research models and underlying assumptions 
 
As has been argued in previous chapters, regulation and regulatory environments are often 
associated with government policy to attain desirable public policy goals (OECD 1997: 5). 
D’Aunno, Succi and Alexander (2000) illustrate how government policy can influence 
organisational field issues in terms of Scott’s (2001) regulative, normative and cognitive 
forces (see figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1: How government policy can influence an organisational field through regulative, 
normative and cognitive forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from D’Aunno et al. (2000) 
 
Most apparently, government policy impacts upon an organisational field through 
regulative forces. Following D’Aunno et al. (2000), regulatory forces are associated with 
resource flows (Wade, Swaminathan and Saxon 1998) and accountability in exchange for 
resources (Edelman and Suchman 1997). Government policy can also become apparent in 
the normative pillar through e.g. property rights (D’Aunno et al. 2000). Finally, D’Aunno 
et al. (2000) argue that government policy can exert cognitive pressures upon firms, but 
only indirectly. Mimetic behaviour is an issue here, which implies that firms model their 
organisation after similar organisations under conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991b).  
Having illustrated that government policy comprises of normative and cognitive 
issues in addition to regulatory issues, figures 5.2 and 5.3 further explicate the research 
models that are applied in this thesis. In both models, strategic renewal is conceptualised as 
a firm’s strategic development path of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal 
actions to align with or adapt to (changing) regulatory issues (Johnson et al. 2003; 
Mintzberg 1978; Siggelkow 2002; Van de Ven 1992; Volberda et al. 2001a; 2001b).  
 
 
 
Normative forces  Government policy 
Cognitive forces 
Regulative forces 
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Figure 5.2: Research model at organisational field level of analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 5.2, the main dependent variable, strategic renewal, is modeled as choices of 
exploitation and exploration at strategic action level, given a set of inter-organisational 
institutional predictor variables. Three main assumptions underlie the first research model.  
First, firms are considered to be holistic entities and strategic decision-making occurs at 
the corporate level (e.g. Hambrick 1989). Second, we consider firms in an organisational 
field as homogeneous entities (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a). As this assumption 
suggests that firms react similarly to institutional prescriptions, it is indifferent which firm 
undertakes a particular strategic action. Third, choices of exploitation and exploration are 
independently of each other. This assumption considers each strategic renewal action as a 
distinct event, which is not related to other strategic renewal actions of the same firm.  
In figure 5.3, strategic renewal is modeled as choices of exploitation and 
exploration at organisational unit level, given a set of intra-organisational institutional 
predictor variables. Three assumptions underlie the second research model. First, firms are 
seen as collections of organisational units and strategic decision-making can also occur at 
lower management levels in addition to the corporate level (e.g. Volberda et al. 2001). 
Second, organisational units are conceptualised as heterogeneous entities (e.g. Greenwood 
H3 = 
Inter-organisational institutional forces  
 
Strategic renewal of 
incumbent firms
 
H2 - 
H1 + 
Inter-organisational 
cognitive forces:  
Mimetic behaviour 
Inter-organisational 
normative forces:  
Permeability 
Inter-organisational 
regulative forces:  
External dependency 
Likelihood of exploitative 
(versus explorative) actions 
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and Hinings 1996). Third, similar to the model in figure 5.2, choices of exploitation and 
exploration are independently of each other.  
 
Figure 5.3: Research model at organisational unit level of analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 How inter-organisational institutional forces influence strategic renewal  
 
In this paragraph, we apply a new institutional theory perspective to study strategic 
renewal behaviour of incumbent firms. More specifically, we build upon Scott’s (2001) 
three pillars of institutionalism to formulate three hypotheses that specify how inter-
organisational institutional regulative, normative and cognitive contingencies relate to 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions. Although we would like to point out 
that the three institutional pillars may reinforce each other (Scott 2001; Vermeulen et al. 
2007) and that firms can experience institutional pressures from the three pillars 
simultaneously (e.g. Wicks 2001), we will discuss them separately for analytical 
convenience. 
 
   
Intra-organisational institutional forces  
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H6b + 
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Inter-organisational regulative forces 
Scott’s (2001) first pillar concerns regulative forces, like rules, laws and sanctions that 
exert coercive authority in strategic renewal actions. Following DiMaggio (1988) and 
Oliver (1991), coercive pressures that are externally validated may become taken for 
granted, unconscious and invisible to organisations. Coercive authority results from formal 
and informal pressures exerted upon a firm through exchange relationships (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991b). We start with a brief discussion on a firm’s exchange relationships with 
regulatory authorities, which will be complemented with a resource dependence 
perspective.  
Regulatory structures, governmental agencies, laws, courts, and professions 
constitute a firm’s regulatory institutional environment (Scott 1987). Institutions impose a 
variety of laws, regulations and expectations on the organisation (Oliver 1991), which are 
embodied in rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities (Scott 2001). Such 
regulatory pressures are usually clear and reinforced in governmental sectors (Kikulis, 
Slack and Hinings 1995). As inter-organisational regulative forces provoke regulatory 
legitimacy, or “consonance with relevant rules or laws” (Scott 2001: 45), a firm’s strategic 
responses generally adhere to external laws and rules (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; Meyer 
and Rowan 1977).   
Resource dependence theory studies exchange relationships in a firm’s task 
environment (Pfeffer and Slancik 1978). This theory has emerged to understand firm 
behaviour when it depends on other organisations for acquiring the resources it needs. 
More specifically: “Organizations are linked to environments by federations, associations, 
customer-supplier relationships, and a social -legal apparatus defining and controlling the 
nature and limits of these relationships” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 2). In this respect, 
coercive pressures may be felt as force, persuasion or as invitations to join in collusion 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). Although institutional theory and resource dependence 
theory differ, we point at Oliver (1991: 147) for convergent assumptions that underlie both 
theories. First, strategic choices are constrained by multiple external pressures. Second, 
environments are collective and interconnected. Third, firms are responsive to external 
demands and expectations. Fourth, firms seek legitimacy. Legitimacy is associated with 
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notions of credibility, stability, safety, trustworthy, predictability, socially acceptable, and 
ethical (Suchman 1995).  
How does a position of resource dependence relate to a firm’s strategic 
responses? Following DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), the higher the extent a firm depends 
on external institutional constituents in an organisational field for resources, the higher the 
degree of conformity to external pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b), and the lower 
the likelihood that a firm’s strategic actions are unique or rare. Oliver (1991) has 
developed a theory of strategic responses to institutional processes that varies from passive 
institutional conformation to active institutional resistance: acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance, defiance and manipulation. The lower the degree of external dependence, the 
greater the likelihood of institutional resistance (Oliver 1991), which is beneficial for 
explorative strategic renewal actions. Applying similar reasoning, higher degrees of 
external dependence would promote institutional conformation, which is supportive for 
exploitative strategic renewal actions.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of external dependency in an organisational field, the 
greater the likelihood that strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms are of an 
exploitative nature. 
 
Inter-organisational normative forces 
Scott’s (2001) second pillar regards normative forces and includes values and norms that 
influence strategic renewal actions. Following DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 77), 
normative isomorphism results from the structuration of organisational fields: “Fields that 
have stable and broadly acknowledged centers, peripheries, and status orders will be more 
homogeneous both because the diffusion structure for new models and norms is more 
routine and because the level of interaction among organizations in the field is higher”. In 
this respect, the degree of interconnectedness in an organisational field – or density of 
relational networks – promotes the diffusion of norms and values across organisational 
field members. But how does the density of relational networks affect firms’ strategic 
renewal actions? The density of relational networks shapes a template or archetype that 
comes to prevail. An archetype is defined as: “a set of structures and systems consistently 
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reflexive of a single, underpinning interpretive scheme” (Greenwood and Hinings 1993: 
1057). Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998: 87) notice that “organizations typically converge 
around a prevailing archetype: strategic orientation and inertia tend to bound the 
organizational change to that which is consistent with the archetype, representing first-
order change”. Baum and Oliver (1991) show that firms increase their survival chances 
when conforming to institutional norms. 
However, if there is not a clearly legitimated normative template to which firms 
must conform, this opens up the possibility for idiosyncratic interpretation of institutional 
cues (D’Aunno, Sutton and Price 1991). Barnett and Carroll (1987) illustrate how the ill-
formed telephone industry – in its founding years – lacked institutional consensus over 
templates (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). In more established organisational fields, the 
concept of sector permeability (Greenwood and Hinings 1996) seems more applicable, 
which indicates the extent to which organisational fields are relatively open to values and 
norms of other sectors or firms. It can be argued that the degree of sector permeability 
prescribes the sources of value that can be created and exploited within an industry (Grant 
2002). Fligstein (1991: 313) notes: “Where rules exist and a pecking order of organizations 
is well established, fundamental change is less likely”. For example, the more an industry 
is characterised as a government monopoly, the higher the contest or negotiation between 
political interest groups, rather than competition for customers in the marketplace (Davies 
1994). On the other hand, change is more likely when new organisations enter established 
fields (Fligstein 1991). Following Greenwood and Hinings (1996), we hypothesise that 
high permeability is more likely to permit variation and change (i.e. explorative strategic 
renewal) as pressures for normative isomorphism to adopt a legitimate template are 
generally lower than in sectors that are relatively closed. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of permeability in an organisational field, the greater 
the likelihood that strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms are of an explorative 
nature. 
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Inter-organisational cognitive forces 
Scott’s (2001) third pillar comprises cognitive forces that highlight how shared 
conceptions impact strategic renewal actions. At inter-organisational level, this is often 
referred to as mimetic behaviour, which implies that firms model their organisation after 
similar organisations in the same field that they perceive to be successful or legitimate 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). Following Flier (2003), the bandwagon phenomenon 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993) is helpful to describe how both efficient and inefficient 
strategies diffuse across an industry. The literature further distinguishes between 
competitive and institutional bandwagons, which provide clues on how shared conceptions 
or a common frame of reference impact strategic renewal actions.  
The fear of losing competitive advantage underlies competitive bandwagons (e.g. 
Flier 2003). Such bandwagons arise as organisations adopt strategies of competitor firms 
to buffer against the risk of falling behind average industry performance (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf 1993). Irrespective of whether an adopted strategic renewal action becomes a 
success or not, it allows an organisation to approximate the average industry performance. 
In an empirical study of the European telecom industry, Stienstra et al. (2004) found much 
similarity in strategic renewal actions among five incumbent telecom operators in the 
period 1992-2001, which resulted in highly similar performance levels.  
The fear of losing legitimacy underlies institutional bandwagons (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991b). Early adopters will undertake innovative strategic renewal actions because 
of their desire to improve performance. As the innovation diffuses across firms in an 
industry, a threshold will be reached beyond which the innovation provides legitimacy, 
rather than improved performance (Meyer and Rowan 1977). However, not adopting the 
strategic action would appear abnormal or illegitimate to stakeholders. In a large-scale 
empirical study of the Portuguese banking industry, Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006) even 
found a negative relationship between legitimacy driven imitation and profitability.  
In general, mimetic behaviour results from conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991b). Following D’Aunno et al. (2000), in the context of regulatory issues, if 
firm A faces state policies that are similar to those of a focal firm, the behaviour of the 
focal firm would provide a relevant role model for the behaviour of firm A. This gives rise 
to the third hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: Incumbent firms mimic competitor firms in the realisation of exploitative 
and explorative strategic renewal actions.   
 
5.4 How intra-organisational institutional forces influence strategic renewal  
 
In this paragraph, we build upon old institutional theory literature to theorise how intra-
organisational regulatory forces influence strategic renewal actions. In addition, we argue 
that the relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and strategic renewal 
does not exist in an organisational vacuum. Neo institutional theory is applied to formulate 
a more sophisticated hypothesis of how inter-organisational regulative forces impact upon 
the relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and strategic renewal 
actions. Finally, we apply an institutional entrepreneurship lens and hypothesise that firms 
do not always conform to (regulatory) institutional prescriptions. From this perspective, 
actors can break through – and even transform – the established intra-organisational 
institutional order. 
  
Intra-organisational regulative forces 
Old institutional theory studies institutionalisation processes within the firm. As has been 
described in the previous chapter, institutions impose constraints upon organisational 
members through regulative, normative and cognitive forces. In the context of intra-
organisational regulative forces, organisational members may feel constrained by 
structures and procedures (Scott 1987). Various authors studied how organisational 
structures and procedures regulate and control the behaviour of organisational members. 
According to Wicks (2001), the hallmark of regulative forces is in the presence of rules, 
laws and sanctions. Considering the Canadian mining case, Wicks (2001: 671) illustrates 
how employees can feel constrained by formal rules: “There were countless occasions 
when miners did things that they would probably not have done otherwise, because they 
felt constrained by formal rules and threatened by sanctions for non-compliance”. Elsbach 
(2002) argues that managers are often charged with protocols to improve the accuracy and 
efficiency of organisational members. Meyer and Rowan (1977: 342) note that 
organisations often function according their formal blueprints: “coordination is routine, 
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rules and procedures are followed, and actual activities conform to the prescription of 
formal structure”. Heugens, Van Riel and Van den Bosch (2004) relax the common view 
that rules are necessarily rigid or obstinate and even emphasise that rules can be at the core 
of various adaptive processes. Hence, we argue that intra-organisational regulative forces 
do not necessarily provoke strategic inaction, but firms will generally undertake those 
strategic renewal actions that adhere to organisational rules, i.e. exploitative strategic 
renewal. 
 
Hypothesis 4: At organisational unit level, the extent of intra-organisational regulative 
forces is positively related to the degree of exploitative strategic renewal. 
 
Moderating effect of inter-organisational regulative forces 
From a neo institutional theory perspective, the impact of intra-organisational regulative 
forces on exploitative strategic renewal should be studied in relation to inter-organisational 
regulative forces. In this respect, the degree of coupling (Greenwood and Hinings 1996) 
plays an important role to investigate the interaction between the inter-organisational 
regulative context and intra-organisational regulative forces. The degree of coupling 
between two systems is conceptualised as the extent to which two systems have variables 
in common (Glassman 1973). Moreover, to the extent that two systems share fewer 
variables – or share weak variables – they are independent of each other (Glassman 1973). 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) distinguish between tight coupling and loose coupling. 
Tight coupling refers to “the existence of mechanisms for dissemination and the 
monitoring of compliance combined with a focused and consistent set of expectations” 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1029). The higher the degree of coupling, the greater the 
institutional pressures for adopting a clearly legitimated organisational template 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996). The institutional context provides ‘templates for 
organising’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). In the context of regulation, mechanisms for 
transmitting those templates upon organisations are the state, regional (and local) 
governments and regulatory agencies. Consequently, in case of tight regulatory coupling, 
strong reciprocity results between inter-organisational regulatory forces at industry level 
and intra-organisational regulatory forces at firm level.  
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But what are consequences for strategic renewal? We follow Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) to hypothesise that the degree of coupling between inter-organisational 
regulative forces and intra-organisational regulative forces influences strategic renewal. 
According to Fligstein (1991: 316), “to the degree that organizational fields are stable and 
the state regulates the environment, one would expect that organizations would be unlikely 
to alter their courses of action”. Kikulis et al. (1995) argue that regulatory pressures are 
usually clear and reinforced in governmental sectors. Therefore, when the degree of inter-
organisational regulative forces is high, the relationship between intra-organisational 
regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal is strong. However, when the degree of 
inter-organisational regulative forces is low, the relationship between intra-organisational 
regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal is less strong. Consequently, the degree 
of inter-organisational regulative forces moderates the relationship between intra-
organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal.  
 
Hypothesis 5: At organisational unit level, the extent of inter-organisational regulative 
forces positively moderates the relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces 
and exploitative strategic renewal. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurship 
Work on inter- and intra-organisational institutional regulative forces has traditionally 
constrained entrepreneurial activity. In reaction to this deterministic view, institutional 
entrepreneurship literature has emerged, which suggests that powerful individuals can 
break with existing rules or practices and institutionalise alternative rules or practices 
(Battilana 2006). For example, Mutch (2007) shows how an individual transfers practices 
from elsewhere to develop his managerial systems in the UK public houses field (i.e. 
pubs). However, according to Lounsbury and Crumley (2007: 993), institutional 
entrepreneurship “has too often celebrated the actions of a single or small number of 
actors, and deflected attention away from the emergent, multilevel nature of how new 
kinds of activities emerge and provide a foundation for the creation of a new practice”. 
Various authors have illustrated how new practice creation surpasses the individual level. 
At organisational field level, Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) examine the creation of 
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active money management practice in the US mutual fund industry. At national level, 
Child, Lu and Tsai (2007) study the development of China’s environmental protection 
system. Wijen and Ansari (2007) even apply the concept of institutional entrepreneurship 
at global level. They illustrate how the regulatory Kyoto Protocol emerges from multiple 
dispersed actors around the world, each with their own interests.  
In this thesis, we focus at the organisational unit level to investigate how 
embedding agency in the organisational structure provides a platform for unfolding 
entrepreneurial activities (Garud et al. 2007). In this respect, the focus is not on 
entrepreneurial outcomes (like new products), but on entrepreneurial processes, that is “the 
methods, practices, and decision-making styles managers use to act entrepreneurially” 
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996: 136). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) use the term entrepreneurial 
orientation to describe how new entry is undertaken. Matsuno, Mentzer and Özsomer 
(2002: 19) use the term entrepreneurial proclivity and define it as “the organization’s 
predisposition to accept entrepreneurial processes, practices, and decision making, 
characterized by its preference for innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness”. 
Following Matsuno et al. (2002), innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness enhance a 
unit’s ability to renew, to destroy the existing market order (e.g. Schumpeter 1934) and to 
offer customers alternative value propositions (e.g. Deshpandé, Farley and Webster 1993).  
Institutional entrepreneurship is inherently paradoxical by nature. Institutions are 
stable designs for repeated strategic activity (i.e. exploitative actions) from which 
deviations get sanctioned or are costly (Jepperson 1991). Garud et al. (2007) question how 
institutional entrepreneurs that may feel constrained by institutional structures are able to 
envision new practices? Malerba and Brusoni (2007: 5) point out: “The key issue here is 
understanding the extent to which firms have their behaviour determined by the 
institutional environment in which they are embedded, as opposed to the extent to which 
they are free to navigate, and influence, the dynamics of such an environment”. This is 
further addressed by Aoki (2007) who synthesises historical, path dependent institutional 
change (i.e. exploitative strategic renewal) with Schumpeterian innovation (i.e. explorative 
strategic renewal). More specifically: “… contrary to the conventional view, an 
equilibrium view of an institution is not necessarily inconsistent with the evolutionary 
approach in the tradition of Schumpeter” Aoki (2007: 247). Entrepreneurial activities drive 
83
 69
the accumulation of knowledge and bestow the development of dynamic capabilities 
(Griffith, Noble and Chen 2006). Consequently, we hypothesise that institutional 
entrepreneurship is positively associated with both exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal. 
 
Hypothesis 6: At organisational unit level, the extent of institutional entrepreneurship is 
positively related to (a) the degree of exploitative strategic renewal and (b) the degree of 
explorative strategic renewal.    
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, two sets of hypotheses have been developed. Regarding the first set, at 
industry level of analysis, hypotheses 1-3 maintain a selection argument and allow 
investigating how and to what extent the rules, norms and beliefs explain what can be 
acted upon and what not (Hoffman 1999). Concerning the second set, at organisational unit 
level of analysis, hypotheses 4-6 deepen the insights how processes of exploitative 
strategic renewal and explorative strategic renewal are driven by the concurrent operating 
of selection and adaptation (e.g. Flier et al. 2003) which contributes to the viewpoint of 
firms as more complex adaptive organisations (Anderson 1999). Table 5.2 summarises the 
six hypotheses with reference to institutional perspective, selection or adaptation argument, 
unit of analysis, and the chapter of empirical verification. 
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6 Research methodologies1 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we take account for the differences in methodological standards and 
assumptions for doing research when testing the two sets of hypotheses. In paragraph 6.2, 
regarding hypotheses 1-3, we describe the document analysis procedure that has been 
applied to collect strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms in the European energy 
industry. In paragraph 6.3, concerning hypotheses 4-6, we provide a detailed description of 
in-depth survey research that was conducted at organisational unit level of two Dutch 
incumbent energy firms. Both paragraphs are structured in a similar way. First, we provide 
criteria for the constitution of a research sample. Second, we describe the data collection 
procedure. Third we present our measures. Fourth, we address issues of reliability and 
validity. Paragraph 6.4 concludes by comparing both methodological approaches along 
several main characteristics.  
 
6.2 Document analysis procedure 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 investigate strategic renewal actions at industry level. We conducted a 
document analysis to measure realised strategies (e.g. Mintzberg and Waters 1985) of 
incumbent firms’ exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions. Realised actions 
are good indicators of a company’s strategy as it are the acts of managers, not their 
intentions, which make up a firm’s strategising in practice. This research method has been 
applied in previous studies (Flier et al. 2003; Volberda et al. 2001b) and is geared towards 
content analysing publicly available archival data that reports strategic renewal moves of 
large firms. Mergers, alliances, new business units, and new products exemplify such 
moves. We applied this method to detect and content analyse strategic renewal actions of 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter are published as Stienstra, M. (2008) Measuring knowledge: Exploitative and 
exploratory learning from strategic actions. Working paper presented at the Strategic Management 
Society 28th International Conference, October 13 – 15, Cologne, Germany.  
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European incumbent energy firms from 1999 to 2004. In this period, incumbent energy 
firms were confronted with a series of regulatory issues (e.g. Helm and Jenkinson 1998; 
Newbery 2004). 
  
Sample 
We applied five selection criteria to constitute our sample of firms and strategic renewal 
actions. First, firms must have incumbency status, i.e. belong to the largest firms in its 
home country in terms of turnover. Second, the firm should have its home base in a 
Northwest EU member state. Third, annual reports in English should be available for the 
entire research period. Fourth, the firm should be involved in the supply of electricity or 
gas to retail customers. As such, firms only active in generation (e.g. PowerGen from the 
UK) were not included in the sample. Fifth, strategic renewal actions should relate to 
generation, trade or sale of energy in the period under investigation. As high capacity 
transmission networks (e.g. electricity grids and gas pipelines) are often unbundled to some 
extent from the energy distribution companies (see paragraph 7.3), strategic renewal 
actions in the transmission segment are excluded from the document analysis. These five 
considerations have resulted in a sample of 1127 strategic renewal actions from thirteen 
incumbent energy firms: Centrica (UK), Distrigas (Belgium), Electricité de France (EdF; 
France), Electrabel (Belgium), EnBW (Germany), Eneco (Netherlands), E.On (Germany), 
Essent (Netherlands), Gaz de France (GdF; France), Nuon (Netherlands), RWE 
(Germany), Scottish & Southern Energy (SSE; UK), and Vattenfall (Sweden). 
 
Data collection 
A pair of researchers was used to detect strategic actions of the sample companies from 
two secondary sources: annual reports and The Financial Times. Both annual reports and 
The Financial Times cover reports of strategic actions of firms that have been 
implemented. The Financial Times was chosen above more (potentially) detailed national 
sources for three reasons. First, The Financial Times is one of the primary business 
newspapers in Europe and it extensively covers moves of European energy firms. Second, 
to avoid differences that stem from using different sources for each country. Third, its 
online database allows efficiently searching, selecting, and downloading relevant articles.
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 Regarding the actual coding of strategic actions into either exploitation or 
exploration, we mainly followed the coding procedure by Barr, Stimpert and Huff (1992). 
Similarly to detecting strategic actions, a pair of coders was used to code the strategic 
actions of the sample companies. Each coder was trained on analysing articles (Financial 
Times) and text units (annual reports) similar to the ones used in this study. Further, a 
coding protocol that had been used in previous research (Flier 2003; Flier et al. 2003; 
Volberda et al. 2001b) was applied in this research to create clarity and facilitate agreement 
between the coders. If the coders did not overlap in the coding of a strategic action, this 
was discussed until a mutually satisfactory solution was arrived. Sometimes, the arguments 
involved in the discussion were formalised as a new coding rule in the coding protocol. 
Appendix A shows the coding protocol, including the list of original coding rules and 
several new coding rules that were added during the coding process.  
 
Measures 
We analysed our main construct of strategic renewal by investigating the path of strategic 
actions a firm undertakes. An action is considered to be strategic insofar it is likely to have 
an impact on the overall behaviour of the firm and its performance. We distinguish the 
concepts exploitative strategic renewal and explorative strategic renewal to investigate 
how firms react by doing more of the same (i.e. maintain congruence with historical path 
of activities), or by developing new ways of wealth generation (i.e. deviate from historical 
path of activities). Because strategic renewal actions are dichotomously classified as either 
exploitation or exploration, one necessarily references the other. At strategic action level, 
optimisation, efficiency programs, and actions that increase the scale of existing businesses 
exemplify exploitative strategic renewal actions. On the other hand, expansion into new 
markets, new product introductions and the creation of new businesses ventures are typical 
examples of explorative strategic renewal actions. Table 6.1 presents illustrative examples 
of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions in the database of 1127 strategic 
renewal actions.  
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Table 6.1: Some illustrative examples of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions 
Examples of exploitative strategic renewal actions:  
x “As a result of modernization, Gaz de France has been able to optimize its storage facilities. 
The capacity of the Chémery unit, initially estimated at 5 billion m3 of natural gas, has been 
increased to 7 billion m3.” (GdF, Annual Report 2000: 37) 
 
x “With this thought in mind, we initiated the Streamlining programme in 2004 designed to 
improve our internal operating processes. By jointly striving for operational excellence, we 
expect to further strengthen customer satisfaction as well as our financial performance.” 
(Essent, Annual Report 2004: 4) 
 
x “The shareholding in the Polish distribution and sales company GZE was increased from 32 
per cent to 53.7 per cent. The company was consolidated into the Group as of January 2003.” 
(Vattenfall, Annual Report 2003: 64) 
Examples of explorative strategic renewal actions: 
x “In September we established a presence in the gas and electricity markets of continental 
Europe by acquiring a 50% interest in the Belgian company Luminus NV.” (Centrica, Annual 
Report 2001: 2)  
 
x “The market for green power was opened up to competition on 1 July 2001. The launch of the 
renewable energy product Ecostroom® was a success. More than 160,000 customers signed up 
for Ecostroom® in 2001.” (Eneco, Annual Report 2001: 16) 
 
x “In 1999, Vattenfall opened a laboratory for the development of electrochemical processes. 
Work will focus primarily on the development of new electrochemical applications, mainly for 
industrial and municipal customers.” (Vattenfall, Annual Report 1999: 13) 
 
We now describe the measurement of our independent variables. Regarding hypothesis 1, 
involvement of external parties is introduced to determine the extent of external 
dependency. At strategic action level, we analyse if a firm depends on external institutional 
constituents for resources in the realisation of a strategic action. Actions that arise within 
the boundaries of the firm, like Greenfield investments, efficiency operations, and 
launching new product lines, exemplify actions in which firms generally not depend on 
outside parties for resources. On the contrary, mergers, acquisitions, alliances and joint 
ventures exemplify actions in which resources of external parties are involved. This 
measure relates to e.g. Penrose’s (1959) distinction between internal growth versus 
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external growth through acquisition. Concerning hypothesis 2, percentage of market 
opening is used to assess the degree of permeability. Directives 96/92/EC (electricity) and 
98/30/EC (gas) provide for a gradual opening of markets in three phases. In each phase, 
eligible customers exceeding a particular consumption threshold are permitted to purchase 
freely from other (foreign) energy incumbents or brand new entrants. These were minimal 
requirements. Member States were allowed to move faster and to open up their national 
electricity and gas markets completely (European Union 1998; 2000). We use European 
Commission benchmarking reports, which provide statistics on the opening up of European 
markets for electricity and gas on a regular base, to assess the percentage of market 
opening at the time of the strategic renewal action. Hypothesis 3 relates to the concept of 
mimicry, which calls for an assessment whether firms differ significantly from each other 
in their likelihood of exploitation and exploration in the period 1999-2004. Mimicry will 
be analysed by using a set of firm dummy variables. Qualitative variables with n values 
can be modeled with n-1 dummy variables. It is indifferent which dummy variable will be 
left out. In our analysis, the firm dummy GdF is left out.  
In addition to the explanatory variables, we control for three factors that can also 
have an influence on a firm’s likelihood of exploitation (or exploration). First, we control 
for time effects by including the year in which the strategic renewal action is undertaken. 
Year will be measured by using a set of dummy variables, with 1999 as reference. Second, 
we investigate the geographic location where the strategic renewal action is undertaken, 
either the domestic market or an international market. This variable is included to control 
for, amongst others,  the possibility that strategic renewal actions are exercised to 
international “realms of decision-making that are relatively unconstrained by regulatory 
strictures” (Peteraf and Reed 2008: 100). Third, resource position reflects the degree to 
which a country is self-sufficient in the production of gas and electricity resources. Natural 
resources are an important factor which bestows comparative advantage for countries (and 
its national energy firms). As it can hardly be influenced, this fits with a rather passive or 
inherited view of economic opportunity (Porter 1990). This measure is calculated as yearly 
annual production divided by yearly annual consumption. The higher the score, the less a 
country depends on foreign firms (and countries) for importing electricity and gas. Annual 
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production and consumption data are obtained from EUROSTAT (2005; 2006). The 
measurement of the dependent and independent variables is summarised in table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Measurement of dependent and independent variables  
Variable Scale Measurement 
Dependent:  
Exploitation (1) versus 
exploration (0) 
Nominal Nature of the strategic renewal action: maintain 
congruence with historical path of activities (1) or 
deviates from historical path of activities (0) 
  
Explanatory:  
External dependency Nominal Involvement of external parties: yes (1) or no (0) 
Permeability Ratio Percentage of market opening at the time of the 
strategic renewal action 
Mimicry Dummy Firm that undertakes the strategic renewal action: 
Centrica, Distrigas, EdF, Electrabel, EnBW, Eneco, 
E.On, Essent, GdF, Nuon, RWE, SSE, Vattenfall 
  
Control:  
Time Dummy Year in which the strategic renewal action is 
undertaken: 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
Geographic location Nominal Country in which the strategic renewal action is 
undertaken: international market (1) versus domestic 
market (0) 
Resource position Ratio Yearly annual production divided by yearly annual 
consumption 
 
Reliability and validity  
Coding strategic actions into exploitation and exploration should be reliable in terms of 
reproducibility and consistency (Weber 1990). Reproducibility concerns are low as all the 
information retrieved from the two data sources is of an explicit nature. Regarding 
consistency, a database was built to systematically order the data in strategic action nodes, 
which minimises the chance of mistakes and increases the coding quality. Intercoder 
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reliability was satisfactory at 89% level of agreement. Flier (2003) reports a 91% level of 
intercoder reliability in a comparable study. 
Construct validity is established by a triangulation of data sources. Combining 
data from annual reports and The Financial Times is beneficial in at least two ways. First, 
the combined use of these two data sources allows for both an insider perspective (annual 
report) and an outsider perspective (Financial Times). Second, it overcomes the biases 
when using only one source. For example, The Financial Times paid more attention to 
firms listed on the stock market than to those not listed. Further, The Financial Times gives 
a higher priority to reporting key strategic actions. Including annual reports compensates 
these effects at least partially. Construct validity also rests on the establishment of semantic 
validity through the use of multiple coders that have to agree that the text or newspaper 
clippings have similar meanings or connotations (Krippendorf 1980). Regarding our data 
on institutional predictor variables, we consulted leading industry experts for validation.  
 
6.3 Survey research 
 
Hypotheses 4-6 investigate strategic renewal at organisational unit level. We conducted a 
survey research to collect data on several intra-organisational institutional predictor 
variables and exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. Complementary to the 
document analysis, in which exploitation and exploration are classified dichotomously, our 
survey measures allow for a more precise measurement of exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal on a ratio scale. Organisational units were selected from two large 
leading Dutch multi-divisional energy firms, which will be referred to as company A and 
company B. 
 
Sample 
We applied four selection criteria to constitute our sample of organisational units. First, the 
energy firms from which organisational units are selected must have incumbency status in 
the Netherlands, i.e. belong to the largest energy firms in terms of turnover. Second, 
organisational units should be empirically distinct from other organisational units. We 
received personnel files from the HRM departments of both companies. The files allowed 
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for a classification of organisational members into distinct organisational units. Further, 
interviews with managers from both companies provided convincing argument that an 
organisational unit level of analysis reflects organisational reality. Third, organisational 
units must have at least four employees. Fourth, organisational units should be involved in 
the core business of energy services. As such, units that are mainly responsible for support 
services (e.g. catering, building maintenance) were excluded from the research. These 
considerations have resulted in a potential sample of 173 organisational units: 108 
organisational units from company A and 65 organisational units from company B. 
 
Data collection 
We developed a questionnaire to collect data at the organisational unit level. The 
questionnaire was sent to employees of each organisational unit, not unit leaders or 
managers. This is because some measurement scales (i.e. entrepreneurial proclivity, 
hierarchy in decision-making) ask respondents to judge the unit leader or manager. 
Further, we explicitly asked respondents to fill out the questionnaire with a focus on their 
organisational unit (or in some cases their unit leader or manager) Employees were 
randomly selected from the 173 organisational units.  
Following Li, Bingham and Umphress (2007) and Westphal (1998), we adopted 
several measures to enhance a sufficient response rate. First, we included an endorsement 
letter in the survey package in which top management emphasised the importance of the 
study for its company and asked its employees for cooperation. Second, we described the 
purpose of our study and provided the telephone number and e-mail address of one 
researcher in case of any questions. Third, we assured confidentiality. In this respect, we 
sent the survey to the respondents’ private home addresses. Further, we included a return 
envelope in the survey package which was directly addressed to the research team. Fourth, 
after four weeks, non-respondents were reminded to fill out and return the questionnaire. 
All in all, we received questionnaires from 112 organisational units. One 
questionnaire was excluded from the analyses because of excessive missing data. This has 
resulted in a final sample size of 111 questionnaires, corresponding with a 64.2% response 
rate. Table 6.3 provides more detailed information regarding the survey’s response rate. 
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Table 6.3: Survey response rate statistics  
Company # Targeted units # Responding units Response rate 
A 108 80 74.1% 
B 65 31 47.7% 
A + B 173 111 64.2% 
 
We tested for several potential biases in our data. First, because of relatively high response 
rates of organisational units across the two companies (see table 6.3), the possibility for 
sampling bias is low. Second, to test for non-respondent bias, we compared organisational 
unit size between respondents and non-respondents. Results of the T-test indicate that there 
are no statistically significant differences between the two groups (t = -1.14; p = 0.26). 
Third, to be sure that not only successful organisational units responded, we refer to an 
item in the questionnaire that asked respondents to indicate to what extent competitors 
could be jealous of their performance (Volberda, Verwaal and Van der Weerdt 2006: 279). 
Measured on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), results 
indicate that our sample is unlikely to be biased towards successful organisational units 
alone (mean = 4.74; s.d. = 1.37; 39.6% of respondents mark 4 or below).  Fourth, we used 
the ANOVA statistic to examine potential differences in the main study variables among 
educational and functional background. Regarding educational background among the 
respondents, 6.4% hold a Master degree, 28.2% hold a Bachelor degree and 65.4% have 
had and education below Bachelor level. Further, regarding functional background among 
respondents, 84.4% have a background in Technology, 11.0% were educated in Economics 
and 4.6% otherwise. First, regarding educational background, we did not find any 
significant differences in the study variables among groups of respondents (Master, 
Bachelor, below Bachelor) when applying a 5% level of significance. F-values for intra-
organisational regulative forces, inter-organisational regulative forces, entrepreneurial 
proclivity, exploitative strategic renewal and explorative strategic renewal are 1.893, 
0.045, 0.958, 2.651 and 0.176, respectively. Similarly, regarding functional background, 
we did not find any significant differences in the main study variables among groups of 
respondents (Technology, Economics, otherwise). F-values for intra-organisational 
regulative forces, inter-organisational regulative forces, entrepreneurial proclivity, 
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exploitative strategic renewal and explorative strategic renewal are 2.882, 1.432, 1.491, 
0.943 and 0.676, respectively.  
 
Measures 
All of our scales were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 
= strongly agree). Appendix B presents an overview of the survey scales of our main study 
variables. Hypotheses 4-6 address two dependent variables: exploitative strategic renewal 
and explorative strategic renewal. We use scales that have been developed and validated in 
previous research to measure these variables. Exploitative strategic renewal (Į = 0.88), 
which reflects the level of efficiency in the organisational unit, was measured by using the 
six-item scale exploitative innovation (Jansen et al. 2006). Explorative strategic renewal 
(Į = 0.93), which considers a unit’s level of innovativeness, was measured by using the 
six-item scale exploratory innovation (Jansen et al. 2006).  
Three explanatory study variables are distinguished: intra-organisational 
regulative forces, inter-organisational regulative forces and entrepreneurial proclivity. 
First, the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces (Į = 0.80) is measured by five 
items that tap into the extent to which organisational members adhere to explicit internal 
regulatory processes: (1) Employees in our unit conform to formal rules (adapted from 
Wicks 2001: 671); (2) Managers are charged with protocols to improve the efficiency of 
organisational members (adapted from Elsbach 2002: 42); (3) In our unit, rules and 
procedures are followed (adapted from Meyer and Rowan 1977: 342); (4) Rules, laws and 
sanctions occupy a central place in our unit (adapted from Wicks 2001: 676); (5) In our 
unit, punishment is administered in case of rule violations (adapted from North 1990: 4). 
Exploratory factor analysis (principal component) was conducted to identify the structure 
of the scale items. All items load on a single factor. Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Chi-Square 
= 213.136; df = 10; p = 0.00) indicates the presence of correlations between items. The 
measure sampling adequacy (0.791) is almost meritorious (e.g. Hair et al 1998). Second, 
inter-organisational regulative forces (Į = 0.78) represents the extent of regulatory 
processes in the industry. A five item scale was developed: (1) The impact of regulation 
and regulators is evident in our industry (adapted from Beardsley et al. 2005: 95); (2) The 
regulatory agencies assume a very important role (adapted from Mahon and Murray 1980: 
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127); (3) The legal environment affects many aspects of our business (adapted from 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 67); (4) Our industry is characterised by numerous 
regulatory limitations (adapted from Flier et al. 2001: 182); (5) In our industry, written 
records are kept of every organisations’ performance (adapted from Deshpandé and 
Zaltman 1982: 27). Again, all items load on a single factor. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
(Chi-Square = 299.384; df = 10; p = 0.00) indicates the presence of correlations between 
items. The measure sampling adequacy (0.788) is almost meritorious (e.g. Hair et al 1998). 
Third, we use the six item scale entrepreneurial proclivity (Į = 0.73) developed by Griffith 
et al. (2006) to measure the extent of institutional entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial 
proclivity measure mainly contains the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation that have 
been identified by Lumpkin and Dess (1996). Following Lumpkin and Dess (1996): (1) 
innovativeness refers to the development of e.g. new ideas, products, and services; (2) risk-
taking is associated with a firm’s willingness to accept greater levels of risk; (3) 
proactiveness reflects opportunistic seizing of market opportunities in the expectation of 
future changes; (4) competitive aggressiveness implies the willingness to adopt 
unconventional methods of competition; and (5) autonomy relates to independence in 
bringing forth and executing an idea. Although Griffith et al. (2006) focused on 
entrepreneurial proclivity at the level of top managers, we rephrased the items and asked 
respondents to focus on organisational unit managers. 
 Finally, we included a number of other variables in the questionnaire to control 
for alternative factors in our analyses that might influence exploitative or explorative 
strategic renewal. First, to control for a unit’s embeddedness in its parent company (either 
A or B), a dummy variable was created with firm A as the base group. Second, we control 
for size, measured by the number of employees in the organisational unit. From previous 
research (e.g. Birnbaum 1984; Grimm, Corsi and Smith 1993), we learn that organisational 
size can have both positive and negative effects on a firm’s strategic responses to 
regulatory reform. Third, in the context of intra-organisational normative forces, discipline 
dominance relates to the extent to which unwritten rules are dominated by the values and 
norms of a certain discipline or profession (Volberda 1998). The stronger a firm’s 
discipline dominance, the lower a firm’s flexibility potential (Volberda 1998), which might 
positively affect exploitative strategic renewal and can have negative consequences for the 
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degree of explorative strategic renewal. In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate 
the extent to which their unit is characterised by a high percentage of employees with the 
same education. Fourth, in the context of intra-organisational cognitive forces, 
connectedness (Į = 0.71) measures the degree of interaction between organisational unit 
members (Jansen et al. 2006; Jaworski and Kohli 1993). We used the five-item scale 
developed by Jansen et al. (2006), which was in turn adapted from Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993), to measure connectedness. Interaction of organisational members results in a 
socially constructed reality (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966) through shared sense 
making. In this respect, cultural-cognitive theorists stress the role of compliance: routines 
are followed as these are the taken for granted way how things are done (Scott 2001).  
Connectedness might therefore positively affect exploitative strategic renewal and 
negatively impact upon explorative strategic renewal. Fifth, centralisation of decision-
making (Į = 0.84) considers the extent to which decision-making is concentrated in an 
organisational unit (Aiken and Hage 1968). Following Jansen et al. (2006), we adopted the 
five-item scale hierarchy of authority (Dewar, Whetten and Boje 1980; Hage and Aiken 
1967) to measure centralisation of decision-making. Following Jansen et al. (2006), high 
centralisation of decision-making may lower an organisational unit’s level of explorative 
strategic renewal, but increase an organisational unit’s level of exploitative strategic 
renewal (Jansen et al. 2006).  
 
Reliability and validity 
We mainly used existing scales that have been validated and proven reliable in previous 
research. All the multi-item scales have Cronbach alpha’s above the 0.70 threshold, which 
assures reliability (e.g. Nunnally 1978). Face validity of all questionnaire items was 
assessed by three scholars in strategic management. After several modifications, we 
conducted pre-tests with eight employees from the two target companies. Observations and 
discussions during the pre-tests have resulted in minor modifications in phrasings to reduce 
ambiguity and to better emphasise organisational unit as the level of analysis in some 
items. To assure validity in respondents’ answers, we sent the questionnaires to employees, 
not unit managers or unit leaders. In our opinion, employees are most knowledgeable about 
regulatory constraints and entrepreneurial opportunities in their organisational unit. In 
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addition, several scales (i.e. centralisation of decision-making, entrepreneurial proclivity) 
contain items that ask respondents to judge their supervisor or manager. Our findings 
indicate that the average working experience was 21.5 years (average age of respondents is 
47.6), which further strengthens our confidence in the validity of our data. 
Yet, as appropriate scales for intra- and inter-organisational regulative forces were 
not available, we took five steps to develop valid measures for these constructs. First, we 
conducted in-depth interviews with three industry experts regarding issues of both intra- 
and inter-organisational regulative forces. Second, we thoroughly examined relevant 
literature within the realms of Scott’s (2001) regulative pillar. According to Scott (2001: 
51): “Scholars more specifically associated with the regulatory pillar are distinguished by 
the prominence they give to explicit regulatory processes: rule setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities. In this conception, regulatory processes involve the capacity to 
establish rules, inspect other’s conformity to them, and, as necessary, manipulate sanctions 
– rewards or punishments – in an attempt to influence future behaviour.”  
 
Table 6.4: Two factor solution of intra-organisational regulative forces and inter-organisational 
regulative forces 
Item Component 
 1 2 
Employees in our unit conform to formal rules -.009 .822 
Managers are charged with protocols to improve the efficiency of 
organisational members 
.069 .519 
In our unit, rules and procedures are followed -.057 .867 
Rules, laws and sanctions occupy a central place in our unit -.042 .896 
In our unit, punishment is administered in case of rule violations .140 .607 
The impact of regulation and regulators is evident in our industry .677 -.174 
The regulatory agencies assume a very important role .929 -.015 
The legal environment affects many aspects of our business .901 .134 
Our industry is characterised by numerous regulatory limitations .807 .106 
In our industry, written records are kept of every organisations’ performance .631 .110 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
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Third, from the literature review, we collected a pool of quotations that tap into the domain 
of each construct. Then, we translated each quotation into a unique item (see Appendix C 
and D). Fourth, after the data collection, a factor analysis was conducted on all items of 
both constructs. This has resulted in a two factor solution where each item loads on its 
intended factor, either intra- or inter-organisational regulative forces (see table 6.4). 
Regarding our sample size, the factor loadings show statistical significance (Hair et al. 
1998: 112). This suggests that intra-organisational regulative forces and inter-
organisational regulative forces are not only conceptually different, but also empirically 
distinct from each other. Fifth, we compared the developed scales with comparable scales 
that had been proven valid and reliable in previous research. We included a five item 
formalisation scale (Į = 0.71) from Deshpandé and Zaltman (1982) in our questionnaire. 
Formalisation reflects the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and 
communications are written down (Khandwalla 1977). Correlation statistics (r = 0.66; p < 
0.00) indicate that our scale of intra-organisational regulative forces correlates highly with 
formalisation. We also included a four item complexity scale (Į = 0.88) from Volberda et 
al. (2006). Complexity regards the number of environmental factors that have an impact on 
an organisation and the relatedness between these factors (Volberda 1998). Correlation 
statistics (r = 0.48; p < 0.00) indicate that the inter-organisational regulative forces scale 
correlates highly with complexity. 
  
6.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, all variables that have been specified in hypotheses 1-6 were made 
operational for empirical investigation. Overall, construct validity of our main construct – 
strategic renewal – is established by a triangulation of research methodologies. The 
document analysis is geared towards a dichotomous classification of reported/realised 
strategic renewal actions into either exploitation or exploration at industry level, whereas 
the survey research allows for a separate measurement of perceived exploitative and 
explorative strategic renewal at organisational unit level. At industry level, we found that 
43.1% of the strategic renewal actions from thirteen incumbent energy firms are of an 
explorative nature (the remaining 56.9% are of an exploitative nature). This means that the 
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number of exploitative strategic renewal actions relates to the number of explorative 
strategic renewal actions by a factor 1.32. At organisational unit level of two Dutch 
incumbent energy firms, the average degree of perceived exploitative strategic renewal 
(4.78) relates to the average degree of perceived explorative strategic renewal (3.71) by a 
factor 1.29. As both approaches yield highly similar results, this suggests construct 
validity. Table 6.5 summarises both methodological approaches described in this chapter 
along several main characteristics. 
 
Table 6.5: Summary of research methodologies  
Research design Level of analysis Hypothesis Main variable  Data collection  
Document analysis Industry level H1 – H3 Exploitative or 
explorative 
strategic renewal 
Financial Times 
and annual reports  
     
Survey Organisational  
unit level  
H4 – H6 Exploitative and 
explorative 
strategic renewal 
Questionnaire  
 
Two methodological/empirical contributions are made in this chapter. First, while this and 
recent studies (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Jansen et al. 2006) focus on survey data 
to measure exploitation and exploration, our document analysis also allows for a 
complementary way of measuring exploitation and exploration. A major strength of this 
method is the use of contemporaneous reporting on the actual realisation of exploitation 
and exploration at strategic action level. Second, as appropriate scales for intra- and inter-
organisational regulative forces were not available, we took several steps to develop valid 
measures for these constructs. 
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7 European electricity and gas market statistics 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we address the research sub-question (1b) at country level, how does 
regulatory reform diffuse across European energy markets? Regulatory reform of energy 
services culminated in the late nineties with the announcement of directives 96/92/EC and 
98/30/EC, which heralded the start of a single European market for electricity and gas, 
respectively. The intention of the EU was to contribute to the achievement of three major 
European energy policy objectives: (1) increased competitiveness, (2) environmental 
protection and (3) security of supply (European Union 1998; 2000). We describe the 
(changing) regulatory landscape of six Northwest European energy markets in the period 
1999-2004. Due to the complex structure of network industries, paragraph 7.2 sets out with 
a description of the European energy market structure. In addition, we present production, 
trade and consumption figures of six EU member states. In paragraph 7.3, we describe 
patterns of regulatory reform across six EU energy markets along three characteristics: (1) 
opening of markets, (2) network unbundling and (3) third party access. In paragraph 7.4, 
we more closely examine European energy markets in terms of concentration ratios. All 
statistics in this chapter are presented for both the electricity and the gas segment, which 
allows for comparisons between the two. Finally, paragraph 7.5 concludes by addressing 
the issue of how a (lack of) European level playing field has impacted upon incumbent 
energy firms’ strategic choices.  
 
7.2 Structure of European electricity and gas markets  
 
Considering European electricity and gas market structures, it is important to make a 
conceptual distinction between several value adding stages: production, trade and sale. In 
addition, transmission concerns the physical transportation of energy through networks: 
electricity grids/wires and gas pipelines. Figure 7.1 provides a simplified illustration of the 
relationship between these four stages. Regulatory reform in the European energy industry 
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contains elements of both deregulation and regulation (and re-regulation). Deregulation 
primarily concerns the production, trade and sale of energy. On the other hand, 
transmission can be considered as a natural monopoly that often remains subject to tight 
governmental regulation at national level.  
 
Figure 7.1: The energy structure (simplified)  
 
 
We will now present production, trade and consumption data of the six countries studied in 
this thesis. From these data, ratios will be calculated that control for factor market 
characteristics (i.e. resource position) in subsequent analyses in chapter 8.  
 
Production 
Production concerns the generation of electricity (e.g. power plants) and exploration of gas 
(e.g. gas fields at sea). Table 7.1 describes electricity generation statistics across six 
European markets in the period 1999-2004. Electricity generation volumes in Belgium 
remained relatively stable over time. In Sweden, total electricity generation in 2004 is less 
than the amount of electricity generated in 1999. The four remaining markets, on average, 
show a gradual increase of electricity generation from 1999 to 2004.  
When looking at the breakdown of electricity production (EUROSTAT 2005; 
2006), the six countries show interesting differences. Nuclear power plants account for 
Deregulated 
market 
Regulated 
market 
Transmission 
Production Trade Sale 
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more than 50% of electricity generation in Belgium and France. For example, France has 
produced 448.241 Gigawatt hours (GWh) of nuclear electricity in 2004 (EUROSTAT 
2006). In Germany, The Netherlands and the UK, the majority of electricity is generated 
from conventional power plants. Conventional power plants use coal or gas as the main 
energy source. Of the six countries, France and Sweden produce substantial amounts of 
electricity from hydro-electric power plants. For example, Sweden has produced 60.178 
GWh of hydro-electric power in 2004 (EUROSTAT 2006). Finally, Germany is the only 
country that uses wind energy on a significant scale. In 2004, 25.270 GWh of electricity 
was generated from wind turbines (EUROSTAT 2006).  
  
Table 7.1: Total electricity generation (in GWh) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 84 521 83 894 79 697 82 060 84 618 85 441 
France 523 985 540 668 550 488 559 197 566 949 572 241 
Germany 555 465 571 551 586 340 571 645 599 470 606 636 
Netherlands 86 396 89 615 93 747 95 965 96 775 100 736 
Sweden 155 171 145 585 161 616 146 733 135 435 151 727 
UK 368 363 377 309 384 682 387 506 398 671 395 853 
Source: EUROSTAT (2005; 2006) 
 
Table 7.2 describes gas production statistics across six European markets in the period 
1999-2004. It appears that the UK and The Netherlands are by far the biggest gas 
producing companies.  Further, (almost) no gas is explored in Belgium and Sweden. These 
countries therefore totally depend on gas imports for their gas consumption.   
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Table 7.2: Total gas production (in Terajoule -GCV) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 17 96 0 0 0 0 
France 77 670 69 999 70 222 67 438 59 621 51 530 
Germany 777 245 735 038 741 143 743 728 740 615 685 342 
Netherlands 2 517 547 2 414 593 2 591 786 2 524 867 2 428 905 2 864 924 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 4 147 772 4 538 225 4 431 339 4 345 335 4 309 312 4 019 594 
Source: EUROSTAT (2005; 2006) 
 
Trade 
Energy trading involves buyers and sellers that engage in financial transactions with each 
other. Trade is also related to a country’s imports and exports of energy with neighbouring 
countries. Imports and exports are often based on economic choices, rather than production 
shortages (EUROSTAT 2006). The figures in table 7.3 regard a country’s net electricity 
import, which is calculated as total electricity imports minus total electricity exports. 
Belgium, The Netherlands and the UK are net importers of electricity in the entire period. 
On the contrary, France is a major net exporter. Germany and Sweden balance between net 
importer and net exporter over time. 
 
Table 7.3: Net electricity import (in GWh) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 825 4 326 9 106 7 588 6 410 7 777 
France -63 143 -69 479 -68 390 -77 034 -66 414 -62 040 
Germany 1 040 3 057 3 657 9 998 -3 272 -2 621 
Netherlands 18 440 18 915 17 283 16 382 16 992 16 217 
Sweden -7 482 4 678 -7 290 5 356 12 830 -2 104 
UK 14 244 14 174 10 399 8 414 2 160 7 490 
Source: adapted from EUROSTAT (2005; 2006) 
 
Table 7.4 presents a country’s net gas import statistics, calculated as total gas imports 
minus total gas exports. As Belgium and Sweden do not produce gas, these countries have 
to import all their gas needs. Additionally, France and Germany also have to import large 
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volumes of gas. The amounts of gas explored in these countries are far to less to meet 
consumption levels. The Netherlands and the UK are important gas exporting countries in 
the period under investigation.  
 
Table 7.4: Net gas import (in TJ -GCV) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 627 007 617 685 610 993 635 134 662 591 677 290 
France 1 619 254 1 664 415 1 625 951 1 709 193 1 749 088 1 756 468 
Germany 2 665 598 2 645 371 2 707 308 2 794 500 2 904 559 3 065 421 
Netherlands -909 113 -799 705 -938 409 -858 271 -753 811 -1 156 480 
Sweden 33215 36092 40720 41439 41322 41142 
UK -257 658 -433 143 -387 967 -324 865 -326 662 68 123 
Source: adapted from EUROSTAT (2005; 2006) 
 
Consumption 
Consumption is the final use of energy by customers. Although it is possible to distinguish 
between industry, transport and households/services (EUROSTAT 2005; 2006), table 7.5 
presents total electricity consumption figures of the six countries. The countries, on 
average, show a slight increase in electricity consumption over time. Remarkably, 
electricity consumption in Sweden is higher than electricity consumption in The 
Netherlands, while the number of inhabitants in Sweden is roughly half the number of 
inhabitants in The Netherlands. This can be explained by the fact that electricity is the 
major heat source in Sweden. On the other hand, Dutch heat production is mainly based on 
gas. 
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Table 7.5: Total electricity consumption (in GWh) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 74505 77539 78138 78443 79677 80603 
France 374677 385111 395489 393230 408248 415880 
Germany 467483 482603 505280 498840 509265 513327 
Netherlands 94722 97938 99428 99736 100520 103118 
Sweden 126580 128725 132673 131279 129443 130361 
UK 322770 329533 332995 333337 337416 340042 
Source: EUROSTAT (2005; 2006) 
 
Table 7.6 shows total gas consumption figures of the six EU member states. The six 
countries show a tendency towards increased gas consumption over time. Gas consumption 
in Sweden lags far behind the consumption levels in the other five countries. Obviously, 
this relates to the fact that no gas is produced in Sweden. 
 
Table 7.6: Total gas consumption (in TJ -GCV) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 416 228 439 428 442 351 451 792 449 061 463 253 
France 1 410 741 1 413 932 1 502 886 1 472 094 1 535 661 1 506 150 
Germany 2 416 601 2 555 257 2 507 799 2 506 590 2 737 608 2 805 000 
Netherlands 930 110 958 318 982 297 956 096 987 437 983 869 
Sweden 19 940 20 623 22 902 21 359 23 117 22 341 
UK 2 308 926 2 389 697 2 431 984 2 312 456 2 372 472 2 346 293 
Source: EUROSTAT (2005; 2006) 
 
7.3 Regulatory reform in European electricity and gas markets 
 
Incumbent energy firms have operated in regulated environments for many decades. 
Owned by (local) governments, each energy firm was responsible for supplying utilities to 
all customers in (a specific region of) a country. With respect to energy production, trade 
and sale, the announcement of directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC heralded the start of a 
single European market for electricity and has, respectively. For the first time, European 
energy firms had to compete with (international) competitors for customers. Prospected 
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benefits of a single and competitive European market for energy are increased efficiency, 
lower prices, security of supply, less (expensive) reserve capacity, better use of resources, 
free choice of suppliers, improving service, and lower production costs for other industries 
(European Union 1998; 2000).  
However, due to the network character of the energy industry, duplicating 
transmission systems in order to connect with each new customer is impossible. Further, 
parts of the transmission networks are often owned by large vertically integrated energy 
companies that perform all activities throughout the value chain. These factors are 
considered problematic in the context of energy market reform. Under the new rules of the 
directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC, transmission networks must offer access to both its 
owner and its competitors on equal terms. Regulatory reform in the European energy 
industry therefore involves a complex interaction of deregulation, regulation and re-
regulation in order to assure fair competition. This is also referred to as the paradox of 
deregulation (Hancher and Van Damme 2000). In the context of regulatory reform, 
directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC affect three main areas: (1) opening of markets, (2) 
network unbundling and (3) third party access.  
 
Opening of markets 
Directive 96/92/EC provided for a gradual opening of electricity markets in three phases. 
In phase 1 (19 February 1999), eligible customers exceeding consumption of 40 GWh 
(CSFB 2002) were permitted to purchase freely throughout the EU. In phase 2 (19 
February 2000), eligible customers exceeding consumption of 20 GWh (CSFB 2002) were 
permitted to purchase freely throughout the EU. Finally, in phase 3 (19 February 2003), 
eligible customers exceeding consumption of 9 GWh (CSFB 2002) were permitted to 
purchase freely throughout the EU. These were minimal requirements; EU member states 
were allowed to move faster and to open up their markets completely. Table 7.7 shows 
market opening rates of the six countries studied in this thesis. During the entire research 
period, all German, Swedish and UK customers were free to choose their electricity 
supplier. From these countries, UK was the first-mover as it had already opened up its 
market for competition in 1990 (CSFB 2002). Belgium, France and The Netherlands were 
relatively late in opening up their markets for all eligible customers. 
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Table 7.7: Market opening rates electricity markets 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 0 35 35 52 52 80 
France 20 30 30 30 37 70 
Germany 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Netherlands 33 33 33 63 63 63 
Sweden 100 100 100 100 100 100 
UK 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 3); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 4); Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 4); Third 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2004: 4); Electricity 
liberalisation indicators in Europe (2001: 101); CSFB (2002); Annual Report Electricité de France  (2003). 
 
Similar to the opening of electricity markets, Directive 98/30/EC provided for a gradual 
opening of gas markets in three phases. In phase 1 (10 August 2000), eligible customers 
exceeding consumption of 25 million m3 were permitted to purchase freely throughout the 
EU (European Union 2000). In phase 2 (10 August 2003), eligible customers exceeding 
consumption of 15 million m3 were permitted to purchase freely throughout the EU 
(European Union 2000). Finally, in phase 3 (10 August 2008), eligible customers 
exceeding consumption of 5 million m3 were permitted to purchase freely throughout the 
EU (European Union 2000). Again, these were minimal requirements; member states were 
allowed to move faster and to open up their markets completely. Market opening statistics 
of the six European gas markets are presented in table 7.8. Germany and the UK had 
already fully open gas markets in 1999. As with electricity, UK was the first-mover in 
opening up its gas market. UK started to liberalise its gas market in 1982 (CSFB 2002). 
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Table 7.8: Market opening rates gas markets 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 0 47 59 59 59 83 
France 0 20 20 20 20 37 
Germany 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Netherlands 45 45 45 60 60 60 
Sweden 0 47 47 47 47 51 
UK 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 5); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 5); Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 6); Third 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2004: 7); DRI*WEFA 
(2001); CSFB (2002); Annual Report Gaz de France (2004). 
 
Unbundling 
Under the new rules of the directives, transmission networks must offer access to all 
distribution companies on equal terms. Historically, network and distribution activities are 
often integrated in the same firm. Unbundling or separation of network activities from 
distribution activities is required to increase transparency and to avoid cross-subsidisation 
and discrimination. The directives require three measures to be taken (European Union 
1998; 2000): (1) Management unbundling: the day to day management of the transmission 
network by the transmission system operator should be independent of the distribution 
company; (2) Accounting separation: transmission and distribution activities from other 
parts of the company should be separated; (3) Confidential information should not be 
passed by the transmission system operator to other parts of the company (Chinese walls). 
These are minimal requirements with respect to unbundling. A more extreme type of 
unbundling is legal separation of the transmission network from the distribution company. 
In this case, the transmission network operates completely independent from other 
distribution companies. The most extreme type of unbundling, ownership unbundling, 
concerns a physical separation of the transmission network from the distribution company. 
Table 7.9 presents the degree of unbundling of high-voltage electricity networks across the 
six European countries. In 1999, Sweden and the UK had already opted for ownership 
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unbundling. In 2002, ownership of the high-voltage electricity network in The Netherlands 
was transferred from the distribution companies to state company Tennet. 
 
Table 7.9: Degree of unbundling high-voltage electricity networks (Ownership=3; Legal=2; 
Management=1; Accounts=0) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Germany 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Netherlands 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Sweden 3 3 3 3 3 3 
UK 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 3); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 4); Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 4); Third 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2004: 4). 
 
Table 7.10 presents statistics about the degree of unbundling of gas networks. In 
comparison with electricity network unbundling, gas networks are characterised by lower 
levels of unbundling in France, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. Only the UK has 
chosen for the most extreme type of gas network unbundling: ownership unbundling. 
 
Table 7.10: Degree of unbundling gas networks (Ownership=3; Legal=2; Management=1; 
Accounts=0) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 5); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 5); Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 6); Third 
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benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2004: 7); DRI*WEFA 
(2001). 
 
Third party access  
With respect to the owners of electricity wires, a distinction can be made between 
transmission system operators and distribution system operators. The transmission system 
operator is responsible for running the high voltage transmission grid. Distribution system 
operators are responsible for running the medium and low voltage networks. Access to the 
electricity wires by third parties is essential in the success of liberalisation. Under a 
negotiated third party access system, each user of the network negotiates the terms of 
access with the system operator. Under a regulated third party access system, the tariffs to 
use the network are based on fixed prices that are published by relevant authorities. A 
regulated third party access system is beneficial as it prevents discrimination against 
competitors and offers transparent prices (European Union 1998). Third party access 
statistics of electricity networks are presented in table 7.11. Except for Germany, all 
countries have a regulated third party access system. 
 
Table 7.11: Third party access to electricity networks (Regulated=1; Negotiated=0) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 9); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 9); Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 11); Third 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2004: 14). 
 
Table 7.12 shows how third party access is arranged in the six European gas markets. 
Similar to electricity, third party access to gas networks in Germany is negotiated from 
1999 to 2004. Belgium has shifted from a negotiated to a regulated system in 2001. The 
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Netherlands has chosen for a hybrid TPA system, which is a combination of both a 
regulated and a negotiated system.  
 
Table 7.12: Third party access to gas networks (Regulated=1; Hybrid=0.5; Negotiated=0) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 0 0 1 1 1 1 
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 9); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 9); Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 11); Third 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2004: 14); DRI*WEFA 
(2001). 
 
7.4 Concentration in European electricity and gas markets 
 
In this section, we describe the extent to which the first main European energy policy 
objective – increased competitiveness – has been achieved. Market concentration is a 
widely used measure to assess competitiveness. There are various ratios to measure market 
concentration. First, concentration ratio can be calculated as the combined market share of 
the n largest firms in a (national) market. For example, the CR3 ratio indicates the 
concentration ratio of the three biggest companies in a (national) market. Following the 
German Federal Cartel Office (www.bundeskartellamt.de), market dominance is presumed 
to exist if three or fewer companies have a combined market share of at least 50 percent. 
Second, market concentration can be calculated as the sum of squared market shares of all 
firms that compete in a (national) market. This is known as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Following the United Stated Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov), 
markets in which HHI exceeds 1800 points are considered highly concentrated.  
Concentration ratio and HHI are related to each other. In this paragraph, market 
concentration is considered to be high if the biggest three companies in a national market 
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(either electricity or gas) have a combined market share of at least 75%. Further, if the 
combined market share is at least 50%, but less than 75%, market concentration is 
considered to be moderate. Finally, if the three biggest companies have a combined market 
share below 50%, market concentration is presumed to be low. 
 
Production 
In table 7.13, market concentration statistics are presented of six European electricity and 
gas production markets.  
 
Table 7.13: Market concentration in electricity and gas production markets (approximate 
market share of three biggest producers between brackets) 
 Electricity  Gas 
 1999 2004  1999 2004 
Belgium 
High  
(97) 
High  
(95) 
 Import 
(-) 
Import 
(-) 
France 
High  
(98) 
High  
(96) 
 High  
(90) 
High  
(98) 
Germany 
Moderate 
(63) 
Moderate 
(72) 
 Moderate 
(54) 
High  
(80) 
Netherlands 
Moderate 
(64) 
Moderate 
(69) 
 High  
(80) 
High  
(85) 
Sweden 
High  
(77) 
High  
(86) 
 Import 
(-) 
Import 
(-) 
UK 
Low  
(44) 
Low  
(39) 
 Moderate 
(50) 
Low  
(36) 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 19); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 19). Second 
(Update) benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2003: 4); Fourth 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2005: 44, 55); OXERA 
(2006: 20); Öko-Institut (2005). EC: Electricity liberalisation indicators in Europe (2001); EREG (2005). 
 
Belgian, French and Swedish electricity production markets are highly concentrated from 
1999-2004. Regarding these three countries, there is a single company that holds a 
dominant position in electricity generation: Electrabel, EdF, and Vattenfall, respectively. 
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Germany and The Netherlands are moderately concentrated. In Germany, there are four 
large electricity producers: RWE, E.On, EnBW and Vattenfall. The Dutch market is also 
characterised by four large electricity producers: Essent, Nuon, Electrabel and E.On. The 
UK market is the most competitive market. The combined market share of the three biggest 
generators is below the critical level of 50%. Further, this ratio has declined from 44% in 
1999 to 39% in 2004.  
Regarding market concentration in European gas markets, it appears that gas 
markets are generally highly concentrated (see table 7.13). More than electricity markets, a 
single company has often been nominated to deal with national gas production or gas 
imports. For example, the largest gas production company in the Netherlands is NAM. 
NAM is a subsidiary of the Dutch state (50%). Shell and Exxon-Mobile each hold a 25% 
stake. However, NAM is not included in our sample of European energy incumbents as it 
is not involved in the sale of gas to retail customers. Regarding our sample companies, 
GdF is the largest gas production company in France. Further, Centrica (British Gas) used 
to be the incumbent monopolist in the UK. However, Centrica was required to transfer gas 
resources to other market players in order to promote a competitive market. Similar to 
electricity market concentration, UK has the most competitive gas market. Gas market 
concentration in Germany has risen from moderate in 1999 to high in 2004. This can be 
explained by several major acquisitions in the German gas market the in the period of 
investigation. For example, RWE merged its gas business with VEW in 2000 and E.On’s 
acquisition of Ruhrgas was finalised in 2003.  
 
Trade 
Historically, market players traded electricity and gas in bilateral contracts, which cover 
relatively long time periods. Regulatory reform has led to the introduction of wholesale 
markets for electricity and gas. Following the first benchmarking report (2001: 109) on the 
implementation of the internal electricity and gas markets, there are several advantages of 
wholesale markets over bilateral contracts. First, wholesale markets provide a transparent 
price. Second, wholesale markets offer flexibility as it is no longer necessary to perfectly 
match customer demand with generation/production capacity. Third, with regard to 
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electricity only, wholesale markets offer a more flexible pricing strategy when production 
volumes depend on climatic conditions (e.g. wind) or when oil or gas prices fluctuate.  
Wholesale markets are important for liberalisation to succeed and liquidity is an 
essential feature of a well developed wholesale market (Newbery, Von der Fehr and Van 
Damme 2003). According to Newbery et al. (2003: 1): “Liquid markets enable the 
immediate execution of standard orders, exhibit prices that are resilient to large orders, and 
have enough participants trading sufficient volume to ensure low transaction costs”. Figure 
7.14 presents liquidity figures of the six European electricity gas and wholesale markets. In 
the UK, both electricity and gas markets are liquid from 1999-2004. Swedish electricity 
trading, i.e. the Scandinavian electricity exchange NordPool, also benefits from sufficient 
liquidity. The remaining markets are not liquid or show limited levels of liquidity.  
 
Table 7.14: Liquidity of electricity and gas wholesale markets (1 = Yes; 0.5 = limited; 0 = No) 
 Electricity  Gas 
 1999 2004  1999 2004 
Belgium 0 0  0.5 0.5 
France 0 0  0 0 
Germany 0 0.5  0 0 
Netherlands 0.5 0.5  0 0.5 
Sweden 1 1  0 0 
UK 1 1  1 1 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 110). 
Fourth benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2005: 44, 55-56). 
 
Supply 
Supply involves the sale of energy to industrial or retail customers. Supply of electricity or 
gas (or both) to retail customers was one of the main considerations in the constitution of 
our research sample. Table 7.15 presents market concentration statistics of energy retail 
supply markets. Despite the EU energy objective of increased competitiveness, it appears 
that electricity retail supply market concentration in Germany and the UK has increased 
from 1999 to 2004, not decreased. Further, market concentration statistics of the other four 
countries have remained relatively stable over time. Regarding gas retail supply, it is 
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difficult to compare the statistics over time. This is because gas market data in 1999 
indicate the market share of the biggest gas retail supply company, whereas 2004 relates to 
the market share of the biggest three gas retail supply companies.  
 
Table 7.15: Market concentration in electricity and gas retail supply markets (approximate 
market share of three biggest suppliers between brackets) 
 Electricity  Gas 
 1999 2004  1999* 2004 
Belgium 
High  
(100) 
High  
(94) 
 High  
(95) 
High 
(99) 
France 
High  
(96) 
High  
(96) 
 High  
(95) 
High  
(n.a.) 
Germany 
Moderate 
(62) 
High  
(n.a.) 
 High  
(n.a.) 
High  
(n.a.) 
Netherlands 
High  
(80) 
High  
(83) 
 High  
(n.a.) 
High  
(83) 
Sweden 
Moderate 
(52) 
Moderate 
(50) 
 High  
(100) 
High  
(77) 
UK 
Low  
(37) 
Moderate 
(59) 
 Moderate 
(50) 
High  
(77) 
*Note: Gas data 1999 indicates market share of biggest gas retail supply company. 
Source: First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2001: 19); 
Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2002: 20); Fourth 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (2005: 45, 58). OXERA 
(2006: 21). 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have presented electricity and gas market statistics of six Northwest 
European countries. These statistics are beneficial in at least four ways. First, the statistics 
deepen the insights in the basic research context: the European energy industry. The six 
energy markets are the home countries of the sample companies selected in this thesis. 
Second, findings illustrate that the first EU energy objective – increased competitiveness – 
was not achieved in the period under investigation. On the contrary, several European 
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electricity and gas markets show a tendency towards increased market concentration from 
1999-2004. However, our interviews with an industry expert point at increased levels of 
competition after 2004. Table 7.16 shows aggregate market concentration levels of the six 
Northwest European electricity and gas markets. It can be concluded that the degree of 
market concentration in the six gas markets, on aggregate, is generally higher than in 
electricity markets. This can be explained by the shorter time horizon since the 
implementation of Directive 98/30/EC in gas (August 2000) compared with Directive 
96/92/EC in electricity (February 1999). Further, regarding energy production, gas 
exploration is generally more capital-intensive than electricity generation. New entrants in 
energy production may therefore prefer electricity production. 
 
Table 7.16: Conclusion on aggregate concentration levels in electricity and gas markets  
 Electricity Gas 
Production Moderately concentrated Highly concentrated 
Trade  Lack of liquidity  
(except UK and Sweden) 
Lack of liquidity  
(except UK) 
Retail supply Highly concentrated, but less 
than gas 
Highly concentrated, more than 
electricity 
 
Third, data provided in this chapter will be used to calculate scores of several independent 
variables. Hypothesis 2 relates to the concept of permeability. Permeability is 
operationalised as the percentage of market opening (see tables 7.7 and 7.8). The control 
variable resource position is calculated as yearly annual production divided by yearly 
annual consumption (see tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.5 and 7.6). The higher the score, the higher a 
country’s (and its incumbents) self-sufficiency in managing its resource flows. Finally, we 
have addressed the research sub-question (1b) at country level, how does regulatory reform 
diffuse across European energy markets from an empirical point of view. Findings suggest 
that differences in characteristics of regulatory reform across six EU energy markets have 
hampered the creation of a European level playing field in the period 1999-2004. With 
respect to market opening, countries have opened up their national markets for (foreign) 
competition at a different pace, which has resulted in unequal strategic renewal 
opportunities for firms across different countries. For example, since competition had 
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already been introduced in the UK electricity retail supply market before 1999, several 
foreign companies have successfully entered the UK in the period under investigation, 
including EdF. However, UK electricity companies did not have an equal opportunity to 
enter EdF’s home market because France kept its electricity retail supply market closed in 
the period 1999-2004. 
 In the next chapter, we will use the Pearson Chi-Square statistic to investigate if 
the relative incidence of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions differs 
across incumbent firms’ home countries (characterised by different patterns of regulatory 
reform). In addition, we will use the Pearson Chi-Square statistic to investigate if sector 
(electricity or gas) matters in incumbent firms’ choices of exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal actions. Further, binary regression analysis allows for a more 
sophisticated investigation of the relationship between governmental policy issues 
(including market opening as a proxy for permeability) and the nature of strategic renewal 
actions.  
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8 Strategic renewal paths in the European energy industry2  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 call for a multivariate analysis at strategic action level to investigate the 
(combined) effect of external dependency, permeability and mimicry on the likelihood that 
strategic actions of incumbent firms will be exploitation (or exploration), while controlling 
for a number of variables that can also have an impact on exploitation (or exploration). In 
paragraph 8.2, descriptive statistics are presented that indicate the relative incidence of 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions across countries and organisational 
fields. In addition, we graphically illustrate strategic renewal paths across countries, 
organisational fields and incumbent firms. In paragraph 8.3, strategic renewal paths are 
further analysed at strategic action level. We present binary logistic regression results of 
our sample of 1127 strategic actions from incumbent energy firms. Finally, in paragraph 
8.4, we apply a 5% level of significance to confirm or reject each of the hypotheses 1-3. 
We conclude by addressing the research questions (2a) which environmental determinants 
are related to firms’ exploitative strategic renewal actions and (3a) which environmental 
determinants are related to firms’ explorative strategic renewal actions? 
 
8.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
In table 8.1, the absolute and relative incidence of exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal actions are shown per country. The chance that a randomly selected strategic 
renewal action will be exploration is highest for Belgian firms (57.4%) and lowest for 
Swedish firms (36.8%). Due to the dichotomous nature of strategic renewal actions, the 
chance that a randomly selected strategic action will be exploitation is lowest for Belgian 
firms (42.6%) and highest for Swedish firms (63.2%).  
                                                          
2 Parts of this chapter are published as Stienstra, M., Van den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W.  
(2008) Strategic renewal paths in institutionalised environments. Working paper presented at the 2nd 
JMS Conference, September 23 – 25, Oxford, United Kingdom.   
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From table 8.1, it further appears that French and UK firms score quite similar on 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions. Likewise, Swedish and German 
firms show much similarity. From the last column in table 8.1, it appears that there is a 
43.1% chance of randomly selecting an explorative strategic renewal action from the total 
sample. In this respect, strategic renewal actions undertaken by Belgian and Dutch firms 
have an above-average exploration probability, while actions from French, German, 
Swedish and UK firms have a below-average exploration probability. In addition, we used 
the Pearson Chi-Square statistic to determine whether firms from different countries differ 
in their strategic renewal behaviour. Results indicate a Pearson Chi-Square value of 21.2, 
which relates to a p value of (0.00). At a 1% level of significance, the null hypothesis that 
the nature of a strategic renewal action is independent of country should be rejected. In 
other words, country matters in the nature of strategic renewal actions. Cramer’s V (0.14) 
indicates the strength of the relationship.  
Figure 8.1 graphically illustrates how incumbent firms from the same country – 
on aggregate – balance between exploitative and explorative strategic renewal activities 
over time. Exploration ratio is used as a metric, which is calculated by dividing the total 
number of explorative strategic renewal actions in a year by the total number of actions 
(exploration and exploitation) in a year. An exploration ratio of 0.50 indicates that the 
number of exploitative strategic renewal actions equals the number of explorative strategic 
renewal actions in a year. Overall, incumbents set out with relatively high levels of 
explorative strategic renewal actions in 1999, show a tendency towards decreased 
explorative activity in the years thereafter, but put increased emphasis on explorative 
strategic renewal actions in 2004. Further, in 2003, incumbent energy firms preferred 
exploitative strategic renewal actions over explorative strategic renewal in all six countries. 
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Figure 8.1: Strategic renewal paths across six countries in the EU energy industry 
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N Belgium = 136; N France = 210; N Germany = 354; N Netherlands = 201; N Sweden = 106; N UK = 120;  
N Total = 1127. Source: based on company annual reports and Financial Times articles.  
  
Table 8.2 displays exploitative and explorative strategic renewal action statistics split up by 
organisational field. The chance that a randomly selected strategic renewal action will be 
exploration is highest in the electricity sector (46.3%) and lowest in the gas sector (37.4%). 
Applying similar reasoning, the chance that a randomly selected strategic renewal action 
will be exploitation is lowest in the electricity sector (53.7%) and highest in the gas sector 
(62.6%). Results further indicate a Pearson Chi-Square value of 8.36, which relates to a p 
value of (0.00). At a 1% level of significance, the null hypothesis that the nature of a 
strategic renewal action is independent of organisational field should be rejected. This 
suggests that organisational field matters in the nature of strategic renewal actions. 
However, Cramer’s V (0.09) indicates a less strong relationship at organisational field 
level than at country level (Cramer’s V = 0.14). Figure 8.2 displays how strategic renewal 
paths of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions evolve over time across 
organisational fields. 
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Figure 8.2: Strategic renewal paths across organisational fields in the EU energy industry  
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Source: based on company annual reports and Financial Times articles. 
 
Except for the year 2004, one can see that the electricity sector has a higher exploration 
ratio than the gas sector. This may suggests that electricity and gas are characterised by 
different sector business models, which prescribe the sources of value that can be created 
within an industry (e.g. Grant 2002; Rodrigues and Child 2003). Regarding the energy 
production segment, for example, it appears from our database of strategic renewal actions 
that electricity (rather than gas) is often generated in a number of ways that are novel to the 
firm, e.g. biomass, wind, solar and wave tidal.  
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able 8.1: E
xploitative and explorative strategic renew
al actions across countries   
Strategic 
actions 
C
ountry 
 
Belgium
 
France 
G
erm
any 
N
etherlands 
Sw
eden 
U
K
 
Total 
 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
Exploration  
78 
57.4%
 
88 
41.9%
 
132 
37.3%
 
99 
49.3%
 
39 
36.8%
 
50 
41.7%
 
486 
43.1%
 
Exploitation 
58 
42.6%
 
122 
58.1%
 
222 
62.7%
 
102 
50.7%
 
67 
63.2%
 
70 
58.3%
 
641 
56.9%
 
Total 
136 
 
210 
 
354 
 
201 
 
106 
 
120 
 
1127 
 
 Table 8.2: E
xploitative and explorative strategic renew
al actions across organisational fields   
Strategic 
actions 
O
rganisational field 
 
Electricity 
G
as 
Total 
 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
N
 
Perc. 
Exploration  
334 
46.3%
 
152 
37.4%
 
486 
43.1%
 
Exploitation 
387 
53.7%
 
254 
62.6%
 
641 
56.9%
 
Total 
721 
 
406 
 
1127 
 
 
126
 112 
Figure 8.3 presents strategic renewal paths of energy incumbents that operate in the same 
macro institutional context of The Netherlands. From the figure, one can see that the three 
Dutch energy incumbents display quite homogeneous strategic renewal paths from 1999 to 
2002. However, as from 2003 on, the strategic renewal paths start to diverge from each 
other. 
 
Figure 8.3: Strategic renewal paths across incumbent firms in the Dutch energy industry  
0.00
0.50
1.00
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Ex
pl
or
at
io
n 
ra
tio
Essent
Nuon
Eneco
N Essent = 72; N Nuon = 70; N Eneco = 59; N Total = 201 
Source: based on company annual reports and Financial Times articles. 
 
8.3 Inter-organisational institutional determinants of exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal actions 
  
So far, the findings are based on static comparison of groups. However, our hypotheses 
call for a multivariate analysis. Binary logistic regression is used to predict the outcome of 
a dichotomous dependent variable based on (a number of) independent variables. From 
figures 8.1 – 8.3, we learn that there is sufficient variation in the dependent variable, which 
is an important assumption in regression analysis. Contrary to OLS regression, binary 
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logistic regression does not assume linearity between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable. Binary logistic regression applies the maximum likelihood estimation, 
which concerns the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable to occur or not 
(e.g. Bowen and Wiersema 2004; Hoetker 2007). Furthermore, binary logistic regression 
does not require normally distributed variables and does not assume homoscedasticity.  In 
our study, binary logistic regression estimates the probability the most frequent category of 
strategic renewal to occur (i.e. exploitative strategic renewal actions).  
 
Model specification and assessment (goodness of fit) 
The main dependent variable, nature of strategic renewal action, is modeled as a 
dichotomous variable which takes two numbers of discrete values: exploitation (1) versus 
exploration (0). Our explanatory variables differ in type of scale: involvement of external 
parties is a categorical variable (yes or no), market opening is a continuous variable and 
mimicry will be analysed using a set of firm dummies. The dummy variable Gaz de France 
(GdF) is left out and regression results of other firm dummy variable are therefore 
interpreted with reference to GdF. Our control variables also differ in type of scale. Time 
will be controlled for using a set of year dummies (1999 is left out), geographic location is 
a categorical variable (international market or domestic market) and resource position is a 
continuous variable.  
In table 8.3, binary logistic regression results are presented. The first column (null 
model) is the baseline prediction. There is a 56.9% chance of blindly estimating the most 
frequent category of strategic renewal actions (i.e. exploitation).  The second column 
(controls model) explains the effect of the control variables on the dependent variable. The 
third column (full model) explains the combined effect of both control and explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable. Before individual hypotheses can be examined, one 
has to examine overall model significance and goodness of fit. The chi-square goodness-
of-fit test tests the null-hypothesis that the step from the controls model to the full model is 
justified. This step is justified as the significance level (p = 0.00) is less than the critical 
value of (0.05). The Hosmer Lemeshow test computes a chi-square from observed and 
expected frequencies. In the controls model, a p-value of (0.61) is computed from a chi-
square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom. In the full model, a p-value of (0.13) is 
128
 114 
computed from a chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom. If the Hosmer 
Lemeshow statistic is (0.05) or less, one has to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between observed and predicted values of strategic renewal actions. As our 
Hosmer Lemeshow statistics exceed (0.05) in both models, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. This implies that our models fit the data adequately, which suggests a 
significant explanation of the variance in the nature of strategic renewal actions.  
 Pseudo R-Squares are attempts to resemble R-Square in OLS regression (Hoetker 
2007). SPSS reports the Nagelkerke R-Square, which ranges from 0 to 1. Our controls 
model shows a Nagelkerke R-Square of (0.02). This has been increased to (0.22) in the full 
model. The higher the pseudo R-square, the more significant the full model compared to 
the null model (Bowen and Wiersema 2004). The proportion of correct predications is 
another measure of fit, which indicates how well the model fits in terms of predictive 
ability (Bowen and Wiersema 2004). From table 8.3, it appears that the controls model 
accurately predicts 58.3% of all observations. This has been raised to 70.1% in our full 
model. While the overall proportion of correct predictions seems reasonably good at 
70.1%, one should note that blindly estimating the most frequent category (exploitation) 
yields a percentage of 56.9 correctly predicted estimations. Following Long (1997) and 
Train (1986), we emphasise that the proportion of correct predictions is not predicting 
exploitation (or exploration) in a given instance. Rather, it relates to the proportion of 
times that the nature of strategic renewal actions is correctly predicted in repeated trials. In 
for example 100 trials, we expect 70 strategic renewal actions being predicted correctly.  
 
Table 8.3: Binary logistic regression results predicting exploitation (versus exploration)  
Variable Model 
 Null model Controls model Full model 
 B  Odds B  Odds B  Odds 
Constant 
 
0.28** 1.32 0.13 1.14 -0.66* 0.52 
Year 2000 
  
  0.29 1.34 -0.11 0.90 
Year 2001 
 
  0.39 1.48 0.21 1.23 
Year 2002 
 
  0.52* 1.69 0.12 1.12 
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Year 2003 
 
  0.64** 1.89 0.28 1.32 
Year 2004 
 
  0.24 1.27 0.08 1.08 
Geographic location 
 
  0.12 1.01 -0.53** 0.59 
Resource position 
 
  -0.20* 0.82 -0.36** 0.70 
Regulative forces: 
 
      
External dependency 
 
    1.77** 5.89 
Normative forces: 
 
      
Permeability 
 
    1.24* 3.45 
Cognitive forces: 
 
      
Firm 1 (Essent) 
  
    0.20 1.23 
Firm 2 (Nuon) 
 
    -0.45 0.64 
Firm 3 (Eneco) 
 
    -0.08 0.93 
Firm 4 (Vattenfall) 
 
    -0.33 0.72 
Firm 5 (Centrica) 
 
    -0.55 0.58 
Firm 6 (SSE) 
 
    -1.11 0.33 
Firm 7 (E.On) 
 
    -0.68 0.51 
Firm 8 (RWE) 
 
    -1.04 0.36 
Firm 9 (EnBW) 
 
    -0.70 0.50 
Firm 10 (Electrabel) 
 
    -0.57 0.56 
Firm 11 (Distrigas) 
 
    -0.88 0.41 
Firm 12 (EdF) 
 
    0.26 1.30 
 
Chi-square goodness of fit 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
Hosmer Lemeshow test 
  
0.61 
 
0.13 
 
Nagelkerke R-Square 
  
0.02 
 
0.22 
 
Predictability 
 
56.9% 
 
58.3% 
 
70.1% 
N = 1127; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Results 
Table 8.3 reports the estimated coefficients for the binary logistic model that indicate the 
nature of the relationship between independent variables and exploitation. Furthermore, 
our model estimates the effect that independent variables have on the probability that a 
strategic action will be exploitation. Unfortunately, the non-linear nature of logistic models 
complicates the interpretation of results (Hoetker 2007). Logistic regression results are 
therefore often interpreted in terms of odds effects, which indicates the effect that a one 
unit change in an independent variable will have on the odds in favour of outcome y = 1 
versus y = 0 (Bowen and Wiersema 2004). The effect of a one unit change in a variable on 
the odds of the dependent variable is the exponential of that variable’s coefficient. In our 
study, and considering the effect of a one unit change in a particular independent variable, 
an odds ratio of 1 means that exploration and exploitation are equally likely to occur. 
Concerning an odds ratio of 2, this means that exploitation is twice more likely to occur 
than exploration. On the other hand, odds ratio’s less than 1 increase the odds of 
exploration to occur. For example, an odds ratio of 0.5 tells that exploration is twice more 
likely to occur than exploitation. An advantage of the odds ratio is its independency from 
other variable in the model (Bowen and Wiersema 2004). Odds effects are listed in the 
right-sided columns in table 8.3. 
The results in table 8.3 indicate that external dependency is positively related to 
exploitative strategic renewal actions (b = 1.77). An odds-ratio of 5.89 tells that the 
likelihood of exploitation is almost 6 times higher when a firm depends on external 
institutional constituents in the realisation of a strategic renewal action. Further, we found 
a positive relationship between the degree of permeability and exploitation (b = 1.24). A 
one percent increase in market opening increases the odds of strategic renewal actions 
being exploitation by a factor 3.5. Finally, our findings allow investigating the extent to 
which the likelihood of a strategic renewal action being exploitation (or exploration) is 
contingent upon the extent to which other firms’ strategic renewal actions are exploitation 
(or exploration). Using GdF as the reference category, we found that the twelve other firms 
do not differ significantly from GdF in the likelihood of exploitation (or exploration), 
which suggests that firms have modeled their strategic renewal actions to each other in the 
period 1999-2004.  
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8.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have empirically addressed research question (2a) which environmental 
determinants are related to firms’ exploitative strategic renewal actions and (3a) which 
environmental determinants are related to firms’ explorative strategic renewal actions? To 
conclude, we test hypotheses 1-3 applying a 5% level of significance (see table 8.4).  
 
Table 8.4: Hypotheses testing at industry level 
Hypothesis Supported 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of external dependency in an organisational 
field, the greater the likelihood that strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms are 
of an exploitative nature. 
Yes 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of permeability in an organisational field, the 
greater the likelihood that strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms are of an 
explorative nature. 
No 
Hypothesis 3: Incumbent firms mimic competitor firms in the realisation of 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions.   
Yes 
 
Binary logistic regression results indicate that all three inter-organisational institutional 
predictor variables identified in paragraph 5.3 significantly influence exploitative and 
explorative strategic renewal actions. First, the more a firm depends on external 
institutional constituents for resources, the greater the likelihood that a strategic renewal 
action will be exploitation. Similarly, due to the dichotomous nature of exploitation and 
exploration, the less a firm depends on external institutional constituents for resources, the 
greater the likelihood that a strategic renewal action will be exploration. Second, the higher 
the degree of permeability, the greater the likelihood that a strategic renewal action will be 
exploitation (and not exploration). Similarly, the lower the degree of permeability, the 
greater the likelihood that a strategic renewal action will be exploration. Third, the 
likelihood of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions is roughly equal across 
incumbent firms in the Northwest European energy industry, which suggests mimetic 
behaviour. In the next chapter, we will investigate intra-organisational antecedents of 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal.  
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9 Strategic renewal at organisational unit level of Dutch energy firms 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Hypotheses 4-6 call for a multivariate analysis at organisational unit level. OLS regression 
allows investigating the (combined) effect of intra-organisational institutional explanatory 
variables on exploitative and explorative strategic renewal, while controlling for a number 
of unit characteristics that can also have an impact on exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal. In paragraph 9.2, we present descriptive statistics of the main study variables 
across the two sample firms. Further, we present a correlation matrix of all variables in the 
regression analyses.  In paragraph 9.3 we present OLS regression results of a sample of 
111 organisational units. More specifically, hierarchical moderated regression analysis will 
be used to test hypotheses 4 and 5. In order to investigate independency of the two 
dependent variables specified in hypothesis 6a (exploitative strategic renewal) and 6b 
(explorative strategic renewal), we use a standard procedure to check for mediating effects 
when testing both hypotheses. Finally, in paragraph 9.4, we apply a 5% level of 
significance to confirm or reject each of the hypotheses 4-6. We conclude by addressing 
research question (2b) which internal factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards 
exploitative strategic renewal actions and (3b) which internal factors influence a firm’s 
proclivity towards explorative strategic renewal actions? 
 
9.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Our sample consists of 111 organisational units from two major Dutch energy companies, 
which will be referred to as firm A and B. Further, within company A and B, 
organisational units were sampled from nine and two divisions, respectively. Table 9.1 
classifies the hierarchical embeddedness of organisational units in divisions and firms. 
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Table 9.1: Hierarchical embeddedness of organisational units  
Firm Division # Organisational units 
A 1 19 
 2 14 
 3 16 
 4 7 
 5 1 
 6 2 
 7 7 
 8 1 
 9 13 
B 10 18 
 11 13 
 
Table 9.2 displays means and standard deviations of the main study variables across the 
two companies. We used T-tests to determine whether selected units that belong to 
different companies, on average, differ significantly in the main study variables. T-values 
for explorative strategic renewal, exploitative strategic renewal, entrepreneurial proclivity, 
intra-organisational regulative forces and inter-organisational regulative forces are -0.714, 
-0.246, 0.392, 2.080 and 0.362, respectively. 
 
Table 9.2: Comparison of main study variables across firms  
Study variable Company P-Value 
 A B  
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  
Explorative strategic renewal 3.65 1.48 3.87 1.30 0.48 
Exploitative strategic renewal 4.77 1.05 4.82 0.99 0.81 
Entrepreneurial proclivity 4.55 0.99 4.47 0.85 0.70 
Intra-organisational regulative forces 4.63 1.08 4.14 1.17 0.04 
Inter-organisational regulative forces 5.57 0.98 5.50 0.82 0.72 
N Company A = 80; N Company B = 31 
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From table 9.2, it appears that organisational units from firm A and B do not differ 
significantly in the degree of explorative strategic renewal, exploitative strategic renewal, 
entrepreneurial proclivity and inter-organisational regulative forces. Yet, units from firm A 
and B differ in the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces when applying a 5% 
level of significance. In addition, we used ANOVA to examine potential differences in 
study variables among divisions. F-values for explorative strategic renewal, exploitative 
strategic renewal, entrepreneurial proclivity, intra-organisational regulative forces and 
inter-organisational regulative forces are 1.700, 0.257, 0.707, 2.020 and 0.890, 
respectively. Applying a 5% level of significance, we again find that organisational units 
on average differ significantly in the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces across 
divisions. From table 9.2, it furthermore appears that units on average score higher on 
exploitative strategic renewal than on explorative strategic renewal. Also, the extent of 
inter-organisational regulative forces is perceived higher than the extent of intra-
organisational regulative forces. 
So far, our findings are based on static comparison of groups (companies and 
divisions respectively). However, our hypotheses call for a multivariate analysis. OLS 
regression is used, which allows investigating the effect of explanatory variables on 
exploitation and exploration, while simultaneously controlling for a number of 
organisational unit characteristics that can also have an impact on exploitation or 
exploration. In table 9.3, descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of all control, 
independent and dependent variables are presented. Because of roughly equal outcomes in 
the main study variables across companies and divisions, we decided to control for 
company effects only in our analyses. As qualitative variables with n values are modeled 
with n-1 dummy variables, we use one dummy variable in which company A is the 
reference group. From table 9.3, the highest bivariate correlation (r = 0.60) appears to be 
between entrepreneurial proclivity and exploitative strategic renewal. Moreover, the 
variables discipline dominance, connectedness and decision-making correlate significantly 
(p < 0.01) with at least one of the main dependent variables, which supports our 
considerations to control our analyses for these effects. 
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9.3 Intra-organisational institutional determinants of exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal actions 
 
We used hierarchical moderated regression analysis to investigate hypotheses 4 and 5 (see 
table 9.4). Three models are constructed to explain exploitative strategic renewal. The first 
model explains the combined effect of the control and moderating variables on exploitative 
strategic renewal. The second model explains the effect of intra-organisational regulative 
forces on exploitative strategic renewal in addition to the variables in model 1. The third 
model explains the moderating effect of inter-organisational regulative forces on the 
relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic 
renewal in addition to the variables in model 2. Hierarchical regression allows 
investigating if added variables make a significant contribution in explaining the 
dependent variable (Significant F change). Adjusted R² indicates how much of the variance 
in the dependent variable is explained by all independent variables. Multicollinearity 
occurs when two or more independent variables are highly correlated. In this respect, the 
regression cannot disentangle the individual effect of each variable on the dependent 
variable (Carver and Nash 2000). To limit multicollinearity, inter-organisational regulative 
forces and intra-organisational regulative forces were mean centered before creating the 
interaction term (e.g. Aiken and West 1991). The variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates 
the degree to which each independent variable is explained by all other independent 
variables (Hair et al. 1998). Variables that exceed a VIF score of 10 are assumed to 
correlate highly with one or more other independent variables (Hair et al. 1998). All of the 
variables entered in model 3 have a VIF score below 1.6, which suggests that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in our analyses. Finally, the Durbin Watson statistic is 
used in order to detect autocorrelation. Autocorrelation implies correlation between 
residuals in period t-1 and residuals in period t. If the Durbin Watson statistic has a score 
of 2, there is no autocorrelation. Our Durbin Watson scores indicate that we have no or 
little autocorrelation. Other statistical considerations, i.e. constant variance of error terms 
and normality of the error term distribution do not raise any concerns.   
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Table 9.4: Linear regression results predicting exploitative strategic renewal  
Variable Exploitative strategic renewal 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 1.54* 0.99 1.59* 
Control variables and moderator:    
Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Discipline dominance 0.19** 0.18** 0.20** 
Connectedness 0.30** 0.26* 0.25* 
Decision-making -0.13* -0.17** -0.15** 
Company 0.01 0.10 0.09 
Inter-organisational regulative forces 0.25* 0.25* 0.12 
Independent variables:    
Intra-organisational regulative forces  0.20* 0.19* 
Interaction term:    
Intra-organisational regulative forces x 
Inter-organisational regulative forces 
  0.20** 
    
R² 0.33 0.37 0.41 
Adjusted R² 0.29 0.33 0.37 
Significant F Change 0.00** 0.01* 0.01** 
Durbin Watson 2.03 2.07 2.13 
Unstandardised regression coefficients; N = 111; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
We use the results from model 3 to interpret our findings. First, we find a significant 
positive relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative 
strategic renewal (b = 0.19). In addition, inter-organisational regulative forces positively 
moderates the relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative 
strategic renewal (b = 0.20). This finding is graphically illustrated in figure 9.1. To create 
the lines, all variables in model 3 took the value of their mean (see table 9.3), except inter-
organisational regulative forces and intra-organisational regulative forces. These two 
variables took values of one standard deviation below (low) and above (high) the mean.    
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From figure 9.1, one can see that there is a positive relationship between intra-
organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal, even when the degree 
of inter-organisational regulative forces is low. When respondents perceive a high degree 
of inter-organisational regulative forces, the positive relationship between intra-
organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal strengthens. The 
significant positive interaction term (table 9.4) indicates that the slopes of the two lines in 
figure 9.1 differ significantly from each other.    
 
Figure 9.1: The moderating effect of inter-organisational regulative forces 
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Hypothesis 6 specifies a relationship between one explanatory variable (entrepreneurial 
proclivity as a proxy of institutional entrepreneurship) and two dependent variables 
(exploitative strategic renewal and explorative strategic renewal). In order to check for the 
possibility of interdependence between the two dependent variables, we used a standard 
procedure to investigate: (1) if exploitative strategic renewal mediates the relationship 
between entrepreneurial proclivity and explorative strategic renewal; or (2) if explorative 
strategic renewal mediates the relationship between entrepreneurial proclivity and 
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exploitative strategic renewal. To test for a mediating effect, three conditions have to be 
met (e.g. Baron and Kenny 1986). First, the independent variable should significantly 
predict the mediating variable. Second, the independent variable should significantly 
predict the dependent variable without the mediating variable. Third, regressing the 
dependent variable on both the independent variable and the mediating variable should 
lead to a significant relationship between the mediating variable and the dependent 
variable, while attenuating the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable. In this respect, the mediating variable takes over predictive power of 
the independent variable in explaining the dependent variable. When the independent 
variable is no longer significantly related to the dependent variable after the third step, this 
is referred to as full mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986).  
 
Table 9.5: Linear regression results predicting exploitative and explorative strategic renewal 
Variable Exploitative 
strategic renewal 
Explorative  
strategic renewal 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.93 2.33* 1.92 
Control variables:    
Size 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Discipline dominance 0.15** 0.07 0.01 
Connectedness 0.20* -0.04 -0.12 
Decision-making -0.03 -0.19* -0.18* 
Company 0.11 0.27 0.22 
Independent variables:    
Entrepreneurial proclivity  0.49** 0.39* 0.17 
Exploitative strategic renewal   0.45** 
    
R² 0.43 0.18 0.24 
Adjusted R² 0.39 0.13 0.18 
F value 12.86** 3.70** 4.53** 
Durbin Watson 1.92 2.20 2.18 
Unstandardised regression coefficients; N = 111; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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From our analyses, we find that exploitative strategic renewal mediates the relationship 
between entrepreneurial proclivity and explorative strategic renewal. This has been 
illustrated in table 9.5, which presents the three steps (model 1-3) to test for the mediating 
effect of exploitative strategic renewal. Model 1 tests the relationship between 
entrepreneurial proclivity and exploitative strategic renewal. Findings indicate a significant 
positive relationship (b = 0.49). Model 2 tests the relationship between entrepreneurial 
proclivity and explorative strategic renewal. Findings indicate a significant positive 
relationship (b = 0.39). These two steps are initially supportive for hypothesis 6a and 6b, 
respectively. However, when regressing explorative strategic renewal on both 
entrepreneurial proclivity and exploitative strategic renewal in model 3, findings show a 
significant relationship between exploitative strategic renewal and explorative strategic 
renewal (b = 0.45), while the relationship between entrepreneurial proclivity and 
explorative strategic renewal (hypothesis 6b) is no longer significant. This indicates a full 
mediation effect of exploitative strategic renewal on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial proclivity and explorative strategic renewal. More specifically, our findings 
indicate that a one point increase in exploitative strategic renewal increases explorative 
strategic renewal by 0.45, which suggests that firms have to achieve relatively high levels 
of exploitation when engaging in any substantial amount of exploration. 
All the variables in the three models have VIF scores below 2, suggesting no 
multicollinearity problems. Durbin Watson scores indicate no or little autocorrelation in 
the three models. Finally, statistical assumptions regarding constant variance of error terms 
and normality of the error term distribution are met.   
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, we test hypotheses 4-6 applying a 5% level of significance. More 
specifically, hypotheses 4 and 5 are tested based on the outcomes of the third model in 
table 9.4. Hypothesis 6a is tested by using the findings of the first model in table 9.5, 
whereas hypothesis 6b is tested by using the findings of the third model. From table 9.6, it 
appears that hypotheses 4, 5 and 6a are supported, while hypothesis 6b is not.  
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Table 9.6: Hypotheses testing at organisational unit level 
Hypothesis Supported 
Hypothesis 4: At organisational unit level, the extent of intra-organisational 
regulative forces is positively related to the degree of exploitative strategic renewal. 
Yes 
Hypothesis 5: At organisational unit level, the extent of inter-organisational 
regulative forces positively moderates the relationship between intra-organisational 
regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal. 
Yes 
Hypothesis 6a: At organisational unit level, the extent of institutional 
entrepreneurship is positively related to the degree of exploitative strategic renewal.   
Yes 
Hypothesis 6b: At organisational unit level, the extent of institutional 
entrepreneurship is positively related to the degree of explorative strategic renewal.   
No 
 
In this chapter, we have empirically addressed research question (2b) which internal 
factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards exploitative strategic renewal actions and (3b) 
which internal factors influence a firm’s proclivity towards explorative strategic renewal 
actions? OLS regression results indicate that the identified intra-organisational institutional 
predictor variables significantly explain exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. 
First, the degree of intra-organisational regulative forces is positively related to the degree 
of exploitative strategic renewal.  However, this relationship is contingent upon the extent 
of inter-organisational regulative forces. If the extent of inter-organisational regulative 
forces is high, there is a strong positive relationship between the extent of intra-
organisational regulative forces and the degree of exploitative strategic renewal. If the 
extent of inter-organisational regulative forces is low, there is a less strong positive 
relationship between the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces and the degree of 
exploitative strategic renewal. Second, the extent of institutional entrepreneurship is 
initially positively related to both exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. However, 
from our analyses, it appears that exploitative strategic renewal fully mediates the 
relationship between the extent of institutional entrepreneurship and the degree of 
explorative strategic renewal. In the next chapter, we will discuss the research findings that 
were presented in this and the previous chapter. 
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10 Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
In this final chapter, we start with a discussion of our main findings in paragraph 10.2. In 
paragraph 10.3, we describe theoretical and methodological/empirical limitations of the 
research. From these limitations, we explore directions for future research. Paragraph 10.4 
discusses the major scientific and managerial contributions of this study. Regarding the 
latter, we apply the strategic renewal framework that was presented in paragraph 3.3 to 
discuss implications for practitioners. Finally, in paragraph 10.5, we conclude by 
addressing our main research problem of – in the context of regulatory environments – 
how and to what extent incumbent firms undertake strategic renewal actions in pursuit of a 
competitive advantage.  
 
10.2 Discussion of main findings 
 
At inter-organisational level of analysis, a new institutional theory approach was adopted 
and three hypotheses were specified that predict how a firm’s strategic renewal actions are 
influenced by regulative, normative and cognitive forces in an organisational field. Starting 
with inter-organisational regulative forces, hypothesis 1 predicts that the higher the degree 
of external dependency in an organisational field, the greater the likelihood that strategic 
renewal actions of incumbent firms are of an exploitative nature. In line with hypothesis 1, 
findings indicate that strategic renewal actions have the odds in favour of exploitation to 
the extent that firms depend on external institutional parties for resources in the realisation 
of the strategic action. Similarly, strategic renewal actions that arise from within 
organisational boundaries have the odds in favour of exploration. This is also supported by 
D’Aunno et al. (2000), who found support that those firms that meet regulatory 
requirements are less likely to make divergent changes (i.e. explorative strategic renewal).  
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In the context of inter-organisational normative forces, hypothesis 2 predicts that 
the higher the degree of permeability in an organisational field, the greater the likelihood 
that strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms are of an explorative nature. Contrary to 
our expectations, findings point at significant increased exploitative activity – not 
exploratory activity – after an increase in sector permeability. Using market opening as a 
proxy, it is likely that European incumbent energy firms already formed the normative 
context for each other before deregulation. As Walker et al. (2002: 91) argue: “In contrast 
to entrants, whose variation in strategy and performance reflects the relative uncertainty of 
the new deregulated era, incumbent strategies are initially constrained by the investment 
policies formed in the much more certain competitive conditions of regulation”. Then, as 
the market opens, firms become more and more focused on becoming as efficient as 
possible in order to beat each other. Silverman et al. (1997: 31) point out:  “Managers 
simultaneously face a novel focus on operating efficiency and an onslaught of new 
competitors”. This has also been confirmed in one of our discussions conducted with a 
leading industry expert in which it was emphasised that managers have first strived for 
operational excellence in existing businesses (i.e. exploitative strategic renewal) before 
exploring new ways of wealth generation (i.e. explorative strategic renewal) in the face of 
deregulation. Perhaps, managers of incumbent energy firms may have taken a longer time 
perspective to engage in explorative strategic renewal after an increase in permeability 
than the one given credit for in this study.  
Regarding inter-organisational cognitive forces, hypothesis 3 predicts that 
incumbent firms mimic competitor firms in the realisation of exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal actions. The extent to which firms model strategic renewal actions after 
each other was analysed using a set of firm dummy variables. Findings indicate that none 
of the twelve European incumbents differed significantly from GdF in the likelihood of 
exploitative (or explorative) strategic renewal actions, which suggests mimetic behaviour 
among the sample firms. Although we have no statistical reasons to reject hypothesis 3, we 
acknowledge that our findings may insufficiently explain mimetic behaviour. Concluding 
on mimetic behaviour because our sample firms do not differ significantly from each other 
in exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions leaves important issues 
unanswered. Did firms indeed mimic competitors that they perceived successful? 
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Similarity can also result from firms’ embeddedness in a homogeneous institutional 
context at industry level. In this respect, we have tested the basic assumption of new 
institutional theory that firms are homogeneous entities (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). 
Moreover, taking a random company from the sample, are the remaining twelve sample 
companies really its peers? Furthermore, not all strategic actions seem suitable for 
imitation. Focusing mimetic behaviour on particular strategic renewal efforts (e.g. those 
actions that relate to green energy), rather than a firm’s complete bundle of strategic 
actions, will most certainly better reflect empirical reality.  
Overall, at inter-organisational level of analysis, our results indicate that firms 
face pressures from Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism simultaneously (e.g. 
Wicks 2001). Although selection arguments seemed plausible for the first two hypotheses, 
mimetic behaviour implies following adaptations that others found successful. Though it is 
not firm idiosyncratic adaptation, it is adaptation to look alike. Theorising mimetic 
behaviour, therefore, blurs in a sense the boundaries between selection and adaptation. In 
this respect, selection can also be understood from collective adaptations of firms in an 
organisational field. 
Building upon old institutionalism, neo institutionalism and institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, we have specified three hypotheses that relate intra-
organisational institutional predictor variables to exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal. From an old institutional theory perspective, hypothesis 4 predicts a positive 
relationship between the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces and the degree of 
exploitative strategic renewal. Our findings support hypothesis 4. The extent of intra-
organisational institutional forces is positively related to routine behaviour. However, as 
has been argued in chapter 4, intra-organisational regulative forces are not the sole 
institutional constituent of old institutional theory. Although regulatory issues are of focal 
interest in this thesis, two of our control variables also tap into the domain of the intra-
organisational institutional context. First, in the context of intra-organisational normative 
forces, the extent of discipline dominance (i.e. high percentage of employees with the same 
educational background) is positively related to the degree of exploitative strategic 
renewal. Second, in the context of intra-organisational cognitive forces, the degree of 
connectedness (i.e. interaction between organisational members) is also positively related 
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to the degree of exploitative strategic renewal. Thus, at intra-organisational level of 
analysis, our findings indicate that organisational units experience pressures for 
exploitative strategic renewal from Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism 
simultaneously (e.g. Wicks 2001). 
From a neo institutional theory point of view, we argued that the strength of the 
relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic 
renewal does not exist in an organisational vacuum, but is affected by the inter-
organisational regulatory context. This argument was specified as hypothesis 5, which 
predicts that the extent of inter-organisational regulative forces positively moderates the 
relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic 
renewal. Findings indeed indicate that the strength of the relationship between intra-
organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic renewal is contingent upon the 
extent of inter-organisational institutional forces. High inter-organisational regulative 
forces provoke regulatory legitimacy, or “consonance with relevant rules or laws” (Scott 
2001: 45), which creates and reinforces routine behaviour intended to make firms reliable 
and accountable for their performance (D’Aunno et al. 2000). Results from hypothesis 5 
contribute to the understanding how environmental selection and firm level adaptation are 
interrelated in the context of regulation.  
Adopting an institutional entrepreneurship lens, hypothesis 6 predicts that the 
extent of institutional entrepreneurship is positively related to (a) the degree of exploitative 
strategic renewal and (b) the degree of explorative strategic renewal. Using entrepreneurial 
proclivity (Griffith et al. 2006) as a proxy of institutional entrepreneurship, we find a 
significant positive relationship between entrepreneurial proclivity and the degree of 
exploitative strategic renewal. Further, although the extent of entrepreneurial proclivity 
and the degree of explorative strategic renewal is initially significant, subsequent analyses 
reveal that it is no longer significant when modeling exploitative strategic renewal as a 
mediating variable between entrepreneurial proclivity and explorative strategic renewal. In 
the context of our results, organisational units enter explorative strategic renewal from 
exploitative strategic renewal, not the other way around. This contributes to the question of 
how exploitative and explorative processes relate to each other (e.g. Crossan et al. 1999; 
Holmqvist 2004). Adopting an organisational learning framework, Holmqvist (2004: 71) 
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argues that “exploitation can become a cause of exploration”. Following Nelson and 
Winter (1982: 129), Malerba and Brusoni (2007: 5) emphasise that innovation does not 
happen in a vacuum, but that the institutional context matters: “One way in which the 
routine functioning of an organization can contribute to the emergence of innovation is that 
useful questions arise in the form of puzzles or anomalies relating to prevailing routines”. 
Paradoxically, an increased emphasis on exploitation involves an increased exploration for 
new solutions to overcome those problems associated with exploitation. This is referred to 
as opening up: “the organization creates variety in experience by opening up to new 
sources of experience” Holmqvist (2004: 72). Overall, our findings put limits on the idea 
that embedding agency in the organisational structure acts as an internal adaptation 
mechanism of both exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. Rather, our findings 
point at the internal (institutional) selection environment (e.g. Burgelman 1983; Galunic 
and Eisenhardt 1996) as a predictor of explorative strategic renewal in regulatory 
environments. 
 
10.3 Limitations and future research 
 
Unfortunately, this study is not without limitations. We discuss both theoretical and 
methodological/empirical limitations and suggest interesting issues for future research. At 
least three theoretical limitations deserve special attention. First, although an institutional 
theory lens has been proven valuable to explain path (in)dependency of incumbent firms’ 
strategic renewal actions, the role of economic factors in strategic decision-making have 
largely been ignored. Economic factors include, amongst others, economies of scale that 
arise from decreasing costs per unit after an increase in production, sunk costs in past 
investments (e.g. Hannan and Freeman 1977) and resource complementarities through 
network externalities (e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985). In these cases, firms may have 
difficulties to redeploy their resources for alternative purposes (Mahoney 2000). Future 
research could investigate the extent to which firms stick with their current path of 
institutionalised activities after a cost-benefit analysis of alternative strategic options 
(Mahoney 2000).  
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A second theoretical limitation stems from the fact that our theoretical framework 
was geared towards a rather static application of Scott’s (2001) institutional pillars. In the 
context of environmentalism, Hoffman (1999) illustrates the situation in which the three 
institutional pillars were built in the sequential order of regulative, normative and 
cognitive. Hafsi and Zian (2005) studied the transformation of the Chinese electricity 
industry from 1980 to 2002 in three distinct, though intertwined cycles: (1) changes in the 
cultural-cognitive cycle, (2) changes in industrial norms and regulations and (3) changes in 
professional behaviour. Future research should take the temporal dimension of Scott’s 
(2001) institutional pillars into account. For example, if a process of institutional change is 
initiated by regulatory authorities, the regulative pillar is most likely to come first, and the 
normative or cultural-cognitive pillar to come later. We therefore suggest a longitudinal 
analysis that covers a longer time period than the one examined in this study (1999-2004). 
In addition, future research is needed to more precisely investigate how regulative, 
normative and cognitive forces interact (Vermeulen et al. 2007).   
Third, in the context of institutional adaptation mechanisms, our thesis partly fails 
to address how institutional change is translated across levels. Zietsma and Lawrence 
(2005) point out that this brings the relationship between levels into question. Although we 
delve into the issue of how inter-organisational regulative issues impact upon the 
relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic 
renewal, we do not investigate how institutional developments at micro level impact meso 
(or macro) level changes. For example, we analysed institutional entrepreneurship in 
relation to institutional change at organisational unit level without studying the 
implications for the wider organisation or the industry. We advise a co-evolutionary 
perspective (e.g. McKelvey 1997; 2002; Rodrigues and Child 2003; 2008) in future 
research to study a mutual-causal process (Maruyama 1963), in which A influences B and 
B influences A. Case study research (including interviews) seems a more suitable research 
design to inform about how institutional change is translated across levels. 
Having discussed three theoretical limitations, we will now address several 
methodological/empirical issues. First, regarding our database of strategic renewal actions, 
we considered the actions as events that are undertaken independently of previous actions. 
However, firms may think about strategic renewal actions in bundles, or at least undertake 
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a strategic renewal action conditional on previously-chosen actions. Huff et al. (1992: 60) 
emphasise the importance of history in affecting future renewal efforts: “Our overarching 
assumptions are that the interaction between stress and inertia will change over the history 
of renewal efforts, and that the transition from one type of relationship to another will have 
an impact on subsequent levels of stress and inertia and thus on the likely path of further 
renewal efforts”. Our survey results provide some evidence indicating that a unit’s level of 
explorative strategic renewal is contingent upon the degree of exploitative strategic 
renewal. Statistically, treating strategic renewal actions independently of previous actions 
does not seem problematic as homoscedasticity is not an assumption in binary logistic 
regression. Nevertheless, future research may take better advantage of the time-series 
nature of the strategic renewal actions. Specific dates can be obtained from those strategic 
renewal actions that have been extracted from Financial Times articles. Other steps to 
improve or expand the document analysis could tap into the process dimension of a firm’s 
strategic renewal path, e.g. speed of strategic renewal. Speed is important for achieving 
first-mover advantages and putting competitors on the defensive (e.g. Schoonhoven, 
Eisenhardt and Lyman 1990; Stalk 1988). Speed can be measured, for example, by 
investigating the (average) time span between strategic renewal actions in a certain period.  
Second, our main construct has been designed to capture a limited range of 
possibilities: exploitative strategic renewal and explorative strategic renewal. Future 
research could develop more sophisticated measures to take account of multiple alternative 
options or ‘vehicles’ within each strategic renewal category. For example, regarding 
explorative strategic renewal, the alternatives include, among others, new product 
launches, new market entry, and alliances that may lead to new learning and skills (e.g. 
Koza and Lewin 1999).  
A third empirical limitation relates to the weighting of strategic renewal actions. 
Strategic actions can differ extensively in terms of size (e.g. full time employees) or money 
spent. Although weighting strategic seems preferable, this is insufficiently reported across 
annual reports or Financial Times articles. Further, irrespective of strategic action 
weightings, binary logistic regression estimates the probability of highest discrete value 
(exploitation = 1 versus exploration = 0) to occur. Nevertheless future research could 
152
 138 
probably ask informants to assess strategic renewal actions in terms of present or expected 
future value.  
Fourth, throughout this thesis, we considered government policy as an exogenous 
event taking place in the environment of our sample firms (e.g. Fligstein 1996). However, 
it seems very unlikely that none of the sample firms participated in – or even influenced – 
the EU regulatory reform schemes. Especially as our sample companies belong to the 
largest firms in the Northwest European energy industry. In a study of the financial 
services sector, Flier et al. (2003: 2179) illustrate the interaction between strategic renewal 
behaviour of Dutch incumbent ING and changes in the Dutch financial regulatory and 
supervisory structure. Future research should therefore include strategic actions (document 
analysis) or scales (survey research) that express political activity, like lobbying and 
activities directed towards the European Commission.  
Fifth, electricity and gas are treated independently of each other. Although 
findings in table 8.2 point at significant differences between the two sectors, this study 
does not take the blurring boundaries between electricity and gas into account. For 
example, statistics indicate that the amount of natural gas that is used to fuel power stations 
has increased over time (EUROSTAT 2006). Regarding strategic renewal actions in the 
gas sector, future research could control for those gas actions that relate to electricity 
production.     
Sixth, this thesis has its focus on incumbent firms in the European energy 
industry. In response to the implementation of EU regulatory reform schemes, which 
heralded the opening of national markets for electricity and gas, our findings show that 
incumbent energy firms reacted by putting increased emphasis on exploitation, not 
exploration. This suggests that incumbent firms – as opposed to new entrants – may suffer 
from the liability of oldness (Hensmans et al. 2001), meaning difficulties to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Future research could shift the attention to relatively small 
European energy firms (e.g. Fortum from Finland), foreign subsidiaries of incumbent 
energy firms (e.g. RWE Energy Netherlands) or even brand new entrants (e.g. Greenchoice 
in the Netherlands) to investigate whether these firms prefer explorative strategic renewal 
over exploitative strategic renewal. In addition, researchers might study the impact of new 
entrants on elements of institutional change in the energy industry.   
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Seventh, we sent the questionnaires to employees, not unit managers. One reason 
for choosing employees was because several measures contain items that ask for the 
respondent’s assessment of his/her supervisor. However, we recognise that unit managers 
are probably in a better position to inform about issues of exploitative and explorative 
strategic renewal. Targeting employees to inform about independent variables and unit 
managers to assess dependent variables is further beneficial to reduce common method 
bias. In addition, to overcome problems associated with single-informant data, future 
research should make use of multiple questionnaires from organisational units to 
investigate interrater reliability. 
Finally, our research does not delve into the relationship between strategic 
renewal and performance. For example, are certain strategic moves more profitable than 
others? In the short run, do firms (units) with an above average emphasis on exploitative 
strategic renewal outperform firms (units) that score below average on exploitative 
strategic renewal (e.g. March 1991). These illustrative questions could be addressed next 
by including financial performance data. 
 
10.4 Scientific contributions and managerial implications 
 
Scholars can build on our insights to deepen their understanding how institutional theory 
relates to strategic renewal. Practitioners may benefit from our research as we offer a tool 
to detect activities which make up a firm’s strategising in practice (Johnson et al. 2003). 
The document analysis allows identifying how a firm’s strategic actions – in retrospect – 
have contributed to its current resource (and knowledge) base, which gives clues on what 
future strategic renewal actions it might undertake. From the survey findings, managers 
can deepen the understanding of how exploitation and exploration can actually be built 
into an organisation (e.g. Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004). 
 
Scientific contributions 
Scholars can benefit from our multi-level institutional framework which constitutes both 
inter-organisational institutional forces and intra-organisational institutional forces that 
concurrently explain exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. Our multi-level 
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institutional framework complements a rational-actor approach – in which managers 
would decide upon exploitative or explorative strategic renewal actions given the 
cost/benefit conditions at hand – and our statistical findings clarify “what has meaning and 
what actions are possible” (Zucker 1983: 2). 
In the context of our results, it can be argued that the joint outcome of 
environmental selection and firm level adaptation (e.g. Flier et al. 2003; Lewin and 
Volberda 1999) underlies how and to what extent firms balance between exploitation and 
exploration (Sidhu, Volberda and Commandeur 2004). At industry level of analysis, 
findings from hypotheses 1-3 indicate that inter-organisational regulative and normative 
elements act as an external selection environment upon firm level adaptations of 
exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions, which might in turn have an impact 
on the inter-organisational institutional environment (e.g. through mimetic isomorphism). 
At organisational unit level of analysis, findings from hypothesis 5 provide insights how 
environmental selection and firm level adaptation are interrelated in the context of 
regulation. The extent of inter-organisational regulative forces positively moderates the 
relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative strategic 
renewal. As Rodrigues and Child (2008: 17) point out, this “posits a framework of 
analysis, focusing on firms, in which there are ongoing recursive processes linking the 
evolution of institutional and extra-institutional environments with that of the firms 
themselves”.  
Furthermore, scholars can benefit from our quantitative approach to institutional 
theory. Our operationalisation of Scott’s (2001) three institutional pillars (i.e. regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive) at industry level can be applied to other research settings 
as well. Nevertheless, as we did not find a significant positive relationship between the 
degree of sector permeability and the likelihood of explorative strategic renewal actions, 
we advise other potential measures to investigate inter-organisational normative forces. 
Another test of the permeability hypothesis could focus on the opening of sector 
boundaries to completely different stakeholder groups – not competitors – who participate 
in strategic-decision making. D’Aunno et al. (2000) provide some clues here regarding 
issues of private versus public ownership of firms’ assets within an industry. Finally, 
scholars may benefit from our survey scales. Two survey scales have been developed and 
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validated to measure the degree of intra- and inter-organisational regulative forces. In 
addition, the entrepreneurial proclivity measure (Griffith et al. 2006) has been adapted and 
applied at organisational unit level. In this respect, we divert the attention away from the 
individual level so common in institutional entrepreneurship literature (Lounsbury and 
Crumley 2007). 
 
Managerial implications 
In the context of our results, we discuss how issues at country, industry, and firm level 
might affect the strategic agenda of managers at incumbent energy firms. At country level, 
descriptive statistics indicate a significant relationship (p = 0.00) between country and the 
nature of strategic renewal actions. Further, patterns of regulatory reform that were 
presented in chapter 7 suggest a lack of European level playing field. Although factors like 
technological inefficiencies and customer preferences for local attention may also have 
impeded a European level playing field, differences in regulatory conditions have had clear 
implications for the strategic renewal opportunities of our sample firms. Table 10.1 
illustrates how developments at country level impact strategic decision-making of 
managers. 
 
Table 10.1: Managerial implications at country level 
Although regulatory differences between EU countries are diminishing, they have hampered the 
creation of a European level playing field in the period 1999-2004. This has resulted in unequal 
strategic renewal opportunities for managers of firms across different countries. For example, a firm 
from country A, which is relatively late in opening up its market for competition, benefits from a 
regulated home market and can simultaneously explore strategic renewal actions in country B, which 
has already opened up its market for competition. On the other hand, a firm from country B has to 
compete with competitors from country A to defend established positions, but it has not an equal 
opportunity to explore strategic renewal actions in country A.     
 
At industry level, descriptive statistics indicate a significant relationship (p = 0.00) 
between sector and the nature of strategic renewal actions. The likelihood of a strategic 
renewal action being exploration is significantly higher in the electricity sector than in the 
gas sector. Applying more fine-grained binary regression, results from hypotheses 1-3 
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show that firms’ exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions significantly adhere 
to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures in an organisational field. This fits with an 
emergent renewal journey (Volberda et al. 2001a) in which top management and frontline- 
and middle management are essentially passive regarding the environment and strategic 
decision-making is limited to following the rules of the industry. Table 10.2 illustrate how 
a firm’s embeddedness in the institutional environment controls managers in the actual 
realisation of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions. 
 
Table 10.2: Managerial implications at industry level 
First, the more a firm depends on external institutional constituents for resources, the greater the 
likelihood that a strategic renewal action will be exploitation. Similarly, the less a firm depends on 
external institutional constituents for resources, the greater the likelihood that a strategic renewal 
action will be exploration. Second, the higher the degree of permeability, the greater the likelihood 
that a strategic renewal action will be exploitation (and not exploration). Similarly, the lower the 
degree of permeability, the greater the likelihood that a strategic renewal action will be exploration. 
Third, the likelihood of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions is roughly equal across 
incumbent firms in the Northwest European energy industry, which suggests mimetic behaviour. 
 
At firm level, survey findings provide insights how lower managers can renew the 
organisation. Entrepreneurial proclivity appears to be a catalyst of both exploitative and 
explorative strategic renewal at organisational unit level. Further, our findings indicate that 
the degree of hierarchy in decision-making negatively impacts an organisational unit’s 
level of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. These findings are suggestive for 
the facilitated renewal journey (Volberda et al. 2001a), which emphasises an essentially 
active role for lower managers in strategic renewal choices in combination with a 
relatively passive role for top management. In this renewal journey, top management’s role 
is defined as creating an internal selection environment (Burgelman 1994) for promising 
renewal initiatives that originate from lower levels in the organisation. Table 10.3 
illustrates how managers can make use of several organisational design elements to 
influence exploitative and explorative strategic renewal at organisational unit level.  
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Table 10.3: Managerial implications at firm level 
First, the amount of internal rules and procedures, the percentage of employees with the same 
educational background and the degree of interaction between organisational members are all 
positively related to the degree of exploitative strategic renewal. Second, lowering hierarchy in 
decision-making will increase both the degree of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal. 
Third, embedding entrepreneurship in the organisational structure is positively related to the degree of 
exploitative strategic renewal, which is in turn beneficial for explorative strategic renewal.  
 
10.5 Conclusion 
 
How do incumbent firms strategically renew in regulatory environments? Based on the 
assumption that regulation can both constrain and enable a firm’s strategic renewal 
opportunities, this thesis has addressed the research problem of how and to what extent 
incumbent firms undertake strategic renewal actions in pursuit of a competitive advantage. 
First, in the context of inter-organisational regulative forces, it can be argued that 
a position of external dependency cannot bestow firm-specific sources of competitive 
advantage. Following Barney (1986), those strategic renewal actions that require external 
resources cannot be sources of competitive advantage because these are available to all 
competing firms in an organisational field. Further, the costs of acquiring the resources 
equal the economic value they create (Barney 1986). Second, regarding inter-
organisational normative forces, incumbent firms have entered the new competitive 
landscape with essentially the same business model and strategy. Following Porter (1996), 
when firms have the same strategy, competition is all about operational excellence, i.e. 
exploitative strategic renewal. In the short run, firms with an above average emphasis on 
exploitative strategic renewal can outperform competitor firms (e.g. March 1991). 
However, as operational efficiency is aimed at becoming better – not different – 
operational efficiency cannot lead to a sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1996). 
Third, in the context of inter-organisational cognitive forces, our results suggest that firms 
often model their strategy to those of competitor firms. In this respect, an organisation’s 
perceived threat to loose competitive advantage vis-à-vis competitors may outweigh the 
perceived value of an equal or higher competitive advantage (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Fourth, from a neo institutional theory perspective, our results provide insights how 
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environmental selection and firm level adaptation are interrelated in the context of 
regulation. Following Burgelman (1994) and Volberda et al. (2001a), the higher the 
congruence between external selection pressures stemming from the industry and internal 
selection criteria set by top management, the better the selection mechanism guarantees co-
evolution of a firm’s competencies with the sources of competitive advantage in the 
industry. Finally, when applying an institutional entrepreneurship perspective, we find that 
managers of incumbent energy firms are challenged to start ‘thinking strategically’, 
thereby renewing some of their current resource deployments in addition to making a 
credible or legitimate claim on the outside world. Strategic choice theorists (e.g. Child 
1997) presume that (top) managers have latitude in their choice of strategic renewal 
actions and therefore “reverses the assumption of environmental determinism” (Rodrigues 
and Child 2008: 12). Entrepreneurial proclivity appears to be a catalyst of both exploitative 
and explorative strategic renewal choices. Addressing exploitation and exploration 
simultaneously is suggested to obtain superior performance (e.g. Jansen et al. 2008) and 
even underlies a firm’s real source of competitive advantage (Chakravarthy 1997). 
The twin concepts of exploitation and exploration involve a number of complex 
variables and contingencies (Gupta et al. 2006). Applying a multi-level institutional 
framework, our results deepen the insights how processes of exploitative strategic renewal 
and explorative strategic renewal are driven by the concurrent operating of environmental 
selection and firm level adaptation in regulatory environments. As a follow up, future 
research should more precisely investigate how selection and adaptation arguments might 
interact in the context of normative and cognitive issues to further deepen the 
understanding of how institutional theory contributes to strategic renewal.  
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Appendix A: Coding rules document analysis  
 
 
General coding rules 
1. Accept and code a strategic renewal action only if it is explicitly mentioned that the 
action is materialised in the year under review, otherwise skip it. Rumours, 
speculations, etc. are not to be coded.  
2. In case of doubt whether an action should be coded, i.e. is a strategic renewal action, 
do not code. 
3. In case actions are retrieved that do not relate to strategic changes, but that are part of 
daily operations, these are not coded. The same goes for actions that are not aimed at 
expanding activities. 
4. In some instances two (or more) potential renewal actions are addressed in one text 
unit. In case these actions are discussed (or valued) separately, they should be coded 
separately. In case the discussion (or value) of the strategic actions is general, 
implying they fall within the same category, they should be coded as one action.  
5. Strategic actions that are complementary should be coded as a single action. An 
example is obtaining a licence and making use of that licence by establishing a 
branch. Another example would be the takeover of a company and subsequent 
integration of that company into the focal company. 
6. Deciding on dates: first, look for official date of implementation. If not available, 
look for date of agreement/signing of contract. In case the action is detected from an 
FT article, look for newspaper clipping date.  
7. Actions executed by daughter companies in which the parent has majority control 
(higher than or equal to 50%), are considered actions of the parent and should be 
coded. Actions of minority holdings (less than 50%) are not to be coded. 
8. A merger counts as one strategic action. 
9. Obtaining a license is per definition exploration. 
10. In case an action is detected which took place in the period under review, but cannot 
be exactly dated, it should be coded in the year of detection. If an action probably 
took place outside the time period, the action is not coded! 
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11. Cost control/cost cutting programs are coded as exploitation actions. Yearly reports 
on the progress of the cost saving programme are only coded once. 
12. In case reference is made to e.g. ‘streamlining operations’; ‘cost ratio went down’, 
etc., to which no referral is made to a concrete action, this should not be coded. 
13. As a rule of thumb, financial actions such as bonds and warrants issues are not to be 
coded. 
 
Additional coding rules in this study  
14. In line with the research scope, only those strategic actions are retrieved which are 
undertaken in the gas or electricity sector. Actions that relate to heat, cable, 
environmental services, etc. are excluded from the strategic action database. 
15. As the focus is on generation/production, trade and supply, actions that relate to 
infrastructure (e.g. network operations, grid maintenance, etc.) are excluded from the 
strategic action database.  
16. Some major actions (e.g. mergers, takeovers, new structure) are logically followed by 
several smaller activities that relate directly to the major action (e.g. integration, 
restructuring). These actions should not be coded separately as they fall under the 
umbrella of the major action. An example would be the announcement of a new 
organisational structure that involves the creation of relatively autonomous business 
units. 
17. Pure financial actions such as ‘lease and lease back’ constructions are not considered 
to be strategic and are not coded. 
18. Programs or campaigns (e.g. related to advertising or marketing of green electricity) 
will not be coded. 
19. Reorganisations and restructurings at business unit level are not to be coded. 
20. In case an action is not explicitly aimed at exploration, it should be coded as 
exploitation. 
21. In response to general coding rule 10, some actions are only materialised after a 
relatively long period of time after their announcement (e.g. the building of a wind 
park). In these cases, look at the date when the action has become operational.  
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Appendix B: Survey measures and items 
 
 
Exploitative strategic renewal (i.e. exploitative innovation by Jansen et al. 2006) 
We frequently refine the provision of existing products and services 
We regularly implement small adaptations to existing products and services 
We introduce improved, but existing products and services for our local market 
We improve our provision’s efficiency of products and services 
We increase economies of scales in existing markets 
Our unit expands services for existing clients 
 
Explorative strategic renewal (i.e. exploratory innovation by Jansen et al. 2006) 
Our unit accepts demands that go beyond existing products and services 
We invent new products and services  
We experiment with new products and services in our local market 
We commercialise products and services that are completely new to our unit 
We frequently utilise new opportunities in new markets 
Our unit regularly uses new distribution channels 
 
Intra-organisational regulative forces  
Employees in our unit conform to formal rules 
Managers are charged with protocols to improve the efficiency of organisational members   
In our unit, rules and procedures are followed 
Rules, laws and sanctions occupy a central place in our unit 
In our unit, punishment is administered in case of rule violations  
 
Inter-organisational regulative forces  
The impact of regulation and regulators is evident in our industry  
The regulatory agencies assume a very important role 
The legal environment affects many aspects of our business  
Our industry is characterised by numerous regulatory limitations  
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In our industry, written records are kept of every organisations’ performance 
 
Entrepreneurial proclivity (Griffith et al. 2006) 
Managers at our unit encourage the development of innovative strategies, knowing some 
will fail 
Managers at our unit value creative solutions more than the solutions of conventional 
wisdom 
Managers at our unit tend to talk more about opportunities than problems 
Managers at our unit treat most people the same regardless of rank or status 
Managers at our unit typically adopt a very competitive “undo-the-competition” 
Managers at our unit are very aggressive and very competitive 
 
All items are measured on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = 
strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163
 149
Appendix C: Formation of scale intra-organisational regulative forces 
 
 
Quotation Item  
“There were countless occasions when 
miners did things that they would probably 
not have done otherwise, because they felt 
constrained by formal rules and threatened 
by sanctions for non-compliance” (Wicks 
2001: 671). 
Employees in our unit conform to formal 
rules 
  
“Organizational managers are often charged 
with devising protocols to improve the 
accuracy and efficiency of functioning 
between groups” (Elsbach 2002: 42). 
Managers are charged with protocols to 
improve the efficiency of organisational 
members  
  
“This assumption is based on the view that 
organizations function according to their 
formal blueprints: coordination is routine, 
rules and procedures are followed, and 
actual activities conform to the prescription 
of formal structure” (Meyer and Rowan 
1977: 342). 
In our unit, rules and procedures are 
followed   
  
“The hallmark of regulative aspects of 
institutions is in the presence of rules, laws 
and sanctions” (Wicks 2001: 676). 
Rules, laws and sanctions occupy a central 
place in our unit   
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 “… the rules and informal codes are 
sometimes violated and punishment is 
enacted. Therefore, an essential part of the 
functioning of institutions is the costliness 
of ascertaining violations and the severity of 
punishment” (North 1990: 4). 
In our unit, punishment is administered in 
case of rule violations 
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Appendix D: Formation of scale inter-organisational regulative forces  
 
 
Quotation Item  
“The impact of regulation and regulators is 
evident in many industries” (Beardsley et al. 
2005: 95). 
The impact of regulation and regulators is 
evident in our industry  
  
“The role that the regulatory agency 
assumes is very important” (Mahon and 
Murray 1980: 127). 
The regulatory agencies assume a very 
important role  
  
“The existence of a common legal 
environment affects many aspects of an 
organization’s behaviour and structure” 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 67). 
The legal environment affects many aspects 
of our business 
  
“Until the mid-1980s, the European 
financial services sector was characterized 
by significant governmental involvement 
and by numerous institutional and 
regulatory limitations on the domestic, 
cross-border and cross-sector activities of 
financial service firms” (Flier et al. 2001: 
182). 
Our industry is characterised by numerous 
regulatory limitations 
  
“The organization kept a written record of 
everyone’s performance” (Desphandé and 
Zaltman 1982: 27). 
In our industry, written records are kept of 
every organisations’ performance 
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Dutch summary 
 
Hoe beïnvloedt regelgeving het strategische vernieuwingsgedrag van grote gevestigde 
bedrijven? In de veronderstelling dat regelgeving de mogelijkheden voor strategische 
vernieuwing zowel kan beperken als bevorderen, wordt er onderzocht hoe en in welke mate 
grote gevestigde bedrijven in gereguleerde omgevingen exploitatiegerichte dan wel 
exploratiegerichte strategische vernieuwingsacties ondernemen, teneinde een 
concurrentievoordeel te behalen. Exploitatiegerichte strategische vernieuwing omvat 
activiteiten die de huidige resource-allocatie van een bedrijf versterken of optimaliseren, 
terwijl exploratiegerichte strategische vernieuwing betrekking heeft op activiteiten 
waarmee nieuwe bronnen van waardecreatie voor het bedrijf worden gegenereerd. Op basis 
van institutionele theorie wordt een raamwerk met selectie- en adaptatieargumenten 
ontwikkeld en toegepast om het strategische vernieuwingsgedrag van een aantal grote 
gevestigde Europese energiebedrijven te onderzoeken.  
Nieuwe institutionale theorie ligt ten grondslag aan de eerste empirische studie op 
sectorniveau. Op basis van historische documentenanalyse (jaarverslagen, krantenartikelen) 
is een database gecreëerd met 1127 exploitatiegerichte en exploratiegerichte strategische 
vernieuwingsacties van 13 Europese energiebedrijven over de periode 1999-2004. Binaire 
logistische regressieanalyse toont aan dat de inter-organisationele institutionele context een 
significante invloed heeft op zowel exploitatiegerichte als exploratiegerichte strategische 
vernieuwingsacties van bedrijven door regulerende, normatieve en cognitieve krachten.  
Bij de tweede empirische studie wordt een survey-instrument op het niveau van 
organisatie-eenheid ontwikkeld op basis van oude institutionele theorie, neo-institutionele 
theorie en institutionele ondernemerschapsliteratuur. Een belangrijk onderdeel hierbij is de 
ontwikkeling en validatie van twee belangrijke schalen waarmee de mate van interne en 
externe regulering kan worden gemeten. De survey is uitgezet bij twee grote Nederlandse 
energiebedrijven, waarbij informatie is verkregen vanuit 111 organisatie-eenheden. 
Lineaire regressieresultaten laten zien dat de mate van interne regelgeving een positieve 
invloed heeft op exploitatiegerichte strategische vernieuwingsacties. Echter, de sterkte van 
het verband tussen interne regelgeving en exploitatiegerichte strategische 
vernieuwingsacties is afhankelijk van de mate van externe regelgeving. Tot slot blijkt dat 
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‘institutioneel ondernemerschap’ als katalysator fungeert voor zowel exploitatiegerichte als 
exploratiegerichte strategische vernieuwingsacties. Additionele bevindingen tonen echter 
aan dat de mate van exploitatiegerichte strategische vernieuwing de relatie tussen 
‘institutioneel ondernemerschap’ en exploratiegerichte strategische vernieuwingsacties 
medieert. Dit betekent dat exploratiegerichte strategische vernieuwing niet direct een 
gevolg is van ‘institutioneel ondernemerschap’, maar wordt aangestuurd door de mate van 
exploitatiegerichte strategische vernieuwing.  
Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat onze resultaten inzichtelijk maken hoe het 
strategische vernieuwingsgedrag van grote gevestigde bedrijven wordt beïnvloed door een 
complexe interactie van inter- en intra-organisationale institutionele factoren en processen. 
Complementair aan een rationele actorbenadering, waarbij verondersteld wordt dat 
managers in het kader van winstmaximalisatie de beste strategische optie kiezen naar de 
omstandigheden, tonen onze statistische resultaten aan dat managers ook (ogenschijnlijk) 
irrationele strategische vernieuwingsacties ondernemen. Regulatieve, normatieve en 
cognitieve issues uit de inter- en intra-organisationele institutionele context dragen ertoe bij 
dat juist die strategische vernieuwingsacties worden ondernomen waarmee aan de 
verwachtingen van stakeholders wordt voldaan, zelfs als dit een negatief effect heeft op 
concurrentievoordeel. Wetenschappers kunnen voortborduren op onze inzichten hoe 
selectie en adaptatie aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn in de context van regelgeving. 
Vervolgonderzoek is gebaat bij een co-evolutionaire benadering, waarbij nauwkeurig in 
kaart wordt gebracht hoe intra-organisationele institutionele processen leiden tot 
veranderingen in de inter-organisationele institutionele context en vice versa.  
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HOW INTER- AND INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
FORCES INFLUENCE EUROPEAN INCUMBENT ENERGY FIRMS
How do incumbent firms strategically renew in regulatory environments? Assuming that
regulation can both constrain and enable a firm’s strategic renewal opportunities, we
inves tigate how and to what extent incumbent firms undertake exploitative and explorative
strategic renewal actions in order to remain competitive. Exploitative strategic renewal
involves those actions that strengthen or optimise a firm’s current resource deployments,
whereas explorative strategic renewal relates to actions that generate new sources of
value creation for the firm. Based on old institutional theory, new institutional theory,
neo-institutional theory and institutional entrepreneurship literature, a multi-level frame -
work that combines selection and adaptation arguments has been developed and applied
to investigate strategic renewal behaviour of a sample of European energy incumbents. At
industry level of analysis, results show how inter-organisational institutional forces signifi -
cantly impact firms’ choices of exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions through
regulative, normative and cognitive forces. At organisational unit level of analysis, we
find that the extent of intra-organisational regulative forces is positively related to exploi -
tative strategic renewal actions. In addition, entrepreneurial proclivity appears to be a
catalyst of both exploitative and explorative strategic renewal actions. Finally, our results
provide insights how environmental selection and firm level adaptation are interrelated in
the context of regulation. The extent of inter-organisational regulative forces positively
moderates the relationship between intra-organisational regulative forces and exploitative
strategic renewal actions.
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